RELEASE OF DRIED RADIOACTIVE WASTE MATERIALS TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT by KOZLOWSKI, S.D.
Page 3 of 168 of DA05056764 
RPP-20725, Rev. 2 
Release of Dried Radioactive Waste Materials 
Technical Basis Document 
S. D. Kozlowski 
C H Z M H I L L  Hanford Group, Inc. 
Richland, WA 99352 
U.S. Department of Energy Contract DE-AC27-99RL14047 
EDT/ECN: 723091 R1 UC: NIA 
Cost Center: 7G500 Charge Code: 501027 
BgRCode: NIA Total Pages: /&b 
Key Words: Demonstration Bulk Vitr i f icat ion System, DBVS, Dried Waste Release, Dr ied  Waste 
Abstract: T h i s  Technical Basis Report supports the accident analysis associated with the release of dried 
waste from the Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System and reflects the design basis of July, 2006. 
TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process. or service by trade name, 
trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or 
favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors. 
Printed in the United States of America. To obtain copies of this dowment, contact: Document Control Services, 
P.O. Box 950, Mailstop H6-08, Richland WA 99352, Phone (509) 372-2420; Fax (509) 376-4989. 
Release Stamp 
0 7  
Approved For Public Release 
A-6002-767 (REV I) 
Page 4 of 168 of DA05056764 
Tank Farm Contractor (TFC) 
RECORD OF REVISION 
(1) Document Number 
RPP-20725 
Page 1 
I Change Control Record 
Revs,on (3). 
0 
(4) Description of Change - Replace, Add, and Delete Pages 
EDT-821653, Original Issue 
(5) Resp. Engr. (prlnWsign/date) 
J. P. Harris 
ECN-723091-RO, Revised to add scoping 
calculations for radiological and 
toxicological consequences for the 
Contact-Handled Transuranic/Mixed Waste 
Facility. 
ECN-723091-R1, Revised to r e f l e c t  DBVS 
design as of J u l y ,  2006. 
(6) Resp. Mgr. (printlsignldate) 
JM Grigsby  
S. D. Kozlowski 
9/22/05 
JM Grigsby 
9/22/05 
I 
A-6003-835 (0304) 
Page 5 of 168 of DA05056764 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
CONTENTS 
1 . 0 
2.0 
3 . 0 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1-1 
1 .1  PURPOSE ............................................................................................................ 1-1 
1.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION .................................................................... 1-1 
1.2.1 Representative Accidents ......................................................................... 1-1 
1.2.2 Bounding Offsite Accident ...................................................................... 1-5 
1.2.3 Associated Hazardous Conditions ........................................................... 1-6 
1.3 RISK BPJNR\TG METHODOLOGY .................................................................. 1-6 
RISK BIN EVALUATION .............................................................................................. 2-1 
2.1 RELEASE OF DRIED WASTE .......................................................................... 2-1 
2.1.1 Representative Accident 1: Release of Dried Waste During 
Pneumatic Transfer .................................................................................. 2-2 
2.1.2 Release of Dried Waste (Height Greater than 3 m) Due to Small 
Fire-Induced Dryer Superstructure Failure and Subsequent Waste 
Dryer CoIlapse ......................................................................................... 2-8 
2.1.3 Representative Accident 2: Spills and Falls of Dried Waste from 
Beneath the Waste Dryer Outlet (Greater Than 3 m Spill) ...................... 2-9 
2.1.4 Lid Fails to Seal to the In-Container Vitrification Container Due to 
Misalignment or Sealing Lip Damage ................................................... 2-16 
2.1.5 Drop and Spill of Dried Waste From ICV Container Due to 
Interrupted Meit (Less Than 3 m High) ................................................. 2-16 
Representative Accident 3: Filter Failure Due to High 
Temperature ........................................................................................... 2-22 
Filter Failure Due to High Pressure ....................................................... 2-29 
Eight-hour Unfiltered Release ............................................................... 2-30 
CONTROL SELECTION ................................................................................................ 3-1 
3.1 SELECTED CONTROLS FOR THE RELEASE OF DRIED 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE ACCIDENTS ............................................................ 3-1 
3.1.1 Control Selection ..................................................................................... 3-1 
3.1.2 Selected Control Strategies ...................................................................... 3-2 
2.2 FILTRATION FAILURE SCENARIOS ........................................................... 2-22 
2.2.1 
2.2.2 
2.2.3 
4.0 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 4-1 
iii 
Page 6 of 168 of DA05056764 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
APPENDICES 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
R YCONTROL ALLOCATION MEETING ATTENDEES ..................... A-i 
SUPPORTING CALCULATIONS ................................................................................. B-i 
PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS FOR THE DEMONSTRATION BULK 
VITRIFICATION SYSTEM ........................................................................................... C-i 
CONTACT-HANDLED TRANSURANIC MIXED WASTE PACKAGING 
UNIT FACILITY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ D-i 
CONTACT-HANDLED TRANSURANIC MIXED WASTE RISK 
BINNING/CONTROL ALLOCATION MEETING ATTENDEES ................................ E-i 
SUPPORTING CALCULATIONS FOR THE DRIED WASTE RELEASE 
WASTE PACKAGING UNIT .......................................................................................... F-i 
HUMAN FACTORS EVALUATION AND PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS 
PACKAGING UNIT ....................................................................................................... G-i 
ACCIDENT AT THE CONTACT-HANDLED TRANSURANIC MIXED 
FOR THE CONTACT-HANDLED TRANSURANIC MIXED WASTE 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1-1. Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Process Summary. ................................. 1-2 
Figure 1-2. Simplified Off-Gas Flow Diagram. .......................................................................... 1-4 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1-1. Offsite (Toxicological Only) Risk Bins. ................................................................... 1-7 
Table 1-2. Onsite (100 m) Risk Bins. ......................................................................................... 1-8 
Table 1-3. Environmental Consequence Categories. .................................................................. 1-8 
Table 2-1. Risk Binning Results for Dried Waste Releases ....................................................... 2-1 
Table 2-2. Qualitative Evaluation of Analysis Assumptions for a Release of Dried Waste 
During Pneumatic Transfer ...................................................................................... 2-4 
iv 
Page 7 of 168 of DA05056764 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
Table 2-3. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls for the 
Release of Dried Radioactive Waste During Pneumatic Transport. ....................... ,2-7 
Table 2-4. Summary of Toxicological Consequences Without Controls for the Release of 
Dried Radioactive Waste during Pneumatic Transport. ........................................... 2-7 
Table 2-5. Qualitative Evaluation of Analysis Assumptions for a Release of Dried Waste 
from beneath the Waste Dryer Outlet (Greater Than 3 m High) ............................ 2-1 1 
Table 2-6. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls for the 
Spill of Dried Waste from Beneath the Waste Dryer Outlet (Greater Than 
3 m High) ................................................................................................................ 2-15 
Table 2-7. Summary of Toxicological Consequences Without Controls for the Spill of 
Dried Waste from Beneath the Waste Dryer Outlet (Greater Than 3 m High). ..... 2-15 
Table 2-8. Qualitative Evaluation of Analysis Assumptions for a Release of Dried Waste 
Spills and Falls from In-Container Vitrification Container after Interrupted 
Melt (Less Than 3 m High) ................................................................................... .2-18 
Table 2-9. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls for the 
Spill of Dried Waste from In-Container Vitrification Container (Less Than 
3 m High) ................................................................................................................ 2-21 
Table 2-10, Summary of Toxicological Consequences Without Controls for the Spill of 
Dried Waste from In-Container Vitrification Container (Less Than 3 m 
High) ....................................................................................................................... 2-21 
Table 2-1 1. Risk Binning Results for Dried Waste Releases Due to Filtration Failures .......... 2-22 
Table 2-12. Qualitative Evaluation of Analysis Assumptions for a Release of Dried 
Waste Due to Filtration Failures ............................................................................ 2-25 
Table 2-13. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls for the 
Filtration Failure Representative Accident. ........................................................... .2-28 
Table 2-14. Summary of Toxicological Consequences Without Controls for the Filtration 
Failure Representative Accident. ........................................................................... 2-28 
V 
Page 8 of 168 of DA05056764 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
LIST OF TERMS 
AA 
AWTE 
BBI 
CH-TRUM 
cwc 
DBVS 
DST 
DWTS 
ETF 
ERPG 
HEGA 
HEPA 
ICV 
IDF 
IS0 
LERF 
MAR 
OGTS 
PDSA 
Ew 
SCR 
SOF 
ssc 
SST 
TEDF 
TEEL 
TSR 
ULD 
WPU 
analysis assumption 
Ancillary Waste Transfer Enclosure 
Best-Basis Inventory 
Contact-Handled Transuranic Mixed (Waste) 
Central Waste Complex 
Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System 
double-shell tank 
Dried Waste Transfer System 
Effluent Treatment Facility 
Emergency Response Planning Guideline 
high-efficiency gas absorber 
high-efficiency particulate air (filter) 
In-Container Vitrification 
Integrated Disposal Facility 
International Organization for Standardization 
Liquid EMuent Treatment Facility 
material at risk 
Off-Gas Treatment System 
preliminary documented safety analysis (RPP-23429, Preliminary 
Documented Safety Analysis for the Demonstration Bulk 
Vitrification System) 
respirable fraction 
selective catalytic reduction (unit) 
sum of fractions 
structures, systems, and components 
single-shell tank 
Treated Effluent Disposal Facility 
Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit 
technical safety requirement 
unit-liter dose 
Waste Packaging Unit 
vi 
Page 9 of 168 of DA05056764 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PURPOSE 
This technical basis document was developed to support RPP-23429, Preliminary Documented 
Safety Analysis for the Demonstration Bulk Vitrzfication System (PDSA) and RPP-23479, 
Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis for the Contact-Handled Transuranic Mixed 
(CH-TRUM) Waste Facility. The main document describes the risk binning process and the 
technical basis for assigning risk bins to the representative accidents involving the release of 
dried radioactive waste materials from the Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System (DBVS) and 
to the associated represented hazardous conditions. Appendices D through F provide the 
technical basis for assigning risk bins to the representative dried waste release accident and 
associated represented hazardous conditions for the Contact-Handled Transuranic Mixed 
(CH-TRUM) Waste Packaging Unit (WPU). 
The risk binning process uses an evaluation of the frequency and consequence of a given 
representative accident or represented hazardous condition to determine the need for safety 
structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety requirement (TSR)-level 
controls. A representative accident or a represented hazardous condition is assigned to a risk bin 
based on the potential radiological and toxicological consequences to the public and the 
collocated worker. Note that the risk binning process is not applied to facility workers because 
credible hazardous conditions with the potential for significant facility worker consequences are 
considaed for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls regardless of their estimated 
frequency. The controls for protection of the facility workers are described in RPP-23429 and 
RPP-23479. 
Determination of the need for safety-class SSCs was performed in accordance with 
DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear 
Facility Documented Safety Analyses, as described below. 
1.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1.2.1 Representative Accidents 
The DBVS will receive, process and package waste retrieved from single-shell tank (SST) 
241-S-109, located in the 200 West Area. The Waste Retrieval System will retrieve saltcake 
waste from the tank, pretreat the waste through selective dissolution and solifliquid separation, 
and deliver the waste salt solution to the DBVS. The DBVS will combine the waste salt solution 
with glass formers and clean soil, vitrify the salt/glass former mixture and produce a vitrified 
waste package suitable for disposal in an onsite licensed disposal facility. Figure 1-1 
summarizes the demonstration bulk vitrification process. 
1-1 
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Figure 1-1. Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Process Summary. 
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The salt waste solution will be transferred to a waste dryer where it will be mixed with soil and 
small amounts of zirconium dioxide (ZrO2) and boric oxide (BzO,) and dried by evaporation to 
approximately 1 wt % moisture. The dryer product is pneumatically conveyed to one of two 
dried waste receivers located directly above the melt station. The water vapor, gases, and dust 
generated by the mixing and drying processes will be routed to the Off-Gas Treatment System 
(OGTS). 
. ^  
I -L 
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An In-Container Vitrification (ICV)' container will be prepared on site by lining it with 
insulating boards, silica sand, and refractory panels; placing a starter path layer at the bottom of 
the container; and installing the container lid and two electrodes. The container will then be 
moved into place in the melt station and connected to the power supply, feed chutes, 
instrumentation and the OGTS. 
The dried mixture will be fed from the dried waste receivers into the ICV container by means of 
rotary valves. Joule heating will melt the mixture to produce borosilicate glass. The air space in 
the ICV container will be exhausted to the OGTS. 
The OGTS shown in Figure 1-2 will treat the overhead gases from both the waste dryer and the 
ICV container. Components of the OGTS will condense the water vapor in the gases, and will 
remove particulates, acid gases, radionuclides, and toxic chemicals so that the effluent gases will 
meet environmental emission standards. 
The DBVS off-gas treatment filtration system consists of a condenser, a mist eliminator, a heater 
(to lower the relative humidity of the air stream), and two parallel filter trains, each containing a 
prefilter and two 2 ft by 2 ft by 1 ft thick high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters in series. 
The HEPA filters are intended to trap any particulate material coming out of the DBVS OGTS. 
After passing through the HEPA filter system, the off-gas passes through an activated carbon 
filter. The urpose of the carbon filter is to trap any chemically active gaseous material, 
primarily ' %, coming out of the OGTS. Downstream of the carbon filter is a final off-gas 
polishing filter. 
The entire filtration system is designed to handle the OGTS effluent from the entire vitrification 
campaign, Le., the loading and vitrification of approximately 50 containers of waste. 
P 
lCVTM (In Container Vitrification) is a trademark of AMEC Inc., London, England. 
1-3 
Page 12 of 168 of DA05056764 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
1-4 
Page 13 of 168 of DA05056764 
WP-20725 REV 2 
Hazard analysis of the DBVS, described in RPP-23429, identified some hazardous conditions 
that required further analysis. Some of these hazardous conditions were related to postulated 
dried waste releases k m  various areas ofthe DBVS. This document discusses the technical 
basis underlying the assignment of risk category and controls for representative accidents 
involving the release of dried radioactive waste. 
The following three hazardous conditions were selected as representing dried radioactive waste 
release events. Each requires a different set of controls for mitigating the consequences. 
The first representative accident is a structural failure (e.g., breach) of the pneumatic 
transport system resulting in the release of dried radioactive powder to the atmosphere. 
This condition was selected because the energy imparted to the released dried waste by 
the action of the vacuum pump could potentially cause all of the released material to 
become airborne. 
The second representative accident is a breach in the discharge chute beneath the waste 
dryer resulting in a spill of dried waste from a height of approximately 11 ft (3.4 m). 
This accident could be the result of one of several possible causes, including vehicle 
impacts, a seismic or other NPH event, manufacturing defects, or installation errors. 
The third representative accident is release of dried waste caused by a filter that fails 
because of high temperature. This condition bounds the other filtration failures because 
the high temperature potentially releases the ‘*’I on the carbon filter as well as a fraction 
of the material on the HEPA filters. 
1.2.2 Bounding Offsite Accident 
Low-energy ground surface solids release events associated with the dried waste release accident 
have been quantitatively analyzed for comparison to the DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, 
“Evaluation Guideline” of 25 rem to the public. The bounding quantitative analysis for the 
release of dried waste accident is documented in RPP-23429, and shows that offsite radiological 
consequences do not challenge the 25 rem evaluation guideline. Therefore, no safety-class SSCs 
or TSR-level controls for protection of the public need to be considered for offsite radiological 
exposures for any of the low-energy ground surface solidhludge release events. 
It is important to note that DOE-STD-3009-94 does not provide any other evaluation guidelines 
@e., evaluation guidelines are not provided for offsite toxicological, or onsite radiological and 
toxicological exposures). These exposures were evaluated for the representative accidents and 
associated hazardous conditions in accordance with the risk binning methodology described in 
Section 1.3. The results of evaluating the risk to the facility worker are documented in 
RPP-23429. 
1-5 
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1.2.3 Associated Hazardous Conditions 
In addition to the hazardous conditions that define the representative accidents, the hazard 
evaluation database lists other hazardous conditions that are characterized by the representative 
accidents. 
For the release of pneumatically transported dried waste from the Dried Waste Transfer System 
(DWTS) representative accident (due to vehicle impacts, seismic structural failure, 
manufacturing defects, or installation errors), the represented conditions are: 
Small hydraulic fire in hydraulic system skid located in International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) freight container below the waste dryer causes weakening and 
collapse of IS0 freight container support structure resulting in release of dried waste. 
Causes include hydraulic system hose leaks or equipment failures creates a spray of fluid 
that is ignited causing a small fire (blowtorch) under Waste Dryer IS0 freight container 
that fails structural components; too high a hydraulic fluid pressure to waste dryer motor 
and damage to hydraulic hoses or motor casing or seals. 
For the spill from beneath the dryer outlet representative accident, the represented conditions are: 
Free-fall spill from the ICV container resulting in the release of dried radioactive material 
to the atmosphere (various causes). This event involves an ICV box that is being moved 
from beneath the dryer due to receipt of a non-compliant dryer batch. The container is 
subsequently dropped or impacted by a vehicle, resulting in the release of dried 
radioactive material to the atmosphere. 
Failure of the seal between the ICV container and the lid due to misalignment or sealing 
lip damage. 
For the filtration failure representative accident, the represented hazardous conditions are: 
Failure of the off-gas HEPA filters due to high pressure, causing a partial release of the 
waste loading on the filters. 
Unfiltered release due to error during filter maintenance, leakage around a misaligned 
filter or damage to the ductwork. 
1.3 RISK BINNING METHODOLOGY 
Direction on risk binning was provided by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of River 
Protection (Klein and Schepens 2003, “Replacement of Previous Guidance Provided by RL and 
ORP”). Risk binning begins with a qualitative evaluation of the frequency and consequence of 
the representative accident. Frequency is qualitatively estimated as “anticipated,” “unlikely,” 
“extremely unlikely,” or “beyond extremely unlikely.” Consequences are evaluated for the 
following receptors and exposures: offsite toxicological, onsite radiological, and onsite 
toxicological. These consequences are assigned to one of three levels: high, moderate, or low. 
1-6 
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Based on the frequency and consequence, risk bins (ranging from I to IV) are assigned. 
Tables 1-1 and 1-2 show the criteria for assigning the frequency and consequence levels, and the 
risk bins, which are assigned to the various combinations of frequency and consequence. After 
the risk binning process is completed for the representative accident, the process is then repeated 
for the represented hazardous conditions associated with the representative accident. 
In accordance with the control selection guidelines in Klein and Schepens (2003), Risk Bin I 
events require safety-significant SSCs or TSRs, and Risk Bin I1 events must consider 
safety-significant SSCs and TSRs. Risk Bin 111 events are generally protected by the safety 
management programs, and Risk Bin IV events do not require additional measures. 
IV 
< ERPG-I / TEEL-1 
(Low) 
Table 1-1. Offsite (Toxicological Only) Risk Bins. 
IV 111 I11 
Consequence category 
(toxicological only*) 
- >ERPG-2 I TEEL-2 
(High) 
ZERPG-I I TEEGl  to 
<ERPG-2 I TEEG2 
(Moderate) 
I Event freauencv I 
Safety SSCs and/or TSR-level controls consideredrequired. 
I I No further consideration for safety SSCs and/or TSR-level controls. 
* Radiological consequences for the offsite receptor are evaluated in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, 
2002, Preparation Guide for  US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, 
Change Notice No. 2, Appendix A, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington D.C. 
ERPG = emergency response planning guideline. TEEL = Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit. 
SSC = structures, systems, and components. TSR = technical safety requirement. 
1-7 
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<25 rem 
<ERPG-2 I TEEL-2 
(Low) 
Table 1-2. Onsite (100 m) Risk Bins. 
IV IV I11 111 
Cateeorv 
>ERPG-3 I TEEL-3 
<ERPG-3 / TEEL-3 
Definition 
E3 
E2 
El  
EO 
Safety SSCs and/or TSR-level controls consideredkequired. 
Offsite discharge or discharge to groundwater 
Significant discharge onsite 
Localized discharge 
No significant environmental conseauence 
I I No further consideration for safety SSCs and/or TSR-level controls. 
ERF'G = emergency response planning guideline. TEEL = Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit. 
SSC = structures, systems, and components. TSR = technical safety requirement. 
Environmental consequences are also assigned during the risk binning process. There are four 
categories of environmental consequences (EO, El ,  E2, and E3, in order of increasing severity) 
and these categories are defined in Table 1-3. 
1-8 
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2.0 RISK BIN EVALUATION 
2.1 RELEASE OF DRIED WASTE 
During several Process and HazardOperability Analysis and control decision meetings, 
consensus was obtained on the assignment of frequencies, consequences, and controls. The 
meeting attendees represented a wide range of expertise in the areas of engineering, licensing, 
and operations. Appendix A lists the meeting attendees. The risk binning results for scenarios 
considered in this document are shown in Table 2-1. 
Scoping calculations were performed to support the assignment of consequence bins. These 
calculations are presented in Appendix B. The risk binning results are shown in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1. Risk Binnine Results for Dried Waste Releases. (2 sheets) 
I I Consc iences Risk bin 
Postulated accident 
Release of pneumatically transported dried 
radioactive waste due to vehicle impacts, 
seismic structural failure, manufacturing 
defects, or installation errors (representative 
L H I 
Spills and falls of dried radioactive waste 
from the bottom of the dryer outlet, a height 
of approximately 11 ft (representative 
accident 2; various causes) 
Small fire (e.g., resulting from vehicle 
impacf or hydraulic system leak) that 
causes weakening and failure of the waste 
dryer steel superstructure resulting in a fall 
of dried waste from greater than 3 m 
(represented accident). 
U 
U 
L 
- 
L 
L 
- 
L 
H 
- 
H 
111 
- 
III 
I11 
- 
I11 
I 
- 
I 
L H 111 I11 I 
- 
1 
Lid fails to seal to the ICV container due to 
misalignment or sealing lip damage 
(represented accident) 
Off-gas system filtration failures 
(representative accident 3) 
L M 111 111 
- 
III 
- 
L M I 
- 
2-1 
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Table 2-1. Risk Binning Results for Dried Waste Releases. ( 2  sheets) 
Postulated accident 
Notes: 
A = anticipated. 
Et =high. 
L =low. 
M =moderate. 
U = unlikely. 
E2 = significant discharge onsite 
ICV = In-Container Vitrification. 
2.1.1 Representative Accident 1: Release of Dried 
Waste During Pneumatic Transfer 
2.1.1.1 Accident Scenario 
As part of the DBVS waste processing system, waste will be mixed with clean soil and glass 
formers and dried before being pneumatically conveyed to the dried waste receiver for eventual 
delivery to the ICV container for vitrification. In this accident scenario, there is a failure of the 
pneumatic transfer line downstream of the vacuum pump during transport of the waste. The 
result is release of the dried material to the atmosphere. It is conservatively assumed that there is 
no confinement and the solids move as a free-ff owing powder. 
2.1 .I .2 Frequency Determination 
Failure of the pneumatic transfer line could be the result of one of several possible causes, 
including vehicle impacts, a seismic event, manufacturing defects, or installation errors. The 
design basis earthquake has a return period that puts it in the “unlikely” frequency range. 
Failures due to manufacturing defects or installation errors are judged to be “unlikely” because 
the equipment will be new, and the facility has a limited operating life. Additionally, all systems 
will be tested during startup with non-hazardous materials prior to operating with the tank waste. 
Even though vehicle accidents are considered anticipated events, the portion of the transfer line 
downstream of the vacuum pump is in a location that is relatively inaccessible by vehicle traffic. 
Therefore, the event was assigned a frequency bin of “unlikely.” 
2.1.1.3 Consequence Determination 
To provide an estimate of the radiological and toxicological consequences, scoping calculations 
were performed and are documented in Appendix B. The accident scenario, without controls, 
2-2 
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assumes that during transport of the dried waste mixture the pneumatic transfer line fails. The 
waste is released to the atmosphere. 
The release is assumed to contain a complete waste dryer batch (7,040 kg) of dried waste 
mixture. A batch of waste mixture will consist of SST 241-S-109 salt solution mixed with soil 
and subsequently dried. It is assumed that the liquid waste entrains as much as 0.25 wt% of 
sludge. Undiluted waste is assumed as feed to the waste dryer even though an overall fresh 
water dilution factor of 3.37:l is expected. 
The radiological unit-liter doses (ULD) and toxicological sum of fraction (SOF) multipliers for 
SST 241 -S-109 waste were taken from RPP-CALC-30596, Demonstration Bulk Vitrification 
System Accident Analysis Source Terns. The atmospheric dispersion factors are from 
RPP- 13482, Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficients and Radiological and Toxicological Eqosure 
Methodology for Use in Tank Farms, and the airborne release fraction, respirable fraction, and 
airborne release rate are from DOE-HDBK-3010-94, Airborne Release Fractions/Rutes and 
Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. 
A complete list of the analysis assumptions is presented in Table 2-2. The table includes, for 
each assumption, information on the potential effect of changes in the assumption, and the need 
to evaluate or protect the assumption. 
2.1.1.3.1 Assignment of Consequence Bins 
Although the evaluation of consequences was intended to be qualitative, there were no previous 
analyses of releases of dried radioactive waste powder to provide a frame of reference for the 
qualitative judgment. Therefore the consequences were estimated by scoping calculations as 
shown in Appendix B. 
Tables 2-3 and 2-4 compare the calculated consequences of the representative accident to the 
radiological and toxicological risk evaluation guidelines. The onsite radiological consequences 
for the release from the DWTS were below the 2.5 rem “moderate” consequence guideline; 
therefore, they were assigned to a consequence bin of ‘‘Iow.” The SOF for the offsite 
toxicological consequences was 0.56, below the “moderate” consequence guideline. Therefore, 
they were assigned to the “low” consequence bin. The onsite toxicological consequences 
exceeded both the moderate and high consequence guidelines, thus they were assigned to a 
‘‘higkf consequence bin. 
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Onsite 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
Offsite 
Table 2-3. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Release of Dried Radioactive Waste During Pneumatic Transport. 
consequence 
SOF Guideline 
Case 
consequence consequence come 
SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF 
I I 
Onsite radiological consequences 
Moderate 
consequence 
guideline 
(rem) 
High consequence 
guideline 
(rem) 
Catcutated dose 
(rem) 
3.4 25 100 I I Release of pneumatically transuorted dried radioactive waste I 
Table 2-4. Summary of Toxicological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Release of Dried Radioactive Waste during Pneumatic Transport. 
Case 
pneumatically 
transported 
dried 
radioactive 
Notes: 
Moderate [ High 1 Moderate 1 High I 
uence 
SOF = sumoffractions. 
2.1.1.3.2 Assignment of Environmental Consequences 
An environmental consequence of E2 was assigned because a discharge of approximately 
7,040 kg of powder was judged to be a significant onsite discharge. 
2.1.1.3.3 Assignment of Risk Bins 
Table 2-1 summarizes the frequency, consequence, and risk bin assignments for the release of 
dried waste during pneumatic transfer representative accident. The assignment of risk bins is 
derived from the consequences and estimated frequency of the accident. The risk bin for the 
offsite toxicological receptor is I11 because the consequence is “low” and the estimated 
frequency is “unlikely.” The risk bin for the onsite toxicological receptor is I because the 
consequence is ‘‘high’’ and the estimated frequency is “unlikely.” The onsite radiological risk 
bin is 111 due to the “low” consequences and “unlikely” frequency. 
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2.1.1.4 Associated Hazardous Conditions 
The results of the risk binning process for the hazardous conditions covered by the representative 
accidents in this document are contained within the hazard evaluation database. The hazard 
evaluation database includes the basis for each consequence and frequency. Consensus was 
reached by the risk binning team that all the represented hazardous conditions were bounded by 
the representative accidents. 
The risk binning team considered the process design as well as the consmatisms in the analysis 
when assigning consequence and fkequency bins to the other represented hazardous conditions. 
The results are presented with the representative accidents in Table 2-1, and are discussed below. 
2.1.2 Release of Dried Waste (Height Greater than 
3 m) Due to Smali Fire-Induced Dryer 
Superstructure Failure and Subsequent Waste 
Dryer Collapse 
2.1.2.1 Accident Scenario 
In this scenario, a small fire (e.g., resuIting fiom a vehicle impact or a hydraulic system leak) 
causes weakening and failure of the steel superstructure supporting the waste dryer resulting in a 
collapse of the waste dryer and a subsequent fall of dried waste from greater than 3 m. 
2.1.2.2 Frequency Determination 
The frequency was judged to be ”unlikely” based on RPP-30361, Technical Basis for DRYS 
Fires and Explosions, which qualitatively determined that the frequency of a leak or crack 
developing in the hydraulic system, and the leak making contact with a source of ignition, is 
“unlikely.” 
2.1.2.3 Consequence Determination 
The consequences for this scenario were conservatively estimated to be the same as for the 
release during pneumatic transfer accident. The onsite radiological and offsite toxicological 
consequences were estimated to be “low.” The onsite toxicological consequences were 
estimated to be “high.” 
2.1.2.4 Risk Bin Results Without Controls 
Table 2-1 summarizes the frequency, consequences, and risk bin without controls for this 
postulated dried waste release accident. An “unlikely” frequency and “high” consequence 
results in this scenario being categorized as Risk Bin I for onsite toxicological consequences. 
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2.1.3 Representative Accident 2: Spills and Falls of 
Dried Waste from Beneath the Waste Dryer 
Outlet (Greater Than 3 m Spill) 
2.1.3.1 Accident Scenario 
Dried waste mixture is discharged from the dryer through a remotely controlled valve 
(33-YV-013) to the Dried Waste Handling System. Initiation of the transfer of dry waste feed to 
the ICV System is performed when the dried waste is at the right target moisture. Valve 
33-YV-013 is opened and material is released into the discharge chute below the dryer. This 
condition can occur when there is a breach of confinement that allows the waste to be spilled 
from the discharge chute beneath the dryer outlet. For the release from beneath the waste dryer, 
because of the fall height (approximately 1 I ft or 3.4 m), it is assumed, that the entire material at 
risk becomes airborne. 
2.1.3.2 Frequency Determination 
This failure could be the result of one of several possible causes, including vehicle’impacts, a 
seismic event, manufacturing defects, or installation errors. The design basis earthquake has a 
return period that puts it in the “unlikely” frequency range. Failures due to manufacturing 
defects or installation errors are judged to be “unlikely” because the equipment will be new, and 
all systems will be tested during startup with non-hazardous materials prior to operating with the 
tank waste. Therefore, the event was assigned a frequency bin of “unlikely.” 
2.1.3.3 Consequence Determination 
To provide an estimate of the radiological and toxicological consequences, scoping calculations 
were performed and are documented in Appendix B. The accident scenario, without controls, 
assumes that during transport of the dried waste mixture from the waste dryer to the ICV 
container, there is a breach in the discharge chute beneath the waste dryer. The dried waste is 
spilled on the ground or other hard surface from a height greater than 3 m. 
The release is assumed to contain a complete waste dryer batch (7,040 kg) of dried waste 
mixture. A batch of waste mixture will consist of SST 241-S-109 salt solution mixed with soil 
and subsequently dried. It is assumed that the liquid waste entrains as much as 0.25 wt% of 
sludge. Undiluted waste is assumed as feed to the waste dryer even though an overall fresh 
water dilution factor of 3.37:1 is expected. 
The radiological ULDs and toxicological SOF multipliers for the dried and processed SST 
241 4-109 waste were taken from RPP-CALC-30596. The atmospheric dispersion factors are 
from RPP-I 3482, and the airborne release fraction, respirable fraction, and airborne release rate 
are from DOE-HDBK-3010-94. 
A complete list of the analysis assumptions is presented in Table 2-5. The table includes, for 
each assumption, information on the potential effect of changes in the assumption, and the need 
to evaluate or protect the assumption. 
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2.1.3.3.1 Assignment of Consequence Bins 
Although the evaluation of consequences was intended to be qualitative, scoping calculations 
were used to provide a frame of reference for the qualitative judgment. Results of the scoping 
calculations are shown in Appendix B. 
Tables 2-6 and 2-7 compare the calculated consequences of the represented accident to the 
radiological and toxicological risk evaluation guidelines. The onsite radiological consequences 
for the fall or drop of dried waste from beneath the waste dryer outlet (greater than 3 m high) 
were below the 25 rem “moderate” consequence guideline; therefore, they were assigned to a 
consequence bin of ‘‘low.’’ The onsite toxicological consequences were above the “high” 
consequence guideline. Therefore, they were assigned to the “high” consequence bin. The 
offsite toxicological consequences are below the moderate consequence guidelines, thus they 
were assigned io a “low” consequence bin. 
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Case 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
High consequence 
guideline 
(rem) 
Moderate 
consequence 
guideline 
(rem) 
Calculated dose 
(rem) 
Table 2-6. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Spill of Dried Waste from Beneath the Waste Dryer Outlet (Greater Than 3 m High). 
Spill and drop of dried waste from 
(greater than 3 m) 
beneath the waste dryer outlet 
Onsite radiological consequences I 
0.73 25 100 
Case 
Toxicological Consequences 
Onsite Offsite 
Moderate High Moderate High 
Table 2-7. Summary of Toxicological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Spill of Dried Waste from Beneath the Waste Dryer Outlet (Greater Than 3 m High). 
consequence 
SOF Guideline 
Spiil and drop 
of dried waste 
from beneath 
the waste dryer 
outlet (greater 
than 3 m) 
152 1 
Consequence consequence consequence 
SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF Guideline 
1 _ _  9.7 1 2.2E-02 1 
2.1.3.3.2 Assignment of Environmental Consequences 
An environmental consequence of E2 was assigned because a discharge of approximately 
7,040 kg of powder was judged to be a significant onsite discharge. 
2.1.3.3.3 Assignment of Risk Bins 
Table 2-1 summarizes the frequency, consequence, and risk bin assignments for the release of 
dried radioactive waste representative accidents. The assignment of risk bins is derived from the 
consequences and estimated frequency of the accident. The onsite radiological risk bin is 111 due 
to the *‘low’’ consequences and “unlikely” frequency. The risk bin for the onsite toxicological 
receptor is I because the consequence is “high” and the estimated frequency is “unlikely.” The 
risk bin for the offsite toxicological receptor is 111 because the consequence is “low” and the 
estimated frequency is “unlikely.” 
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2.1.3.4 Associated Hazardous Conditions 
The results of the risk binning process for the hazardous conditions covered by the representative 
accidents in this document are contained within the hazard evaluation database. The hazard 
evaluation database includes the basis for each consequence and frequency. Consensus was 
reached by the risk binning team that all the represented hazardous conditions were bounded by 
the representative accidents. 
The risk binning team considered the process design as well as the consenratisms in the analysis 
when assigning consequence and frequency bins to the other represented hazardous conditions. 
The results are presented with the representative accidents in Table 2-1, and are discussed below. 
2.1.4 Lid Fails to Seal to the In-Container Vitrification 
Container Due to Misalignment or Sealing Lip 
Damage 
2.1.4.1 Scenario 
This scenario postulates that dried material could leak from the ICV container during processing 
if the seal between the container and the Ancillary Waste Transfer Enclosure (AWTE) were 
compromised. 
2.1.4.2 Frequency Determination 
This condition would likely be due to human error. Therefore, a frequency bin of “anticipated” 
was assigned. 
2.1.4.3 Consequence Determination 
No quantification of consequences of this scenario was made. Leakage, if any, from the gap 
between the container and the AWTE is expected to be bounded by the scenarios previously 
discussed. Therefore, the consequence bins assigned were assigned based on the spills and falls 
of dried waste from beneath the dryer outlet representative accident. The onsite radiological and 
the offsite toxicological bins are ‘‘low.’’ The onsite toxicological consequence bin is qualitatively 
assigned to be “moderate” because it is not expected that the release rate of material from the 
leak between the ICV and the AWTE would be as high as for the dryer outlet release accident. 
2.1.5 Drop and Spill of Dried Waste From ICV 
Container Due to Interrupted Melt (Less Than 
3 m High) 
2.1.5.1 Accident Scenario 
This condition can occur when a non-compliant batch is received fiom the waste dryer causing 
the melt to stop and the ICV container must be moved from the melt area. The top of the ICV 
container is at a height of approximately 11 fi. This spill is assumed to occur when the container 
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tips over or is dropped during movement of the ICV to the container storage area. The release is 
therefore assumed to occur at a height within 3 m of the ground. Conservative assumptions 
include, three dryer batches involved in the spill, and none of the waste being vitrified. The 
waste drop would result in the generation of dust as well as a small amount of material 
suspension due to air movement. 
2.1.5.2 Frequency Determination 
This event could be the result of one of several possible causes, including vehicle impacts, a 
seismic event, manufacturing defects, or installation errors. The design basis earthquake has a 
return period that puts it in the “unlikely” frequency range. Failures due to manufacturing 
defects or installation errors are judged to be “unlikely” because the equipment will be new, and 
all systems will be tested during startup with non-hazardous materials prior to operating with the 
tank waste. Therefore, the event was assigned a frequency bin of “unlikely.” 
2.1.5.3 Consequence Determination 
To provide an estimate of the radiological and toxicological consequences, scoping calculations 
were performed and are documented in Appendix B. The accident scenario, without controls, 
assumes that during transport of the ICV container to the storage area, there is a breach in the 
container due to events identified above. The dried waste is spilled on the ground or other hard 
surface. 
The release is assumed to contain three complete waste dryer batches (7,040 kg) of dried waste 
mixture. The dried waste is assumed to contain no liquids. 
The radiological ULDs and toxicological SOFs for the dried waste (stream 8) waste were taken 
from RPP-CALC-30596. The atmospheric dispersion factors are from RPP-13482, and the 
airborne release fraction, respirable fraction, and airborne release rate are from 
DOE-HDBK-3010-94. 
A complete list of the analysis assumptions is presented in Table 2-8. The table includes, for 
each assumption, information on the potential effect of changes in the assumption, and the need 
to evaluate or protect the assumption. 
2.1.5.4 Assignment of Consequence Bins 
Although the evaluation of consequences was intended to be qualitative, consequences were 
estimated by scoping calculations as shown in Appendix B. 
Tables 2-9 and 2-1 0 compare the calculated consequences of the representative accident to the 
radiological and toxicological risk evaluation guidelines. The onsite radiological consequences 
for the fall or drop of dried waste from an ICV container (less than 3 m high) were below the 
25 rem “moderate” consequence guideline; therefore, they were assigned to a consequence bin of 
“low.” The onsite toxicological consequences were above the “high” consequence guideline. 
Therefore, they were assigned to the “high” consequence bin. The offsite toxicological 
consequences are below the moderate consequence guidelines, thus they were assigned to a 
“low” consequence bin. 
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Onsite radiological consequences 
Moderate 
consequence High consequence Calculated dose 
Table 2-9. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Spill of Dried Waste from In-Container Vitrification Container (Less Than 3 m High). 
2.1 E-02 Spill and drop of dried waste from 
ICV container (less than 3 m high) 25 100 
Case 
Spill and drop 
of dried waste 
from ICV 
container (less 
than 3 m high) 
Table 2- 10. Summary of Toxicological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Spill of Dried Waste from In-Container Vitrification Container 
(Less Than 3 m High). 
Toxicological Consequences 
Onsite Offsite 
Moderate High Moderate High 
consequence consequence consequence consequence 
SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF Guideline 
1 __ 144.4 1 9.2 1 0.65 1 
2.1.5.5 Assignment of Environmentai Consequences 
An environmental consequence of E2 was assigned because a discharge of approximately 
7,040 kg of powder was judged to be a significant onsite discharge. 
2.1.5.6 Assignment of Risk Bins 
Table 2-1 summarizes the frequency, consequence, and risk bin assignments for the release of 
dried radioactive waste representative accidents. The assignment of risk bins is derived from the 
consequences and estimated frequency of the accident. The onsite radiological risk bin is I11 due 
to the “low” consequences and “unlikely” frequency. The risk bin for the onsite toxicological 
receptor is I because the consequence is “high” and the estimated frequency is “unlikely.” The 
risk bin for the offsite toxicological receptor is 111 because the consequence is “low” and the 
estimated frequency is “unlikely.” 
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2.2 FlLTRATION FAILURE SCENARIOS 
During several Process and HazardOperability Analysis and control decision meetings, 
consensus was obtained on the assignment of frequencies, consequences, and controls. Scoping 
calculations were performed to support the assignment of consequence bins. These calculations 
are presented in Appendix B. The risk binning results for the filtration failure scenarios are 
shown in Table 2-1 1. 
Table 2-1 1. Risk Binning Results for Dried Waste Releases Due to Filtration Failures. ~. . ..... 
Consel ences I Risk bin +
c 
9 
e! 'B 
2 s  
0 %  e 
- 0  Postulated accident Frequency 
Release of radioactive and hazardous 
material from DBVS OGTS filters due to 
over temperature event. Includes 8-hr 
unfdtered release through failed filters 
(reoresentative accident 3). i 
El  
L L M I11 
I_ 
111 
I A 
Release of radioactive and hazardous 
material from DBVS OGTS filters due to 
over pressure event. Includes 8-hr 
unfiltered release through failed filters 
(associated accident). 
L L M A I 
Unfiltered release of radioactive and 
hazardous material from DBVS OGTS due 
to failure of filters or seals. The onsite and 
offsite receptors are assumed to be exposed 
for 8 hr (associated accident). 
L L M 
__ 
A I 
- 
Notes: 
A = anticipated. L = low. 
DBVS= De&nstration Bulk Vitrification System. M = moderate. 
E 1 = localized discharges of hazardous material. OGTS = Off-Gas Treatment System. 
2.2.1 Representative Accident 3: Filter Failure Due to 
High Temperature 
2.2.1.1 Accident Scenario 
In this scenario the OGTS HEPA filters (and prefilters) faiI due to high temperature causing a 
partial release of the maximum waste loading on the filters. This is followed by an 8-hr 
unfiltered release from the DBVS at the maximum exhauster flow rate. 
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2.2.1.2 Frequency Determination 
The HEPA over temperature accident may occur as a result of a ventilation system heater failure 
or an extemaI fire. These potential accident initiators are assigned an "anticipated"' frequency. 
2.2.1.3 Consequence Determination 
To provide an estimate of the radiologicai and toxicological consequences, scoping calculations 
were performed and are documented in Appendix 3. The accident scenario, without controls, 
assumes that during operation of the DBVS the HEPA filters fail due to a high temperature 
event. The waste is released to the atmosphere. 
For purposes of this analysis, a bounding case was assumed that takes no credit for the OGTS 
and assumes maximum continuous releases from the ICV. The highest particulate release rates 
from the ICV occur during the loading process where dried waste is being added to the 
vitrification container from a dry waste receiver. During this operation, a fraction of the dried 
feed is expected to enter the off-gas system as a fine dust. During normal operation, this dust 
will be caught by sintered metal filters, recycled back to the waste dryer, and then back to the 
vitrification container feed. For the bounding filtration failure analysis, it is assumed that the 
dust effluent from the vitrification container feed operation proceeds directly to the final HEPA 
filters for the duration of the accident. The HEPA filters are assumed to be plugged with dust 
from the vitrification container feed operation. 
The maximum loading on each HEPA filter is assumed to be 1 L of solids based on filter 
plugging (i.e. high AP and low flow rate). The load on each of the two prefilters is assumed to 
be 10% of the load on a HEPA filter and one HEPA load of waste is assumed to be plated out 01 
trapped within the ductwork, heater, etc. upstream of the filters. The total load of waste within 
the particulate filter system (two prefilters, four HEPA filters, and one duct) subject to release is 
therefore assumed to be 5.2 HEPA loads or 5.2 L of dried solids. 
Any '291 associated with the dust coming out of the Vitrification container loading operation will 
be trapped by the HEPA filters. The gaseous 1291 loading on the activated carbon filter will 
originate primarily in the melting process. No credit is taken for removal of '291 by the off-gas 
scrubber system when estimating the loading on the carbon filter. Although the '*')I emissions 
from the vitrification operation are minor compared to the other components, the ''7 loading on 
the carbon filter is treated separately in the calculation of filter release due to high temperature. 
In the release due to high temperature case the carbon filter is assumed to release 100% of its 
Ioad of Iz9I (as opposed to 0.01% for the particulates on the HEPA filters) and so the Iz9I has 
some importance. The total lz9I release per container processed with no credit for the off-gas 
scrubber system is 2.15 E-03 Ci (stream 21 in Appendix H of RPP-20528, Demonstration Bulk 
Vitr?fication System Flowsheet). The carbon filter is assumed to be loaded with a total 1291 
inventory equivalent to the releases ffom the vitrification of 100 containers of waste 
(approximately twice the number expected to be processed), or 2.15 E-01 Ci. [2.15 E-31 ICV x 
100 ICVS] 
The radiological ULDs and toxicological SOF multipliers for the dried waste (stream 8) were 
taken from RPP-CALC-30596. The atmospheric dispersion factors are from RPP-13482, and the 
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airborne release fraction, respirable fraction, and airborne release rate are from 
DOE-HDBK-3010-94. 
A compfete list of the analysis assumptions is presented in Table 2-12. The tabIe includes, for 
each assumption, information on the potential effect of changes in the assumption, and the need 
to evaluate or protect the assumption. 
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Temperature 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
Moderate 
consequence 
guideline 
High consequence 
guideline Calculated dose 
(rem) (rem) (rem) 
5.0 E-01 25 100 
2.2.1.3.1 Assignment of Consequence Bins 
Although the evaluation of consequences was intended to be qualitative, the consequences were 
estimated with scoping calculations as shown in Appendix B. 
Tables 2-16 and 2-17 compare the calculated consequences of the representative accident to the 
radiological and toxicological risk evaIuation guidelines. The onsite radiological consequences 
for the release from the OGTS fiitration failure were below the 25 rem “moderate” consequence 
guideline; therefore, they were assigned to a consequence bin of “low.” The offsite toxicological 
consequences were below the “moderate” consequence guideline and were assigned to a 
consequence bin of ‘‘low.” The onsite toxicological consequences were above the “moderate” 
consequence guideline but below the “high” consequence guideline, thus they were assigned to a 
“moderate” consequence bin. 
Case 
Filter Failure 
Temperature 
Due to High 
Table 2-13. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Filtration Failure Representative Accident. 
Onsite radiological conseauences 
Toxicological Consequences 
Onsite Offsite 
consequence consequence consequence consequence 
Moderate High Moderate High 
SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF Guideline 
1.6 1 0.10 1 7.2 E-03 1 1.1 E-03 1 
Table 2-14. Summary of Toxicological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Filtration Failure Representative Accident. 
2.2.1.3.2 Assignment of Environmental Consequences 
An environmental consequence of E l  was assigned because it is expected that the filtration 
failure releases will be localized. 
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2.2.1.3.3 Assignment of Risk Bins 
Table 2- 1 1 summarizes the frequency, consequence, and risk bin assignments for the filtration 
failure representative accident. The assignment of risk bins is derived from the consequences 
and estimated frequency of the accident. The risk bin for the onsite radiological and offsite 
toxicological receptors is I11 because the consequences are “low” and the estimated frequency is 
“anticipated.” The risk bin for the onsite toxicological receptor is I because the consequence is 
“moderate” and the estimated frequency is “anticipated.” 
2.2.1.4 Associated Hazardous Conditions 
The results of the risk binning process for the hazardous conditions covered by the representative 
accidents in this document are contained within the hazard evaluation database. The hazard 
evaluation database includes the basis for each consequence and frequency. Consensus was 
reached by the risk binning team that all the represented hazardous conditions were bounded by 
the representative accidents. 
The risk binning team considered the process design as well as the conservatisms in the analysis 
when assigning consequence and frequency bins to the other represented hazardous conditions. 
The results are presented with the representative accident in Table 2-1 1, and are discussed below. 
2.2.2 Filter Failure Due to High Pressure 
2.2.2.1 Accident Scenario 
The HEPA filters fail due to an overpressure event causing a partial release of the maximum 
waste loading on the filters. This is followed by an 8-hr unfiltered release from the DBVS at the 
maximum exhauster flow rate. 
2.2.2.2 Frequency Determination 
The HEPA over pressure accident is similar to an event believed to have occurred in the past 
when a filter became saturated with moisture and was subsequently damaged when the 
ventilation fans were turned on. The unfiltered release path could occur from several causes, 
including human error during filter maintenance. Therefore, the event is assigned a frequency of 
“anticipated.” 
2.2.2.3 Consequence Determination 
The consequences of the filter failure due to overpressure are the same as the consequences of 
filter failure due to high temperature. The 8-hr release following filter failure dominates the 
consequences. Therefore, the onsite radiological consequences and the offsite toxicological 
consequences were assigned to the “low” consequence bin. The offsite toxicological 
consequences were assigned to the “moderate” consequence bin. 
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2.2.3 Eight-hour Unfiltered Release 
2.2.3.1 Scenario 
An 8-hr unfiltered release occurs at the maximum exhauster flow rate due to an error during filter 
maintenance, gross leakage around a misaligned filter, or damage to the ductwork. This release 
is also included in the first two scenarios, but in this third scenario there is no release from the 
filters themselves. 
2.2.3.2 Frequency Determination 
The unfiltered release path could occur from several causes, including human error during filter 
maintenance. Therefore, the event was assigned to the “anticipated” frequency bin. 
2.2.3.3 Consequence Determination 
The Consequences of the two previously discussed filter failure scenarios were dominated by the 
portion of the consequences that came from the 8-hr unfiltered release following the filter failure 
event. Therefore, the consequences of 8 hr of leakage around the filter are essentially the same 
as the consequences of the filter failure scenarios. The onsite radiological and the offsite 
toxicological consequences are in the “low” consequence bin. The onsite toxicological 
consequences are in the “moderate” consequence bin. 
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3.0 CONTROL SELECTION 
During several Process and HazardOperability Analysis and control decision meetings, 
consensus was obtained on the assignment of frequencies, consequences, and controls for each of 
the release of dried waste accidents. The meeting attendees represented a wide range of 
expertise in the areas of engineering, licensing, and operations. The control decision results for 
scenarios considered in this document are shown in this section. Selected controls for the 
representative and represented release of dried waste accidents are discussed in detail below. 
3.1 SELECTED CONTROLS FOR THE RELEASE 
OF DRIED RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
ACCIDENTS 
3.1.1 Control Selection 
The proposed controls were discussed and evaluated by the group. Control decision criteria are 
established in the following documents: 
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, Subpart B, “Nuclear Safety 
Management” (10 CFR 830) 
DOE-STD-3009-94 
DOE G 421 .l-2, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Documenfed Safecy 
Analyses to Meet Subpart B of 10 CFR 830 
DOE G 423.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Safety Requirements 
Klein and Schepens (2003). 
The control decision preference can be summarized as follows: 
1. Preventive controls over mitigative 
2. Passive controls over active control 
3. Engineering controls over administrative controls 
4. Controls with the highest reliability 
5. Controls closest to the hazard 
6.  Controls with the lowest implementation and maintenance costs. 
A consensus was reached based on the judgment of the participants to use a passive confinement 
strategy based on the preferences listed above. The passive confinement strategy maximizes the 
use of passive and engineered controls over active and administrative controls. 
3-1 
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3.1.2 Selected Control Strategies 
3.1.2.1 Representative Accident 1: Failure of Pneumatic Transfer Line During Transfer of 
Dried Waste 
For the release of dried waste from the DWTS during pneumatic transport scenario, the 
estimated offsite toxicological consequences are “low” (Risk Bin 111). The estimated onsite 
(100-m facility worker) radiological consequence is “low” (Risk Bin 111). The estimated worst- 
case onsite toxicological consequence is “high” > temporary emergency exposure limit 
(TEEL)-3, (Risk Bin I). Controls @e., safety SSCs, TSRs) are required because the potential 
onsite toxicological risk of a release of dry material from this accident was assigned to Risk 
Bin I. 
The overall control strategy for the pneumatic transfer accident is to confine the dried waste 
material and filter any effluent (e.g., sintered metal filters high-efficiency gas absorbers (HEGA), 
HEPA filters) prior to release. Negative pressure confinement is normally provided for the 
dryer, the DWTS, the ICV container, and OGTS. The safety control strategy, which does not 
credit this negative pressure confinement or filtration, is to passively confine the dried waste, and 
release any actively confined dried waste effluent from a tall exhaust stack to increase 
atmospheric dispersion. Specific controls assigned to each hazardous condition requiring 
controls are described in Appendix A of RPP-23429, PreliminaFy Documented Safety Analysis 
for the Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System. 
The safety-significant SSCs and TSRs that have been designated for this accident, including their 
safety functions are described in Table 3.3.2.3.5-2 and Table 3.3.2.3.5-3 of RPP-23429. Several 
safety-significant SSCs work together with TSRs to address dried waste release accidents. 
3.1.2.2 Small Fire-Initiated Fall of Dried Waste from Greater than 3 m. 
Application of controls for dried waste release accident scenarios initiated by fires are addressed 
in RPP-30361. 
3.1.2.3 Representative Accident 2: Spills and Falls from Beneath the Dryer Outlet (> 3 m). 
For the greater than 3 m release from beneath the dryer outlet, the estimated offsite toxicological 
consequences are “low” (Risk Bin 111). The estimated onsite (100-m facility worker) 
radiological consequence is “low” (Risk Bin HI). The estimated worst-case onsite toxicological 
consequence is “high” > EEL-2 ,  (Risk Bin I). Controls (i.e., safety SSCs, TSRs) are required 
because the potential onsite toxicological risk of a release of dry material from this accident was 
assigned to Risk Bin I. 
The overall control strategy for the release from beneath the dryer outlet accident is to prevent 
the dried waste material release. Safety-significant passive confinement is provided by the dryer, 
DWTS, ICV containers, OGTS confinement structures, and Off-gas exhaust stack. To reduce 
the frequency of breaches in these confinement boundaries these confinement structures are 
designated safety-significant. To ensure the dryer is able to provide confinement, a TSR is 
specified to ensure waste dryer openings are closed and seals are inspectedtested. Specific 
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controls assigned to each hazardous condition requiring controls are described in Appendix A of 
RPP-23429. 
The safety-significant SSCs and TSRs that have been designated for this accident, including their 
safety functions are described in Tabfe 3.3.2.3.5-2 and Table 3.3.2.3.5-3 of RPP-23429. Several 
safety-significant SSCs work together with TSRs to address dried waste release accidents. 
3.1.2.4 Representative Accident 3: Filtration Failures 
For the high-temperature caused filter failure leading to release of dried waste from the OGTS 
during vitrification operations, the estimated offsite toxicological consequences are “low” (Risk 
Bin 111). The estimated onsite (100-m facility worker) radiological consequence is “low” (Risk 
Bin 111). The estimated worst-case onsite toxicological consequence is “moderate” > TEEL-2 
(Risk Bin I). Controls (Le., safety SSCs, TSRs) are required because the potential onsite 
toxicological risk of a release of dry material from the OGTS due to filtration failure was 
assigned to Risk Bin I. 
This accident is mitigated by ensuring that the OGTS outlet is sufficiently elevated that 
atmospheric dispersion will have diluted the release before it reaches the ground. Specific 
controls assigned to each hazardous condition requiring controls are described in Appendix A of 
RPP-23429. 
The safety-significant SSCs and TSRs that have been designated for this accident, including their 
safety functions are described in Table 3.3.2.3.5-2 and Table 3.3.2.3.5-3 of RPP-23429. Several 
safety-significant SSCs work together with TSRs to address dried waste release accidents. 
Other hazardous conditions represented by the filter failure due to high temperature 
representative accident include filter failure due to high pressure and unfiltered releases due to 
improper filter installation or damaged ductwork. The control strategy for the representative 
accident is also applicable to the represented accidents. No additional controls were identified. 
Facility Worker Hazards and Controls 
The above hazard evaluation also determined the potential consequences to facility workers from 
dried material release accidents. The postulated risk bin I and 11 release of dried material 
scenarios addressed previously have the potential to cause significant facility worker 
consequences, but are acceptably prevented or mitigated by the selected controls. However, one 
additional hazardous condition with “low” consequences to the onsite worker and offsite public 
was identified as having potentially significant facility worker hazards. This hazardous 
condition concerned a release of dried radioactive and other hazardous materials from the waste 
dryer or DWTS due to hydraulic fire in waste dryer IS0 freight container. Since the initiator is a 
fire, application of controls for this hazardous condition are addressed in RPP-30361. 
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APPENDIX B 
RELEASE OF DRIED WASTE SUPPORTING CALCULATIONS 
B1.O INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a basis for the qualitative assessment of consequences 
assigned during the risk binning meeting. Consequences are calculated for the radiological and 
toxicological exposures resulting from a release of dried radioactive waste during Demonstration 
Bulk Vitrification System (DBVS) operations. The hazardous conditions include events 
involving mechanical failures of DBVS components, including the Dried Waste Transfer System 
(DWTS), In-Container Vitrification (ICV)' Container, Ancillary Waste Transfer Enclosure 
(AWTE), and Off-Gas Treatment System (OGTS) (e.g., filtration failures). 
B2.0 METHODOLOGY 
Radiological dose exposure consequences are calculated consistent with the methodology 
documented in RPP-13482, Atmospheric Dispersion Coeficients and Radiological/ToxicologicaI 
ExposureMethodology for Use in Tank Farms. The onsite dose (Equation B-1) is given by: 
Dose = (Q, reIeased)&/Qy(BR)(ULD, onsite) (B-1) 
where: 
Dose 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment, L 
XIQ' 
BR = breathing rate, m3/s 
ULD 
= inhalation dose to receptor, Sv 
= atmospheric dispersion coefficient, s/m3 
= dose per unit liter of material inhaled as aerosols, S v L  
The toxicological consequences were calculated per the methodology established in RPP-13482 
for toxicological releases. Toxicological consequences are calculated either with a puff release 
model or a continuous release model depending on the duration of the release. The puff release 
model is used for onsite releases with durations < 3.7 s, and for offsite releases with durations 
< 439 s (RPP-13482). The events considered in this appendix are modeled as continuous 
releases. 
~~ 
ICV (In-Container Vitrification) is a trademark of AMEC, Inc., London, England. 
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For a continuous release, the toxicological consequence (Equation B-2) is given by: 
Consequence = (Q/gk/QY(SOF Multiplier) (B-2) 
where: 
Consequence 
Q 
1 = release time, s 
XIQ' 
SOF MultipIier = s u m  of fractions multiplier, unitless. 
= final sum of fractions value, unitless 
= release to the environment, m3 
= atmospheric dispersion coefficient, s/m3 
Determining the quantity of airborne respirable material released to the environment requires 
knowledge of the volume that is affected and is provided in Equation B-3: 
Source Term (Q} =(MAR)(DR)(ARF,)(RF) (B-3) 
where: 
= source term, L 
= material at risk, L 
e 
MAR 
DR = damage ratio = 1 * 
ARF = airborne release fraction 
RF = respirable fraction (not applicable to toxicological consequences). 
*Note: A damage ratio of 1 .O is applied for the scenarios in this appendix that do not 
use a damage ratio. 
B3.0 CALCULATIONS 
B3.1 DBVS UNIT LITER DOSE AND SUMS OF FRACTIONS MULTIPLIERS 
Unit liter doses (ULD) and sum of fractions (SOF) multipliers for each Temporary Emergency 
Exposure Limit (TEEL) are shown in Table B-1. 
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B3.2 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS 
B3.2.1 RELEASE OF PNEUMATICALLY TRANSPORTED DRIED WASTE 
The following assumptions are considered for the failure of the transport system during 
pneumatic transport of the waste: 
The material acted upon is conservatively assumed to be a full waste dryer batch 
(4,540 L). [RpP-20528, Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Flowsheet, App H, 
Stream 8 (single ICV), (9.60 E+03 gal/ICV x 3.785 L/gal)/8 batches per XV)]  
The waste transfer rate is assumed to empty a waste dryer batch 7,040 kg or 4,540 L in 
1 hr (RPP-20528, Appendix H). 
For the radiological consequence calculation, the relevant x/Qs for ground-level releases 
are taken from Tables 2-4 and 2-5 of RPP-13482 and are shown in Table B-2. The 1-hr 
xlQs (Le. without plunie meander) are used for short duration radiological releases 
(<l hr). These x/Q's are for ground-level, point-source releases. The x/Q's are 95'h 
percentile worst-case values. 
For the toxicological consequences of the release during pneumatic transport of the dried 
waste, a 1-hr x/Q' with plume depletion is applied, as discussed in Section 2.3.1 of 
RPP-13482. The consequence analysis for these two cases assumes a particle size 
distribution taken from measurements of Hanford tank farms backfill soil as given in 
PNNL-13757-1, Characterization of Vadose Zone Sediment: Uncontaminated RCRA 
Borehole Core Samples and Composite Samples. The data from the 39.54 depth (the 
shallowest of the levels analyzed from the core) were used for the analysis. The x/Qs 
from Tables 2-9 and 2-10 of RPP-13482 were applied for the fraction of the waste in each 
bin and subsequently summed. Table E-3 shows the particle size distributions and the 
resulting xlQ's. 
Based on the same tank farm soil characterization data from PNNL-13757-1, about 3% of 
the soil's volume has a diameter of 10 pm or less (RPP-10773, Compressed Gus Accident 
Parametric Consequence Analysis). Therefore, the respirable fraction, used for the 
radiological consequences of the release of pneumatically transported waste is assumed 
to be 0.03. 
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XfQ' (s/m3) 
1-hr acute 8-hr acute 
3.28 E-02 5.58 E-03 
Offsite 2.22 E-05 7.90 E-06 
Table B-3. Atmosuheric DisDersion Coefficients for Plume Dmletion. 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.06 
Particle size bin 
3.28 E-02 6.56 E-04 2.22 E-05 4.44 E-07 
2.71 E-02 2.71 E-04 8.86 E-06 8.86 E-08 
2.1 1 E-02 2.1 1 E-04 3.62 E-06 3.62 E-08 
1.38 E-02 8.28 E-04 1.6 1 E-06 9.66 E-08 
Pm 
Less than 2 
2-10 
10-20 
20-50 
50-100 
Greater than 100 
Total x/Q' 
~ 
I Onsitc I Offsite - 1  
Fraction of Bin Bin 
particles in I the 1 Fraction x bin 1 "'Q'2: the I Fraction x bin I 
the bin X f Q  xlQ 
I s/m3 I s/m3 I s/m3 I s/m3 
0.65 I 0.00 I 0.00 I 0.00 I 0.00 ~ I 
333.2.1.1 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
The onsite dose is found using the methodology in RPP-13482. The dose is given by 
Equation B- 1 : 
Donsite = (Q, release~))(K/e'onsire)(BR)(ULD,n,i,3 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= M A R x D R x A R F x R F  
= (4,540 L)(1)(1)(0.03) 
= 136.3 L 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 E-02 s/m3 
x / Q ' ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~  
BR = breathing rate 
= 3.33 E-04 m3/s 
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ULDonSite = onsite ULD (Table B-1) 
= 23 Sv/L. 
The onsite dose for pneumatically transported waste is: 
Donsire = (136 L)(3.28 E-02 s/m3)(3.33 E-04 m3/s)(23 Sv/L) = 0.034 Sv 
x 100 remiSv = 3.4 rem 
B3.2.1.2 Onsite Toxicological Consequences 
The toxicological consequences are calculated per the methodology established in RPP-13482. 
The onsite toxicological consequences are determined by Equation B-2: 
Onsite Consequence = (Q/O(X/e'onsi,e)(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment, 1.26 E-03m3/s 
XIQ' = onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient with plume depletion 
= 2.32 E-03 s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless 
The rate of release to the environment can be calculated based on the mass flow rate of 
pneumatically transported waste assuming a guillotine type break in the exhaust line from the 
vacuum pump using the transportability factor from above: 
rn3 m3 
hr 3600s lOOOL S 
x-= 1.26E -03- 45401. hr X- 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier listed in 
Table B- 1, is: 
Onsite Consequence(moderate) = (1.26 E-03m3/s)(2.32 E-03 s/m3)(9.7 E+07) = 284 
where: 
9.7 E+07 = TEEL-2 SOF multiplier 
The onsite high toxicoIogical consequence, based on the TEEL-3 SOF multiplier listed in 
Table B-1, is: 
Onsite Consequence(high) = ( 1.26 E 4 3  m3/s)(2.32 E-03 s/m3)(6.2 E+06) = 18.1 
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where: 
6.2 E+06 = TEEL-3 SOF muhipher. 
B3.2.1.3 Offsite Toxicological Consequences 
The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Consequence = (Q/f)&/Qy(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment, 1.26 E-03 m3/s 
dQ' = offsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient with plume depletion 
= 6.81 E-07 s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEG1 SOF multiplier listed in 
Table B-1, is: 
offsite Cansequence(m0derate) = (1.26 E-03m3fs)(6.81 E-07 s/m3)(6.5 E+08) = 0.56 
where: 
6.5 E+08 = TEEL-1 SOF multiplier 
B3.2.2 SPILLS AND FALLS OF DRIED WASTE FROM BENEATH THE WASTE 
DRYER OUTLET (GREATER THAN 3 M) 
This case is based on a free-fall spill of the dried waste from the bottom of the waste dryer outlet, 
a height of approximately 1 1 f? (3.4 m). The consequences consist of two components: the 
aerosol generated by the spill and the subsequent entrainment from the resultant heap of waste, 
because not all of the material is made airborne. 
The assumptions and input data relevant to this scenario are: 
The material at risk (MAR) is a full waste dryer batch of dried waste, or 4,540 L. It is 
assumed that a breach of the waste dryer outlet would empty the full contents of the 
waste dryer in 10 min. 
An airborne release fraction (ARF) of 6.3 E-03 for the free-fall spill of cohesionless 
powders with a fall distance of greater than 3 m was selected from (Equation 4-5, 
pg. 4-81) DOE-HDBK-3010-94, Airborne Release FractiondRates and Respirable 
Fractions far Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. Bounding ARF= 2 (0.1064 
,-&O. 1 2 5 ~ ( ~ 2 . 3 7 ~ / p a p l  .02)
B-7 
Page 66 of 168 of DA05056764 
FU'P-20725 REV 2 
where: 
AFW = airborne release fraction 
Mo = mass of powder spiIled, 7,040 kg 
H = spill height, 3.4 m 
pep = bulk density of powder, 1,550 kg/m3. 
The airborne release rate (ARR) for aerodynamic entrainment and resuspension of a 
homogeneous bed of powder exposed to ambient conditions is 4 E-05 hr-' 
(DOE-HDBK-3010-94, Sections 4.0 and 4.4.3). 
The respirable fraction (RF) (only used for radiological consequences) for the spill is 
conservatively assumed to be 1 .O. DOE-HDBK-3010-94 does not indicate a RF value to 
be used with the ARF calculated above. Therefore, it is assumed that the RF for this case 
is I .O, because the comparison the handbook asks for is against an ARF x RF 
combination. 
The RF (only used for radiological consequences) is 1 .O for aerodynamic entrainment and 
resuspension of a homogeneous bed of powder exposed to ambient conditions 
(DOE-HDBK-3010-94, Sections 4.0 and 4.4.3). 
The x/Q' for the calculation of the radiological consequence of the release from the initial 
spill is the 1-hr xlQ' given in Table B-2. The radiological consequence calculation of the 
resuspension and entrainment release uses the 8-hr xlQ'. 
The I-hr X I Q S  are also used for calculating the toxicological consequences of the 
resuspension and entrainment. 
For the toxicological consequences of the release during the spill from greater than 3 m 
high, a 1-hr x /Q  is used (RPP-13482). The xlQs are shown in Table B-2. 
B3.2.2.1 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
The onsite dose for a free-fall spill of cohesionless powder from greater than 3 m high is found 
using the methodology in RPP-13482. The onsite dose from the impact of the spilled material on 
a surface is given by Equation B-1 : 
D = (Q, released)(X/e3(BR)(ULD) 
where: 
Q. released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= M A R x D R x A R F x R F  
= 28.7 L 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
(4540 L)(1)(6.3 E-03)( 1) 
x/Q' 
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= 3.28 E-02 s/m3 
= 3.33 E-04 m3/s 
= onsite ULD, h m  Table B-1 
= 23.OSvL. 
BR = breathing rate 
ULD 
The onsite dose for the impact of the spilled material on a surface is: 
Dspill = (28.7 L)(3.28 E-02 s/m3)(3.33 E-04 m3/s)(23.0 SvIL) 7.2 E-03 SV 
= 7.2E-01 rem 
The onsite dose for entrainment and resuspension can be found similarly using the ARR: 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= MAR n DR x ARR x RF x release time 
= (4,540 L)(1)(4 E-05 h')(1.0)(8 h) 
= 1.45 L 
= onsite 8-hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 5.58 E-03 s/m3 
= 3.33 E-04 m3/s 
= onsite ULD, from Table B-1 
= 23.OSvL. 
x/Q' 
BR = breathing rate 
ULD 
The onsite dose due to entrainment is: 
Dentr,,inmen, = (1.45 L)(5.58 E-03 s/m3)(3.33 E-04 m3/s)(23.0) = 6.2 E-05 Sv 
x 100 r e d S v  = 6.2 E-03 rem 
The total onsite dose is the sum of the dose due to the free-fall spill and the entrainment from the 
unconfined powder: 
Dose = DspilI + Denrrainmrnr 
Dose = 7.2 E-01 rem + 6.2 E-03 rem = 7.3 E-01 rem 
Note: The entrainment contribution is a very small contributor to the total radiological 
conseqeuences and a small fraction of the guideline. Therefore, entrainment calculations are 
ignored for the remaining radiological calculations. 
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B3.2.2.2 Onsite ToxicologicaI Consequences 
The onsite toxicological consequences are determined by: 
Consequencespill = (Q/q(y/P)(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment (m3/s) 
= MAR/t x DR x ARF x conversion factor 
= (4,540 W600 s)( 1)(6.3 E-03) / 1,000 Urn3 
= 4.8 E-05 m3/s 
= onsite 1 -hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 E-02 s/m3 
X / e '  
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence for a spill, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier 
from Table B-1 is: 
Consequence,i!, = (4.8 E-05 m3/s)(3.28 E-02 s/m3)(9.7 E+07) = 152 
where: 
9.7 E+07 = TEEL-2 SOF multiplier. 
The onsite high toxicological consequence for a spill, based on the TEEL-3 SOF multiplier from 
Table B-1, is: 
Conseyuence,i// = (4.8 E-05 m3/s)(3.28 E-02 s/m3)(6.2 E+06) = 9.7 
where: 
6.2 E+06 = TEEL-3 SOF multiplier. 
The onsite consequence for entrainment and resuspension can be found similarly using the ARR: 
Consequence,,,ninmen, = (Q/Q(y/Q?(SOF Multiplier) 
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where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment (m3/s) 
= MAWt x DR x ARR x conversion factor 
= (4,540 L)( 144 E05 hr-’)( 1)( 1/1,000 L/m3) / (3,600 dhr) 
= 5.04 E-OS m /s 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 E-02 slm3 
dQ’ 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions rnultipEer, unitless. 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence for entrainment, based on the TEEL-2 SOF 
multiplier from Table B-1, is: 
Consequence,,,minnme, = (5.04 E-OS m3/s)(3.28 E-02 s/m3)(9.7 E+07) = 0.16 
where: 
9.7 EM7 = TEEL-2 SOF multiplier. 
The onsite high toxicological consequence for entrainment (based on the TEEL-3 SOF 
multiplier) is: 
Consequence,,r~~inme,, = (5.04 E-08 m3/s)(3.28 E-02 s/m3)(6.2 E+06) = 0.01 
where: 
6.2 E+06 = TEEL-3 SOF multiplier 
The overall onsite toxicological consequences can be found by summing the contribution of the 
free-fall spill with the subsequent entrainment and resuspension. 
The total onsite moderate toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-2) is: 
Consequence = 152 + 0.16 = 152 
The total onsite high toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-3) is: 
Consequence = 9.7 + 0.01 = 9.7 
Note: The entrainment contribution is a very small contributor to the total toxicological 
conseqeuences and a small fraction of the guideline. Entrainment calculations are ignored for 
the remaining toxicological calculations. 
B3.2.2.3 Offsite Toxicological Consequences 
The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Consequence = (Q/O&/QY(SOF Multiplier) 
B-11 
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where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
= rate of release to the environment, 4.8 E-05 m3/s 
= offsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient with plume depletion 
= 2.22 E-05 s/m3 
Q/t 
x/Q’ 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-1 SOF multiplier listed in 
Table B-1, is: 
Ofsite Consequence(modevate) = (4.8 E-05 m3/s)(2.22 E-05 s/m3)(6.5 E+08) = 0.69 
where: 
6.5 E+08 = TEEL-1 SOF multiplier 
B3.2.3 SPILLS AND FALLS OF DRIED WASTE FROM AN IN-CONTAINER 
VITRIFICATION CONTAINER AFTER AN lNTERRUPTED MELT (LESS 
THAN 3 M) 
This case is based on a free-fall spill of the dried waste from a partially filled ICV container that 
has to be moved from the melt area due to receipt of the non-compliant dryer batch. 
Conservatively, the melt is assumed to not have begun. The consequences consist of two 
components: the aerosol generated by the spill and the subsequent entrainment from the resultant 
heap of waste, because not all of the material is made airborne. 
The assumptions and input data relevant to this scenario are: 
The MAR is three full waste dryer batches of dried waste, or 13,620 L. It is assumed that 
the release duration is 1 min. 
The ARF is 2 E-03 for free-fall spill of cohesionless powders with a fall distance of less 
than 3 m (DOE-HDBK-3010-94, Sections 4.0 and 4.4.3). 
The entrainment contribution was shown to be a very small contributor to the total 
radiological and toxicological consequences and a small fraction of their respective 
guidelines. Therefore, entrainment calculations are ignored. 
The RF (used only for calculating radiological consequences) is 0.3 for a free-fall spill of 
a cohesionless powder with a fall distance of less than 3 m (DOE-HDBK-3010-94). 
The x/Q for the calculation of the radiological consequence of the release from the initial 
spill is the 1-hr x /Q  given in Table B-2. The radiological consequence calculation of the 
resuspension and entrainment release also uses the 1-hr xlQ‘ 
B-12 
Page 71 of 168 of DA05056764 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
Due to the large size and mass of the ICV container, onIy a small fraction of its contents 
are expected to be ejected from the container in the release resulting from a spill, drop, or 
tipping accident. A damage ratio of 0.1 was assumed to account for the small fraction of 
dried waste involved in the release. 
B3.2.3.1 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
The onsite dose for a free-fall spill of cohesionless powder from less than 3 m high is found 
using the methodology in RPP-13482. The onsite dose from the impact of the spilled material on 
a surface is given by Equation B-1 : 
D = (Q, reIeased)(X/e?(BR)(ULD) 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= MARnDRxARFxRF 
= 0.82 L 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 E-02 s/m3 
= 3.33 E-04 m3/s 
= onsite ULD, from Table B-1 
= 23.OSvL 
= (13,620 L)(O.1)(2 E-03)(0.3) 
x/Q' 
BR = breathing rate 
ULD 
The onsite dose for the impact of the spilled material on a surface is: 
DJpi// = (0.82 LX3.28 E-02 s/m3)(3.33 E-04 m3/s)(23.0 Sv/L) = 2.1 E-04 SV 
= 2.1 E-02 rem 
B3.2.3.2 Onsite Toxicological Consequences 
The onsite toxicological consequences are determined by: 
Consequence,i!r = (Q/O (x/Q')(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment (m3/s) 
= MAlUt x DR x ARF x conversion factor 
= (13,620 L/1 min)(O.l)(2.0 E-03) / [(l,OOO L/m3)(60 dmin)] 
= 4.5 E-OS m3/s 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 E-02 s/m3 
x/Q' 
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SOF Muftipfier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence for a spill, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier 
calculated in Section B6.1 is: 
Consequence,,i// = (4.5 E-05m3/s)(3.28 E-02 s/m3)(9.7 E+07) = 144 
where: 
9.7 E+07 = TEEL-2 SOF multiplier. 
The onsite high toxicological consequence for a spill, based on the TEEL-3 SOF multiplier from 
TabIe B-1, is: 
Consequencespi~~ = (4.5 E-05 m3/s)(3.28 E-02 s/m3)(6.2 E+06) = 9.2 
where: 
6.2 E+06 = TEEL-3 SOF multiplier. 
B3.2.3.3 Offsite Toxicological Consequences 
The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Consequence = (Q/t)&/QY(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/f = rate of release to the environment (rn3/s) 
= MAR/t x DR x ARF x RF 
= (13,620 L/1 min)(O.l)(2.0 E-03)(1) I [(l,OOO L/m3)(60 dmin)] 
= 4.5 E-05 m3/s 
= offsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 E-05 s/m3 
dQ' 
SOF MuZtiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitIess. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence for a spill (based on the TEEL-I SOF multiplier) 
is: 
ConsequenceSpi/r = (4.5 E-05 m3/s)(Z.22 E-OS s/m3)(6.5 E+08) = 6.5 E-01 
where: 
6.5 E+08 = TEEL-I SOF multiplier. 
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B3.2.4 FILTRATION FAILURES 
Filtration failure scenario is considered: 
High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter failure due to high temperature 
HEPA filter failure due to high pressure 
Unfiltered release from leakage around HEPA filters due to maintenance failure, 
misaligned filter, or damage to ductwork. 
The following assumptions and input data apply to the filter failure scenarios: 
The maximum loading on each HEPA filter is assumed to be 1 L of solids based on filter 
plugging (Le. high AP and low flow rate). The load on each of the two prefilters is 
assumed to be 10% of the load on a HEPA filter and one HEPA load of waste is assumed 
to be plated out or trapped within the ductwork, heater, etc. upstream of the filters. The 
total load of waste within the particulate filter system (two prefilters, four HEPA filters, 
and one duct) subject to release is therefore assumed to be 5.2 HEPA loads or 5.2 L of 
dried solids. 
The maximum '"1 loading on the activated carbon filter is assumed to be the total release 
from the processing of 100 waste containers with no credit for the off-gas scrubbers. 
Both first and second stage HEPA filters, prefilters, and the activated carbon filter are 
assumed to have a high waste loading and are assumed to be involved in a filter failure 
accident. 
The assumed maximum filter loadings take no credit for the OGTS. During normal 
design operation of the DBVS the loadings on all the exhaust filters would be negligible 
over the life of the facility. 
The activated carbon filter is assumed to bum up in the high temperature accident, 
releasing 100% of its '"1 loading. In the high pressure accident, the effect of the '291 on 
the carbon filter is negligible compared to the other components of the release. 
The throughput of material into the OGTS is assumed to be equal to the dust generation 
rate during the ICV container filling operation. 
For purposes of estimating toxicological release rates, the filter releases from the over 
pressure event are assumed to be complete in less than 1 min. 
For purposes of estimating toxicological release rates, the filter releases from the over 
temperature event are assumed to occur over a period of 15 min. 
Release fractions from HEPA filters failed by over pressure or high temperature events 
are 2 E-06 and 1 E-04, respectively as recommended in DOE-HDBK-3010-94. 
s 
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Receptor 
Onsite 
WP-20725 REV 2 
~ ~ ~~ 
8-Hr Release 
Release Dose 
(L) (SV) (rem) 
14.4 6.2 E-04 6.2 E 4 2  
B3.2.4.1 EIGHT-HOUR UNFILTERED RELEASE 
The dust effluent from the container loading operation is assumed to be characterized by 
stream 20 (dust recycle) (RPP-20528, Appendix H). The dust generated by the process is 
assumed to be equal to the recycle rate given as 7.04 lbkr [from RPP-20528, Appendix H 
(stream 20), 169 lb/day / 24 hr/day = 7.04 Ibhr] (3.19 kg/hr) of dried waste with a bulk density 
of 1.55 kglL. On a volumetric basis the dust flow rate is then 1 .SO L h  or 5.0 E 4 7  m3/s. The 
8-hr release would then be 14.4 L. 
03.2.4.1.1 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
The resulting radiological dose due to the 8-hr continuous releases from the vitrification 
container fill operation with no filtration is shown below. Note that these doses assume a 
continuous, nonstop fill operation. In reality, the fill operation would alternate with vitrification 
of batches of material in the container. 
The onsite dose is found using the methodology in RF'P-I 3482. The dose is given by 
Equation B-1 : 
Donsite = (Q, reieased)(X/ebnsite)(BR)(ULDonsire) 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
x / Q ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
BR = breathing rate 
ULDon,i,e 
= 14.4L 
= onsite eight hour atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 5.58 E-03 s/m3 
= 3.33 E-04 m3/s 
= onsite ULD (Table B-1) 
= 23.0SvL. 
The dose is calculated as follows: 
14.4 L x 5.58 E-03 dm' x 3.33 E-04 m3/s x 23.0 Sv/L x 100 rem/Sv = 6.2 E-02 rem 
Table B-4. Radiological Doses Due to 8-Hr Continuous Unfiltered Release. 
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B3.2.4.1.2 Toxicological Consequences 
The toxicological consequences are calculated per the methodology established in RPP-13482. 
The onsite toxicological consequences are determined by Equation B-2: 
Onsite Consequence = (Q/g(X/e’ons&SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment, 5.0 E-07 m3/s 
x/Q’ = onsite 1-hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 E-02 s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier from 
Table B- 1, is: 
Onsite Consequence(modemte) = (5.0 E-07 m3/s)(3.28 E-02 dm3)(9.7 E+07) = 1.6 
where: 
9.7 E+07 = TEEL-2 SOF multiplier 
The onsite high toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-3 SOF multiplier from 
Table B-1, is: 
Onsite Consequencefiigh) = (5.0 E-07 m3/s)(3.28 E-02 s/m3)(6.2 E+06) = 0.10 
where: 
6.2 E+06 = TEEL-3 SOF multiplier 
The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Consequence = (Q/t)k/QY (SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment, 5.0 E-07m3/s 
X/Q’ = offsite 1 -hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 E-05 s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
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Receptor 
WP-20725 REV 2 
Release Rate Ws) Sum of Fractions 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-1 SOF multiplier from 
Table B- 1, is: 
Offsite Consequence(moderate) = (5.0 E-07m3/s)(2.22 E-05 s/m3)(6.5 E+08) = 7.2 E-03 
where: 
6.5 EM8 = TEEL-1 SOF multiplier 
The resulting SOFs for the continuous unfiltered release are shown in Table B-5. 
1.6 (moderate) 
0.10 (high) 
7.2 E-03 (moderate) 
Onsite 
- 5.0 E-04 
Offsite _ _  
B3.2.4.2 HEPA FILTER FAILURE DUE TO HIGH TEMPERATURE 
The HEPA filter release fraction for the high temperature filter failure scenario is assumed to be 
1 E-04 based on recommendations in Section 5.4.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94. This release 
fraction is assumed to also apply to the prefilter and the material in the upstream OGTS. 
B3.2.4.2.1 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
In the high temperature release scenario, the activated carbon filter is assumed to release 100% 
of its loading of Iz9I. The dose conversion factor (DCF) for ’291 is 5.1 E-08 SvBq or 
1.89 E+05 rem/Ci for the onsite (collocated worker) receptor (from ICRP-68, Dose Coefficients 
for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers - Replacement of ICRP Publication 61). 
The onsite dose for the release from the filter due to high temperature is found using the 
methodology in RPP-13482 and is given by Equation B-1: 
D = (Q, released)~/Q3(BR)(lJLD) 
where: 
Q. released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= MARxDRxARFxRF 
= 5.2 E-04L 
= onsite 1-hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 E-02 s/m3 
= (5.2 L)( 1)( 1 E-04)( 1) 
x/Q’ 
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Receptor 
Onsite 
FWP-20725 REV 2 
Initial Releases from Particulate Filters '"1 Release from Carbon Filter 
Release Dose Release Dose 
(L) (SV) (rem) (Ci) (SV) (rem) 
5.2 E-04 1.3 E-07 I 1.3 E-05 2.15 E-01 4.4 E 4 3  I 4.4 E-01 
BR = breathing rate 
ULD 
= 3.33 E-04 m3/s 
= onsite ULD, from Table B-1 
= 23.0 SvIL. 
5.2 E-04 L x 3.28 E-02 s/m3 x 3.33 E-04 m3/s x 23.0 Sv/L x 100 rem/Sv = 1.3 E-05 rem 
I IS calculated by multiplying the Iz9I loading for 100 129 . The contribution to the dose from the 
ICV containers (twice the expected mission), 2.15 E-01 Ci (FWP-20528, Appendix H, Stream 21) 
[2.15 E-03 Ci/ICV x 100 ICVs] by the dose conversion factor, 1.89 E+05 rem/Ci. The dose from 
129,  is 
2.15 E-01 Ci x 1 3 9  E+05 rem/Ci x 3.28 E-02 s/m3 x 3.33 E-04 m3/s = 4.4 E-01 rem 
The total onsite radiological consequence is 
Consequence = 1.3 E-05 rem + 4.4 E-01 = 4.4 E-01 rem 
The onsite radiological dose due to high temperature filter failure are shown in Table B-6 for 
both the dried waste releases from the particulate filters and the '"I release from the carbon 
filter. 
Table B-6. Radiological Doses from Filter Releases Due to High Temperature. 
The scenario includes 8 hr unfiltered release through the failed filters. Table B-4 shows the 
radiological doses due to the 8-hr continuous release from the vitrification container fill 
operation with no filtration. Note that these doses assume a continuous, nonstop fill operation. 
In reality, the fill operation would alternate with vitrification of batches of material in the 
container. 
The combined cases are shown in Table B-7. Total doses (particulates + Iz9I) are shown for the 
initial filter failure and then for the combined case that includes the 8 hr of unfiltered release 
(14.4 L of dried waste) from the system through the failed filters. 
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Receptor 
Onsite 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
Initial Release from Filters Wlth 8-hr Unfiltered Release 
Dose Dose 
Release Release 
Particulates Filters + 
(W (rem) (SV) (rem) 
4.4 E-03 4.4 E-01 5.0 E-03 5.0 E-01 
pius Iz91 14.4 L 
Table B-7. Total Radiological Doses from to Filtration Failure Due to High Temperature. 
B3.2.4.2.2 Toxicological Consequences 
In the case of toxicological exposures, the maximum concentration at the receptor is the 
operative parameter so that the 1 -hr x/Q, as shown in Table B-2 is used. The release rate Q’ is 
given in terms of liters of dried waste released per second averaged over a 15-min release time. 
In evaluating Equation B-2, the release rate must be divided by 1,000 L/m3 to make the units 
compatible with the x/Q‘. The resulting SOFs for the continuous unfiltered release are shown in 
Table B-5. 
Consistent with previous filtration failure analyses for tank farms facilities, it is assumed that the 
release from the filter in the high temperature failure scenario requires at least 15 min so the 
release is averaged over 900 s (1 5 min). The resulting release rate and SOFs for the filter release 
are shown in Table B-8. The combined case with both the filter release and the unfiltered release 
from the off-gas system is also shown. It is assumed that both releases occur concurrently and 
are thus additive. 
The onsite toxicological consequences are determined by Equation B-2: 
Onsite Consequence = (Q/t)(x/ebnsite)(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t rate of release to the environment 
= (5.2 L )(1 E-04)/(900 s)(I,OOO Vm3) = 5.8 E-10 m3/s 
X / e ’  = onsite 1 -hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 E-02 s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier from 
Table B-1, is: 
Onsite Consequence(moderute) = (5.8 E-10 m3/s)(3.28 E-02 s/m3)(9.7 E+07) = 1.9 E-03 
where: 
9.7 E+07 = TEEL-2 SOF multiplier 
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Release from Filter Only 
Release Rate (L/s) SOF 
Receptor 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
With Unfiltered Release 
Release Rate (L/s) SOF 
The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Onsite 
Offsite 
Consequence = (Q/t)(X/eY(SOF Multiplier) 
1.9 E-03 1.6 (moderate) 
1.2 E-04 + O.lO(high) 
8.4 E-06 7.2 E-03 (moderate) 
- 5.8 E-07 
5.8 E-07 
5.0 E-04 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment, 5.8 E-10 m3/s 
x/Q' = offsite I-hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 E-05 s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEGl SOF multiplier from 
Table B-1, is: 
Oflsite C o n s e q u e n c e ~ ~ o ~ e ~ u ~ e ~  = (5.8 E-10 m3/s)(2.22 E-05 s/m3)(6.5 E+08) = 8.4 E-06 
where: 
6.5 E+08 = TEEL-1 SOF multiplier 
Table B-8. Toxicological Sum of Fractions Relative to the Threshold For Moderate 
Consequence Class for High Temperature Filter Failure Release Scenario. 
Note: 
SOF = sum of fractions 
B3.2.4.3 HEPA FILTER FAILURE DUE TO HIGH PRESSURE 
The filter release fraction for the high pressure failure scenario is assumed to be 2 E-06 based on 
recommendations in Section 5.4.2.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94. This release fraction is assumed 
to also apply to the prefilter and the material in the upstream filtration system. 
B3.2.4.3.1 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
The onsite dose for the release from the filter due to high pressure is found using the 
methodology in RPP-13482 and is given by Equation B-1: 
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Receptor 
Onsite 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
Initial Release from Filters Only With 8-hr Unfiltered Release 
Release Dose Release Dose 
(L) (SV) (rem) (L) (SV) (rem) 
1.0 E-05 
+ 14.4 1 .O E-05 2.5 E-09 2.5 E-07 6.2 E-04 6.2 E-02 
D = (Q, released)(y/Q3(BR)(ULD) 
I 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= MARxDRxARFxRF 
= (5.2 L)(1)(2 E-OG)(l) 
= 1.0 E-05 L 
x/Q' 
BR = breathing rate 
ULD 
= onsite 1 -hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 E-02 s/m3 
= 3.33 E-04 m3/s 
= onsite ULD, from Table B-1 
= 23.0Sv/L. 
= 1.0 E-05 L x 3.28 E-02 dm3 x 3.33 E-04 m3/s x 23.0 Sv/L x 100 rem/Sv = 2.5 E-07 rem 
Radiological doses due to high pressure filter failure are shown in Table B-9. Doses are shown 
for the initial filter failure and for the combined case that includes the 8 hr of unfiltered release 
from the system through the failed filter. 
Table B-9. Radiological Doses Due to Filtration Failure Due to High Pressure. 
B3.2.4.3.2 Toxicological Consequences 
Consistent with previous filtration failure analyses for tank farms facilities, it is assumed that the 
release from the filter in the high pressure failure scenario requires less than 1 min so the release 
i s  averaged over GO s (1 min). The resulting release rate and SOFs for the filter release are 
shown in TabIe B-10. The combined case with both the filter release and the unfiltered release 
from the off-gas system is also shown. It is assumed that both releases occur concurrently and 
are thus additive. 
The onsite toxicological consequences are determined by Equation B-2: 
Onsite Consequence = (Qhj (x/eb,,J(SOF Multiplier) 
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where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment 
= (5.2 L )(2 E-06)/(60 s)(l,OOO L/m3) = 1.7 E-10 m3/s 
x/Q' = onsite 1-hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 E-02 s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier from 
Table B-1, is: 
Onsite Consequence~mo~e~a~e) = (1.7 E-10 m3/s)(3.28 E-02s/m3)(9.7 E+07) = 5.4 E-04 
where: 
9.7 E+07 = TEEL-2 SOF multiplier 
The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Consequence = (Q/t)(X/eY(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment, 1.7 E-10 m3/s 
x/Q' = offsite 1-hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 E-05 s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL- 1 SOF multiplier from 
Table B-1, is: 
Offsite Consequencefmoderate) = (1.7 E-10 m3/s)(2.22 E-05 s/m3)(6.5 E+O8) = 2.5 E+06 
where: 
6.5 E+O8 = TEEL-1 SOF multiplier 
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Table B-10. Toxicological Sum of Fractions Relative to the Threshold for Moderate 
Consequence Class for High Pressure Filter Failure Release Scenario. 
t -- Offsite 5.2 E-04 _- 
I I I 5.4 E-04 I I 1.6 tmoderate) 1 
Calculated dose Case 
(rem) 
I 2.5 E-06 I I 7.2 E-03 (moderate) I 
High consequence 
consequence 
(rem) 
guideline guideline 
(rem) 
Filtration failure leading to 
temperature) 
unfiltered release (high 
Note: 
SOF = sum of fractions. 
5.0 E-01 
B4.0 RESULTS 
Table B-1 1 compares the accident consequences with the onsite radiological risk evaluation 
guidelines. Reviewing the consequences shows that the release of dried radioactive waste 
representative accident is below the onsite radiological guideline for moderate consequences for 
the pneumatic case, spill from the top of the dried waste receiver, spill of less than 3 m. 
Table B-1 1. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Release of Dried Radioactive Waste During 
Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Operations. 
Onsite radiological consequences 
3.4 Release of pneumatically transuorted dried radioactive waste 25 100 
Spills and falls of dried radioactive 
waste from beneath the waste 1 0.73 
dryer outlet (-1 1 W3.4 m) 
100 
Release of dried radioactive waste 
from the ICV container after 
relocation from melt area after 
intermuted melt 
3.2 E-02 25 100 
25 100 
Note: 
ICV = In-Container Vitrification. 
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0.56 
0.69 
0.65 
r.2 E43 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
Guideline 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Table B- 12 compares the accident consequences with the toxicological risk evaluation 
guidelines. Reviewing the consequences shows that the release of dried radioactive waste 
representative accident is above the onsite toxicological guideline for “high” consequences for 
the pneumatic, dryer outlet, and ICV release cases. For filtration failures, the onsite “moderate” 
consequence guideline is exceeded. For offsite consequences, the consequences are below the 
“moderate” consequence guideline for all cases. 
Table B-12. Summary of Toxicological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Release of Dried Radioactive Waste Representative Accident. 
Toxicologic; 
Onsite 
consequences 
Offsite 
Case 
Moderate I High consequence iuence Moderate conswuence High consequence cons 
SOF hideline SOF 1 Guideline 
Release of 
pneumatically 
transported dried 
radioactive waste 
284 1 1 18.1 1 
Spills and falls of 
dried radioactive waste 
from beneath the waste 
dryer outlet (-1 1 W3.4 
ml 
1 1 9.7 152 1 
Release of dried 
radioactive waste from 
ICV container after 
internoted melt 
1 1 9.2 144 1 
!Filtration failure 
leading to unfiltered 
release (High 
Temperature) 
1 1 0.10 1.6 
- 
1 
Note: 
ICV = In-Container Vitrification. 
SOF = sum of fractions. 
The results show that, even with no credit for the DBVS OGTS, the direct release of the dust 
generated by the vitrification container fill operation results in low consequence radiological 
doses for all scenarios. The toxicological consequences rise to the moderate level only for the 
onsite receptor. It is also evident that the consequences from the failure of the exhaust filters are 
negligible compared to the consequences due to direct dust release from the fill operation over an 
8-hr period. 
The control for mitigating the consequences of the filtration failure includes ensuring that the 
release occurs through the exhaust stack at 155 ft high. The onsite xlQ‘ for the elevated release is 
4.77 E-05 s/m3 (RF’P-23572, Technical Basis Document for Release of Process Off-Gas with 
Toxic Components). When this dispersion coefficient is applied to the onsite toxicological 
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consequences, the SOF becomes 2.3 E-03. Thus the consequences for all receptors for the 
mitigated accident are in the ‘claw" consequence bin. 
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CHECKLIST FOR TECHNICAL PEER REVIEW 
Document Reviewed 
Basis Documenf, Rev. 2 
Scope of Review (e.g., document section or portion of calculation): Revision 2 changes only. 
Yes No NA* 
[X ] [ ] [ ] 1. Previous reviews are complete and cover the analysis, up to the scope of this 
review, with no gaps. 
[XI [ ] [ ] 2. Problem is completely defined. 
[XI [ ] [ ] 3. Accident scenarios are developed in a clear and logical manner. 
[XI [ ] [ ] 4. Analytical and technical approaches and results are reasonable and 
appropriate. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.8) 
Ix] [ ] [ ] 5 .  Necessary assumptions are reasonable, explicitly stated, and supported. 
(ORP QAPP criterion 2.2) 
[ ] [ ] p ]  6. Computer codes and data files are documented. 
[XI [ ] [ ] 7. Data used in calculations are explicitly stated. 
[XI [ ] [ ] 
RPP-20725, Release of Dried Radivacfive Waste Materials Technical 
8. Bases for Calculations, including assumptions and data. are consistent with 
the supported safety basis document (e.g., the Tank Farms Final Safely 
Analysis Report). 
9. Data were checked for consistency with original source information as 
applicable. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.9) 
10. For both qualitative and quantitative data, uncertainties are recognized and 
discussed, as appropriate. (OM QAPP criterion 2.17) 
I 1, Matbematical derivations were checked including dimensional consistency of 
results. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.16) 
12. Models are appropriate and were used within their established range of 
validity or adequate justification was provided for use outside their 
established range of validity. 
p] [ ] [ ] 
[XI [ ] [ ] 
[XI [ ] 1 
[XI [ ] ] 
[ ] [ ] [XI 13. Spreadsheet resuhs and all hand calculations were verified. 
p] [ ] [ 1 14. Calculations are sufficiently detailed such that a technically qualified person 
can understand the analysis without requiring outside information. (ORP 
QAPP crilerion 2.5) 
[ ] [ ] [XI 
[ ] [ ] [XI 
15. Software input is correct and consistent with the document reviewed. 
16. Software output is consistent with the input and with the results reported in 
the document reviewed. 
[ ] [ ] [XI 17. Software verification and validation are addressed adequately. (URP QAPP 
criferion 2.6) 
p] [ ] [ ] 18. Limits/criteriaiguidelines applied to the analysis results are appropriate and 
referenced. Limits/criteridguidelines were checked against references. 
(ORP QAPP criterion 2.9) 
[XI [ ] [ ] 
[XI [ ] [ ] 
[XI [ ] [ ] 
[XI [ ] [ 1 
[XI [ ] [ ] 
[XI [ I [ ] 
19. Safety margins are consistent with good engineering practices. 
20. Conclusions are consistent with analytical results and applicable limits. 
21. Results and conclusions address all points in the pu'pose. (ORP QAPP 
22. All references cited in the text, figures, and tables are contained in the 
23. Reference citations (e.g., title and number) are consistent between the text 
24. Only released (Le., not draft) references are cited. (ORP QAPP criferion 2.1) 
criferion 2.3) 
reference list. 
calfout and the reference list. 
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25. Referenced documents are retrievable or othmise available. 
26. The most recent version of each reference is cited, as appropriate. 
27. There are. no duplicate citations in the reference list. 
28. Referenced documents are spelled out (title and number) the fim time they 
29. All acronyms are spelled out the first time they are used. 
30. The Table of Contents is correct. 
31. All figure, table, and section callouts are correct. 
32. Unit conversions are correct and consistent. 
33. The number of significant digits is appropriate and consistent 
34. Chemical reactions are correct and balanced. 
35. At tables are formatted consistently and are free of blank cells. 
36. The document is complete (pages, attachments, and appendices) and in the 
37. The document is free of typographical errors. 
38. The tables are internally consistent. 
39. The document was prepared in accordance with HNF-2353. Section 4.3, 
Attachment B, “Calculation Note Format and Preparation Instructions”. 
40. Impacted documents are appropriately identified in Blocks 7 and 25 of the 
Engineering Change Notice (form A-6003-563. I). 
41. If more than one Technical Peer Reviewer was designated for this document, 
an ovetall review of the entire document was performed after resolution of all 
Technical Peer Review comments and confirmed that the document is self- 
consistent and complete. 
(ORP QAPP criterion 2. I )  
are cited. 
proper order. 
Concurrence 
If No or NA is chosen, provide an explanation on this form. 
- Computer codes not used for this analysis. 
No chemical reactions are included in this analysis. 
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Document Reviewed: RPP-20725, Release of Dried Radioactive Wuste Matmiah Technicul 
Basis Document, Rev. 2 
Scope of Review (e.g., document section or portion of calculation): Technical edit 
Yes No NA* 
[ ] [ ] [XI 1. Previous reviews are complcte and cover the analysis, up to the scope of this 
[ ] [ ] [XI 2. Problem is completely defined. 
[ ] [ ] [XI 3. Accident scenarios are developed in a clear and logical manner. 
[ ] [ ] [XI 4. Analytical and technical approaches and results are reasonable and 
appropriate. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.8) 
[ ] [ ] [XI 5. Necessary assumptions are reasonable, explicitly stated, and supported 
(ORP QAPP criterion 2.2) 
[ ] [ ] [XI 6. Computer codes and data files are documented. 
[ ] [ ] [XI 7. Data used in calculations are explicitly stated. 
[ ] [ ] [XI 8. Bases for calculations, including assumptions and data, are consistent with 
review, with no gaps. 
the supported safety basis document (e.g.. the Tank Farms Documented 
Safety Analysis). 
applicable. (ORP QAPP criferion 2.9) 
discussed, as appropriate. (OW QAPP criterion 2.1 7) 
results. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.16) 
12. Models are appropriate and were used within their established range of 
validity or adequate justification was provided for use outside their 
established range of validity. 
[ ] [ ] [XI 9. Data were chaked for consistency with original souree information as 
[ ] [ ] [XI 
[ ] [ ] [XI 11. Mathematical derivations were checked including dimensional consistency of 
[ ] [ ] [XI 
10. For both qualitative and quantitative data, uncertainties an recognized and 
[ ] [ ] [XI 13. Spreadsheet results and all hand calculations were verified. 
[ ] [ ] [XI 14. Calculations are sufficiently detailed such that a technically qualified person 
can understand the analysis without requiring outside information. (OM 
QAPP criterion 2.5) 
[ ] [ 3 [XI 
[ ] [ ] [XI 
[ ] [ ] [XI 17. Software verification and validation are addressed adequately. (ORP QAPP 
[ ] [ ] [XI 18. Limitdcriteridguidelines applied to the analysisresults are appropriate and 
15. Software input is correct and consistent with the document reviewed. 
16. Software output is consistent with the input and with the results reported in 
the document reviewed. 
rriterion 2.6) 
referenced. Limitderitcridguidelines were checked against referme-. 
(OW QAPP criterion 2.9) 
[ ] [ ] [XI 19. Safety margins are consistent with good engineering practiecs. 
[ I [ I [XI 20. Conclusions are consistent with analytical results and applicable limitsL 
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[ ] [ ] [x] 
[XI [ ] [ 1 
[XI [ ] [ 
[XI [ ] I ] 
[XI 1 3 1 3 
[XI [ ] [ ] 
[XI [ ] [ ] 27. There are no duplicate citations in the reference list. 
[XI [ [ 1 
[XI [ ] [ ] 
[XI [ ] [ ] 30. The Table of Contents is correct. 
[XI [ ] [ ] 31. All figure, table, and section callouts are correct. 
[XI [ ] [ ] 32. Unit conversions are correct and consistent 
[x] [ ] [ 3 33. The numbm of significant digits is appropriale and consistent. 
[ ] [ ] [XI 34. Chemical reactions are correct and balanced 
[XI [ J [ ] 
1x1 [ ] [ ] 
[XI [ ] [ ] 37. The document is free of typographical errors. 
[XI [ ] [ ] 38. The tables are internally consistent. 
[XI [ ] [ 1 
[ ] [ J [XI 
[XI [ ] [ ] 
21. Results and conclusions address all points in the purpose. (OW QAPP 
22. All references cited in the text, figures, and tables are contained in the 
23. Reference citations (e.g., title and number) are consistent between the text 
24, Only released (i.e., not draft) references are cited (OW QAPP criferion 2.1) 
25. Referenced documents are retrievable or otherwise available. 
26. The most recent version of each reference is cited, as appropriate. 
criterion 2.3) 
reference list. 
callout and the reference list. 
(OW QAPP aiterion 2. I) 
28. Referenced documents are spelled out (title and number) the first time they 
29. All acmnyms are spelled out the first time they are used. 
are cited. 
35. All tables are formatted consistently and are free ofblank cells. 
36. The document is complete (pages, attachents, and appendices) and in the 
proper order. 
39. The document was prepared in accordance with HNF-2353, Section 4.3, 
Attachment B, "Calculation Note Format and Preparation Instructions". 
40. Impacted documents are appropriately identified in Blocks 7 and 25 of the 
Engineering Change Notice (form A-6003-563.1). 
41. If more than one Technical Peer Reviewer was designated for this document. 
an overall review of the enlire document was performed d e r  resolution of all 
Technical Peer Review comments and confirmed that the document is self- 
consistent and complete. 
1x1 [ I  [ I  Concurrence 
Leona Germain 3 5 7  10- /$-ob 
Reviewer (Pnnted Name and Signature) fl Date 
* If No or NA is chosen, provide an explanation on this form. 
Technical Edit 
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10110106 as a result of prior p e a  rcviews. 
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2.  
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8 .  
9. 
Previous reviews ~ I V  complete and cover the analysis, up to the scope of this 
review, with no gaps. *EMW&M: 
Problem is completely defined. *~~pimdm:  
Accident scenarios are developed in a clear and logical manner. 
*Exglm+m: 
Anal wal and technical a oaches and results are reasonable and appropriate, 
( O J Q A P P  criterion ~ J ' K p m ~ o n :  , , 
Necessary assum tions are reasonable, expllcdly stated, and supported. (OW 
QAPP criterion $2) *EIpimdon: 
Computer codes and data files are documented. 
'Expl'7"atia": 
Data used in calculations are exdicitlv stated. . -  
*wg~"do": 
Bases for calculations, including assum tions and data, are consistent with the 
supported safety basis document ( e a ,  $e Tank Farms Documented Safety . - .  
kiilysis). *E&&= 
Data were checked for consistency with original source information as applicable 5;"' TAPP criterion 2.9) --don: 
discussed, as appropriate. (ORF' QAFP criterion 2.17) 
10. or bot qualitatwe and quantitative data, uncertainties are recognized and 
.~ . - 
*.%+n"miO": 
11. Mathematical derivations were checked including dimensional consistency of 
results. (ORP QAPP criterion 2-16) 
%IplO"UiiLW 
12. Models are a ropriate and were used within their established range of validity or 
ade uate jugca t ion  was provided for use outside their established range of 
vali$ity. * - h u m  
13. Spreadsheet results and all hand calculations were verified. , 4. ;ym" culanons are sufficient1 detailed such that a technically qualified person can 
understand the analysis wit1out mquiring outside information. (ORP QAPP 
criterion 2.5) *6rpkmmc 
15. Software input is correct and consistent with the document reviewed. 
16. S%are output is consistent with the input and with the results reported in the 
17. Software verification and validation a~ addressed adequately. (ORP QAPP 
18. Limitdcriteridpidelines a plied to the analysis results 
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APPENDIX D 
CONTACT-HANDLED TRANSURANIC MIXED WASTE PACKAGING UNIT 
FACILITY ANALYSIS 
D1.O BACKGROUND 
Dl. l  OVERVIEW 
The Contact-Handled Transuranic Mixed (CH-TRUM) Waste Packaging Unit (WPU) is a 
supplemental technology developed by CH2M HILL to receive, dry, and package CH-TRUM 
waste from tank farm single-shell tank (SST) systems. 
Waste from the 241-I3 and 241-T Tank Farm tanks will be retrieved using the SST waste 
retrieval system (WRS) (vacuum retrieval) and transferred to the CH-TRUM WPU for receipt, 
drying, packaging, and temporary storage prior to being shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant (WIPP). The dried waste will be packaged in %-gal drums and moved via forklift to a 
temporary storage facility where it will be kept prior to shipment to the Hanford Central Waste 
Complex (CWC). 
D1.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The CH-TRUM WPU is a modular, portable, nuclear processing system designed to receive and 
package waste retrieved from 11 SSTs located in the 200 East and 200 West Areas. The 11 
tanks are 241-B-201,241-B-202,241-B-203,241-B-204,241-T-201,241-T-202,241-T-203, 
241-T-204,241-T-104,241-T-110, and 241-T-111. The WPU will be set up and operated 
initially at the 241-B Tank Farm in the 200 East Area. Upon completion of processing at the 
241-B Tank Farm, the WPU will be relocated to the 241-T Tank Farm in the 200 West Area. 
The WPU is sized to process 1.4 million gal of undiluted waste retrieved from 11 SSTs. The 
mission is to complete the packaging of the SST waste in approximately 1 yr, including a 30-day 
transfer of the WPU from the 241-B Tank Farm to the 241-T Tank Farm. The operational 
throughput capacity of the system will be 10,000 gal/day of diluted (nominal 1 :1 dilution) tank 
waste although the system will be designed to handle 12,000 gayday. Additives will be used, as 
necessary, to control the properties of the dried product and insure a flowable material that can 
be transported in the conveyance chute. 
The slurry is dried to a target weight percent water in the waste dryer. A batch of the dried 
material, enough to fill a 55-gal drum to 85% capacity, is fed through the spherical cone valve at 
the waste dryer discharge and metered by a rotary valve into the hopper. Once the requisite 
amount of dried waste has been fed to the hopper, the cone valve is closed and the rotary valve 
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stopped. Subsequently, another cone valve and rotary valve pair at the outlet to the hopper meter 
the dried waste into the drum. 
The hopper and the lower part of the discharge chute, including the lower cone and rotary valves, 
are contained in a ventilated space with gloved ports for installing and deinstalling the 
connection of the bag to the discharge chute. The drum is sealed to the bottom of this 
confinement box prior to connecting the bag to the discharge chute. Once the drum is installed, 
it becomes part of the secondary confinement during filling operations. 
After the requisite amount of dried waste has been delivered into the bag, the operators cut the 
bag below the discharge chute, close off the top, fold the top into the drum and swipe the outside 
of the bag for spreadable contamination. The drum is then decoupled from the confinement box 
and lowered onto a wheeled dolly. The steel lid is replaced on the bottom of the confinement 
box to close off the hole. The drum on the dolly is then rolled out into the lidding area, the lid 
and ring are installed and the ring tightened, and the drum is given a final swipe for spreadable 
contamination. 
An estimated 7,550 55-gal drums (RPP-20499, System Design Description for the Contact- 
Handled Transuranic Mixed Waste Packaging Unit and Support Equipment Project) will be 
filled for final disposal at the WIPP. The condensate resulting from the dryer operation will be 
sent to the Effluent Treatment Facility by tanker truck or returned to the WRS. The operating 
mission is expected to be completed in approximately 1 yr after startup. 
D1.3 REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENTS 
Hazardous conditions were identified that potentially could not be represented by an established 
representative accident (RPP-23479, Preliminaly Documented Safety Analysis for the Contact- 
Handled Transuranic Mixed (CH-TRUM) Waste Facility). These hazardous conditions were all 
related to postulated dry material releases from the Dewatering System (DWS), the Waste 
Packaging System (WPS) or the Off-Gas Treatment System (OGTS). The release of dried 
radioactive waste materials representative accident qualitatively considered in this technical basis 
document is a failure of the dried material conveyance system, which results in the release of 
dried waste to the atmosphere. This condition was selected since the potential drop heights ffom 
the DWS bound those of the WPS. 
D1.3.1 Associated Hazardous Conditions 
In addition to the hazardous conditions that define the representative accident, the hazard 
evaluation database lists other hazardous conditions that are characterized by the representative 
accident. The conditions include release of dried solids from the WPS, release of dried solids 
from the waste dryer, release of dried solids from the containment box due to a failed or missing 
seal to the 55-gal drum, release of dried solids due to drum spill before the lid is installed, spill of 
waste from the waste dryer through the waste conveyance system to the WPU floor (drum not 
present and waste conveyance valves not present or not closed), release of dried waste from the 
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WPS due to a failed or missing seal to the 55-gal drum, release of dried waste from the WPS due 
to the drum not being in place (operator error}, a small fire (e.g., resulting from a vehicle impact 
or a hydraulic system leak) that causes weakening and failure of the waste dryer steel 
superstructure resulting in a fall of dried waste from greater than 3 m, and release of dried solids 
from the OGTS due to filtration failure. 
D2.0 RISK BINNING EVALUATION 
During meetings conducted January 27,2005, and February 16,2005, consensus was obtained 
on the assignment of frequencies, consequences, and controls. The meeting attendees 
represented a wide range of expertise in the areas of engineering, licensing, and operations. 
Appendix E lists the meeting attendees. The risk binning results for scenarios considered in this 
document are shown in Table D2-1. 
D2.1 REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENT: FAILURE OF WASTE DRYER OR DRIED 
WASTE CONVEYANCE SYSTEM WITH FALL HEIGHT GREATER THAN 3 M 
Accident Scenario 
As part of the CH-TRUM WPU, waste will be dried and packaged in %-gal drums for disposal 
at the WIPP. Dried waste is transferred from the dryer to the WPS via the waste conveyance 
system. Each dryer is mounted on a steel Superstructure directly over its respective WPS with 
the bottom of the dryer approximately 18 ft above grade level. In the accident scenario, solids 
are released to drop on the ground kom a failure in the waste conveyance system. The release 
could occur at any point between the dryer and the 55-gal drum. The result is release of the dried 
material to the atmosphere. It is conservatively assumed that there is no confinement and the 
solids move as a free-flowing powder. 
Frequency Determination 
Failure of the dried material conveyance system could be the result of one of several possible 
causes, including vehicle impacts, a seismic event, manufacturing defects, small fire, or 
installation errors. The design basis earthquake has a return period that puts it in the “unlikely” 
frequency range. Failures due to manufacturing defects or installation errors are judged to be 
“unlikely” because the equipment will be new, and the facility has a limited operating life. 
Additionally, all systems will be tested during startup prior to operating with the tank waste. 
Even though vehicle accidents are considered anticipated events, the dried material conveyance 
system is in a location that is relatively inaccessible by vehicle traffic. Therefore, the event was 
assigned a frequency bin of “unlikely.” 
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Consequence Determination 
To provide an estimate of the radiological and toxicological consequences, scoping calculations 
were performed that are documented in Appendix F. The accident scenario, without controls, 
assumes failure of the dried material conveyance system that is used to transport the dried waste 
from the DWS to the plastic liner of a 55-gal drum. The waste is spilled from the dried material 
conveyance system to a hard, unyielding surface open to ambient conditions. 
The spill is assumed to contain a complete dryer batch (6,120 L) of dried sludge from the 
bounding CH-TRUM tank. The waste is assumed to be dried to 0 wt% water instead of the 
planned 3-20 wt% water. This assumption maximizes the unit-liter dose (ULD) for the dried 
waste. 
The radiological ULDs for the CH-TRUM tank waste were taken from RPP-5924, Radiological 
Source Terms for Tank Farms Safety Analysis, and the toxicological sum of fiaction (SOF) 
multipliers were taken from RPP-8369, Chemical Source Terms for Tank Farms Safety Analyses. 
The atmospheric dispersion factors are from RPP- 1 3482, Atmospheric Dispersion Coeficients 
and Radiological and Toxicological Exposure Mefhodology for Use in Tank Farms, and the 
airborne release fraction, respirable fraction, and airborne release rate are from 
DOE-HDBK-3010-94, Airborne Release FractiondRates and Respirable Fractions for 
Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. 
A complete list of the analysis assumptions, the potential effect of changes in the assumption, 
and the need to evaluate or protect the assumptions are presented in Table D2-2. 
Assignment of Consequence Bins 
Although the evaluation of consequences was intended to be qualitative, the radiological and 
toxicological characteristics of the CH-TRUM material at risk (MAR) are significantly different 
from those of previous analyses of releases of dried radioactive waste powder. Therefore, the 
previous analyses did not provide a frame of reference for the qualitative judgment. Therefore, 
the consequences were estimated based on scoping calculations shown in Appendix F. 
Tables D2-3 and D2-4 compare the calculated consequences of the representative accident to the 
radiological and toxicological risk evaluation guidelines. The onsite radiological consequences 
were above both the 25 rem guideline and the 100 rem guideline; therefore, they were assigned 
to a consequence bin of “high.” Both, the onsite and offsite toxicological consequences were 
shown to be above both the “moderate” and the “high” guidelines and were assigned to a 
consequence bin of “high.” 
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Case 
Release of dried radioactive waste 
materials 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
Onsite radiological consequences 
Moderate 
consequence 
guideline (rem) 
(rem) 
1,300 25 100 
High consequence 
guideline Calculated dose 
(rem) 
Table D2-3. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Release of Dried Radioactive Waste Materials Representative Accident. 
Case 
Release of 
dried radio- 
active waste 
materials 
Onsite Offsite 
Moderate 
consequence High consequence Moderate consequence High consequence 
SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF Gutdeline 
3,800 1 2,300 1 7.9 I 2.6 1 
Table D2-4. Summary of Toxicological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Release of Dried Radioactive Waste Materials Representative Accident. 
I ToxicoIoeIcal Conseauences I 
Assignment of Environmental Consequences 
An environmental consequence of E3 was assigned since a discharge of 6,120 L of powder was 
shown to have the potential for offsite discharge. 
Assignment of Risk Bins without Controls 
Table D2-1 summarizes the frequency, consequence, and risk bin assignments for the release of 
dried radioactive waste materials representative accident. The assignment of risk bins is derived 
from the consequences and estimated frequency of the accident. The risk bin for the offsite 
toxicological receptor is I because the consequence is “high” and the estimated frequency is 
“unlikely.” The risk bin for the onsite toxicological receptor is 1 because the consequence is 
“high” and the estimated frequency is “unlikely.” The onsite radiological risk bin is I due to the 
“high” consequences and “unlikely” frequency. 
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D2.2 RELEASE OF DRIED RADIOACTIVE WASTE MATERIALS ASSOCIATED 
HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS 
The results of the risk binning process for the hazardous conditions covered by the representative 
accident in this document are contained within the hazard evaluation database. The hazard 
evaluation database includes the basis for each consequence and frequency. Consensus was 
reached by the risk binning team that all the represented hazardous conditions were bounded 
with respect to consequences by the representative accident. However, the frequencies of the 
represented hazardous conditions were generally higher. 
In addition to the hazardous conditions that define the representative accident, the hazard 
evaluation database lists other hazardous conditions that are characterized by the representative 
accident. These conditions include: 
4 
r 
Release of dried waste from the dried waste conveyance system or WPS (less than 3 m) 
Release of dried waste due to spilling a drum prior to installing the lid (less than 3 m) 
Release of dried waste ftom the waste dryer through the dried waste conveyance system 
to the WPS floor due to the drum not being in place (assumes the waste conveyance 
valves are not present or are not closed) (greater than 3 m) (operator error) 
Release of dried waste from the WPS due to a failed or missing seal to the 55-gal drum 
(less than 3 m) 
A small fire (e.g., resulting from vehicle impact or hydraulic system leak) that causes 
weakening and failure of the waste dryer steel superstructure and release of dried waste 
(greater than 3 m) 
Release of dried solids from the OGTS due to filtration failure. 
rn 
The risk binning team considered the process design as well as the conservatisms in the analysis 
when assigning consequence and frequency bins to the other represented hazardous conditions. 
The results are presented with the representative accident in Table D-1, and are discussed below. 
D2.2.1 Failure of Waste Dryer or Dried Waste 
Conveyance System with Fall Height Less 
than 3 m 
Scenario 
This condition can occur when a breach occurs in the dried waste conveyance system or W S  at 
a location where the spill height of dried waste material is restricted by the presence of a solid 
surface less than 3 m below the breach. The event could be caused by a number of initiators, 
including vehicle impact, a seismic or other natural phenomena hazard event, material defects or 
mechanical failures. The waste would drop from the dried waste conveyance system to the solid 
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surface resulting in the generation of radioactive “dust” as well as a smaIl amount of entrainment 
and resuspension due to air movement. 
Frequency Determination 
Failure of the dried waste conveyance system or WPS (e.g., dried waste hopper, dried waste 
hopper secondary confinement box) could be the result of one of several possible causes, 
including vehicle impacts, a seismic event, manufacturing defects, or installation errors. The 
design basis earthquake has a return period that puts it in the “unlikely” frequency range. 
Failures due to manufacturing defects or installation errors are judged to be “unlikely” because 
the equipment will be new, and the facility has a limited operating life. However, vehicle 
accidents are considered anticipated events because this portion of the conveyance system is 
accessible to vehicle traffic and is subject to spills less than 3 m above grade (e.g., dried waste 
hopper, WPS). Therefore, the event was assigned a frequency of “anticipated.” 
Consequence Determination 
Scoping calculations, shown in Appendix F, give a conservative estimate of the consequences for 
this scenario. The onsite radiological consequences were estimated to be “moderate.” The 
offsite toxicological consequences were estimated to be “Iow.” The onsite toxicological 
consequences were estimated to be “high.” 
Assignment of Risk Bins Without Controls 
Table D2-1 summarizes the frequency, consequences, and risk bin without controls for this 
postulated dried waste release accident scenario. 
An “anticipated” frequency and “moderate” consequence results in this scenario being 
categorized as Risk Bin I for onsite radiological consequences. An “anticipated” frequency and 
“high” consequence results in this scenario being categorized as Risk Bin I for onsite 
toxicological consequences. An “anticipated” frequency and ‘‘low” consequence results in this 
scenario being categorized as Risk Bin I11 for offsite toxicological consequences. 
D2.2.2 Release of Dried Waste from the Waste 
Packaging System Due to a Drum Spill 
In this scenario a release of dried waste results from tipping over a drum before the lid is 
installed. The failure is due to operator error. The material in the drum would drop to the floor 
of the International Organization for Standardization (1.50) container releasing a fraction of the 
spill into the air. 
Frequency Determination 
The frequency for a drum spill that results in the release of dried radioactive waste materials 
could be caused by human error. Therefore, the spill was judged to be “anticipated.” 
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Consequence Determination 
This scenario is similar to the spill of dried waste from the conveyance system at a height of less 
than 3 m Erom the spill surface. The MAR in this case is the contents of a single 55-gal drum. It 
is conservatively assumed that the drum was erroneously filled beyond the 85% full operating 
limit to its full capacity (55 gal). The onsite radiological consequence was estimated to be 
“low.” The onsite toxicological consequence was estimated as “high,” and the offsite 
toxicological consequence was estimated as “low.” 
Assignment of Risk Bins Without Controls 
Table D2-1 summarizes the frequency, consequences, and risk bin without controls for this 
postulated dried waste release accident scenario. 
An “anticipated” frequency and “high” consequence results in this scenario being categorized as 
Risk Bin I for onsite toxicological consequences. An “anticipated” frequency and “low” 
consequence results in this scenario being categorized as Risk Bin I11 for onsite radiological and 
offsite toxicological consequences. 
D2.2.3 Release of Dried Waste from the Waste 
Packaging System Due to Failed or Missing 
Seal to the 55-Gal Drum 
Scenario 
This scenario postulates that dried waste material could leak into the W S  container during 
processing if operators were to attempt to initiate waste transfer with a failed seal between the 
drum and the WPS secondary confinement box. 
Frequency Determination 
This condition would likely be due to human error. Therefore, a frequency bin of “anticipated” 
was assigned. 
Consequence Determination 
No quantification of consequences of this scenario was made. Leakage, if any, from the gap 
between the drum and WPS secondary confinement box is expected to be bounded by the spill 
from the dried material conveyance system or the WPS (less than 3 m) scenario (Section D2.2.1.) 
The consequence bins were qualitatively assigned to be lower than those assigned for the spills 
and falls of dried waste from heights of less than 3 m because the seal leak scenario is postulated 
to result in a smaller release of dried material. The onsite radiological and the offsite 
toxicological bins are “low.” The onsite toxicological risk bin is qualitatively assigned to be 
“moderate.” 
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Assignment of Risk Bins Without Controls 
Table D2-1 summarizes the frequency, consequences, and risk bin without controls for this 
postulated dried waste release accident. 
An “anticipated” frequency and “moderate” consequence results in this scenario being 
categorized as Risk Bin I for onsite toxicological consequences. An “anticipated” frequency and 
“low” consequence results in this scenario being categorized as Risk Bin I11 for onsite 
radiological and offsite toxicoIogica1 consequences. 
D2.2.4 Release of Dried Radioactive Waste from the 
Waste Packaging System Due to the Drum 
not in Place 
Scenario 
In this scenario a release of dried waste results from a failure to have the plastic drum liner and 
drum connected to the conveyance chute before commencing dried waste transfer. The bounding 
assumption for this scenario is that the spill couId be from the dryer, down an unobstructed 
pathway through the conveyance system to the floor of the IS0  container. The bounding result 
is the same as for the spill of dried waste from a height greater than 3 m. 
Frequency Determination 
The frequency without controls for a failure to ensure the liner and drum are in place before 
commencing waste conveyance operations is judged to be “anticipated” because it would be 
caused by human error. 
Consequence Determination 
The consequences for this scenario were conservatively estimated to be the same as for the 
representative accident. The onsite radiological, and onsite and offsite toxicological 
consequences were estimated to be “high.” 
Assignment of Risk Bins Without Controls 
Table D2-1 summarizes the frequency, consequences, and risk bin without controIs for this 
postulated dried waste release accident scenario. 
An “anticipated” frequency and “high” consequence results in this scenario being categorized as 
Risk Bin I for onsite toxicological consequences. An “anticipated” frequency and “high” 
consequence results in this scenario being categorized as Risk Bin I for onsite radiological and 
offsite toxicological consequences. 
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D2.2.5 Release of Dried Waste (Height Greater than 
3 m) Due to Small Fire-Induced Dryer 
Superstructure Failure and Subsequent 
Waste Dryer Collapse 
Scenario 
In this scenario, a small fire (e.g., resulting from a vehicle impact or a hydraulic system Ieak) 
causes weakening and failure of the steel superstructure supporting the waste dryer resulting in a 
collapse of the waste dryer and a subsequent fall of dried waste from greater than 3 m. 
Frequency Determination 
Based on operational experience, fires involving vehicles have occurred in the past, but were not 
of the type that directly involved waste or waste containers such as those described by the 
postulated representative accident. In addition, RPP-242 1 7, Technical Basis Report for Large 
Fire Accidents Involving Aboveground TankdVesseIs, judges leaks from the CH-TRUM 
hydraulic system to be “unlikely.” Thus, the tank waste container fire scenario is judged to be 
less than anticipated and the accident is qualitatively assigned a frequency of “unlikely.” 
Consequence Determination 
The consequences for this scenario were conservatively estimated to be the same as for the 
representative accident. The onsite radiological consequences were estimated to be “high.” The 
onsite and offsite toxicological consequences were estimated to be “high.” 
Risk Bin Results Without Controls 
Table D2-1 summarizes the frequency, consequences, and risk bin without controls for this 
postulated dried waste release accident. An ‘‘unlikely’’ frequency and “high” consequence 
results in this scenario being categorized as Risk Bin I for onsite radiological and onsite and 
offsite toxicological consequences. 
D2.2.6 Release of Dried Waste from the Off-Gas 
Treatment System Due to Filtration Failure 
Scenario 
In this scenario the OGTS high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters (and prefilters) fail due 
to high temperature or high pressure, causing a partial release of the maximum waste loading on 
the filters. This is followed by an 8-hr unfiltered release from the CH-TRUM WPU at the 
maximum exhauster flow rate. 
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An 8-hr unfiltered release could also occur at the maximum exhauster flow rate due to an error 
during filter maintenance, gross leakage around a misaligned filter, or damage to the ductwork. 
This release is also included in the first two scenarios, but in this third scenario there is no 
release from the filters. 
Frequency Determination 
The HEPA over-temperature accident may occur as a result of a ventilation system heater failure 
or an external fire. The HEPA over pressure accident is similar to an event believed to have 
occurred in the past when a filter became saturated with moisture and was subsequently damaged 
when the ventilation fans were activated. The unfiltered release path could occur from several 
causes, including human error during filter maintenance. Therefore, the event is assigned a 
frequency of “anticipated.” 
Consequence Determination 
The consequences of the two filter failure scenarios (high temperature and high pressure) are 
dominated by the portion of the consequences that come from the 8-hr unfiltered release 
following the filter failure event. Therefore, the consequences of 8 hr of leakage around the filter 
are essentially the same as the consequences of the filter failure scenarios. The onsite 
radiological and the onsite and offsite toxicological consequences are estimated to be in the 
“low” consequence bin. 
Risk Bin Results Without Controls 
Table 2-1 summarizes the frequency, consequences, and risk bin without controls for this 
postulated dried waste release accident. An “anticipated” frequency and “low” consequence 
results in this scenario being categorized as Risk Bin 111 for onsite radiological and onsite and 
offsite toxicological consequences. 
D3.0 CONTROL SELECTION 
Control selection was accomplished in formal risk binning and control selection meetings held 
on April 2,2004, January 27,2005, and February 16,2005, and in an email sent March 3,2005, 
to the control selection group by Nuclear Safety and Licensing in which additional control 
recommendations were made. Meeting attendees represented an appropriate range of expertise 
and relevant experience in the areas of transportation, waste handling, licensing, and operations. 
The results of scoping calculations used to develop the accident analysis documented herein 
were available to the control decision meeting attendees to assist in the decision process. The 
meeting attendees and their respective organizational affiliation are listed in Appendix E. The 
email sent to the control decision group is also included in Appendix E. Risk binning and 
control decision results were documented in meeting minutes. The specific risk binning results 
are discussed in Section D2.0, and the specific control selection results are discussed in the 
following sections. 
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D3.1 PROPOSED CONTROLS FOR THE RELEASE 
OF DRIED RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
MATERIALS REPRESENTATIVE 
ACCIDENT 
A summary of the consequence analysis of the representative accident and associated hazardous 
conditions, as well as a discussion of the risk binning results, was presented to the control 
selection team. The group then proposed and discussed potential controls for the representative 
accident and the associated hazardous conditions. The discussion focused on two potential 
controls schemes. 
The first control strategy considered was referred to as “active confinement.” It consisted of 
secondary confinement of the dried waste streams coupled with active ventilation to provide 
negative pressure within the confinement thus preventing leaks outside of the confinement. The 
ventilation would exhaust through a HEPA filter to remove any suspended waste. 
The second control strategy was referred to as “passive confinement.” This strategy also uses 
secondary confinement, but does not rely on active ventilation. In this strategy, the secondary 
confinement would be tested for bypass leakage to ensure that any spill within the confinement 
would not be released to the environment through a non-filtered path. 
The third and final (selected) control strategy considered involves the use of active secondary 
confinement in the DWS IS0 freight container provided by a single safety-significant OGTS 
exhauster, with safe shutdown of the waste dryer upon loss of negative differential pressure. 
Although safe shutdown of the waste dryer is required on a loss of active secondary confinement, 
a significant amount ofwaste will necessarily remain in the dryer. Therefore, an additional level 
of protection is provided by the use of passive secondary confinement, comprising the DWS IS0 
freight container and inlet HEPA filter. 
D3.2 SELECTED CONTROLS FOR THE RELEASE 
OF DRIED RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
MATERIALS REPRESENTATIVE 
ACCIDENT 
D3.2.1 Controi Selection 
The proposed controls were discussed and evaluated by the group. Control decision criteria are 
established in: 
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, ‘T\Tuclear Safety Management” 
Subpart B, (1 0 CFR 830) 
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DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreacfor 
Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses 
DOE G 421 .l-2, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Documented Safety 
Analyses tu Meet Subpart 3 of I O  CFR 830 
DOE G 423.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Safety Requirements 
Klein and Schepens 2003, “Replacement of Previous Guidance Provided by RL and 
ORP”. 
The control decision preference can be summarized as follows: 
I .  Preventive controls over mitigative 
2. Passive controls over active control 
3. Engineering controls over administrative controls 
4. Controls with the highest reliability 
5. Controls closest to the hazard 
6. Controls with the lowest implementation and maintenance costs. 
D3.2.2 Selected Control Strategy 
Credited Design Features for this strategy prevent dried waste releases directly to the 
atmosphere. The dryers and connecting lines to the conveyor that are within the IS0 freight 
container (a waste transfer-associated structure) shall maintain their confinement for anticipated 
environmental and operating conditions. The waste conveyance system primary confinement 
must contain the dried waste and the secondary confinement must confine dried waste releases 
from primary confinement failures. The secondary conveyance system confinement is relied on 
to mitigate a dried waste release from the primary confinement. 
The safety structures, systems, and components (SSC), technical safety requirement (TSR) 
controls, and design features selected for preventing or mitigating dried waste release accidents 
during CH-TRUM WPU operations are summarized below. For each safety SSC and TSR, the 
safety function is described. 
Safety Significant SSCs 
Safety-significant SSCs for the representative accident, failure of the waste dryer or dried waste 
conveyance system resulting in a dried waste spill from a height greater than 3 m, include: 
Waste dryer confinement. 
Dried waste conveyance system between the waste dryer and the plastic liner of the drum 
(includes piping, valves and the hopper). 
Dried waste hopper secondary confinement box. 
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I 
WPS secondary Confinement box system. 
Interlock to close valve(s) to stop dried waste flow on loss ofvacuum in the hopper 
secondary confinement box and WPS confinement box/drum system, thus limiting the 
release. This interlock system will meet single-failure criteria. This control would also 
be used to mitigate the hazard of initiating waste transfer when a drum is not in place. 
DWS IS0 freight container. 
Waste dryer discharge valve. 
Vehicle barriers. 
Dried waste hopper/WPS secondary confinement vacuum interlock system. 
DWS IS0 freight container ventilation system. 
DWS IS0 freight container negative pressure monitoring and alarm system. 
DWS IS0 freight container inlet HEPA filter. 
DWS IS0 freight container OGTS HEPA filter. 
Dried waste hopper discharge valve. 
Because the accident could be initiated by a seismic event or other natural phenomena hazards, 
the designation of the waste dryer, the conveyance system, the hopper secondary confinement 
box, the WPS confinement box system, the DWS IS0  freight container, the DWS IS0 freight 
container ventilation system and the DWS IS0 freight container HEPA filters are designed to 
performance category-2 (PC-2) natural phenomenon hazard requirements. 
The safety function of the waste dryer and the dried waste conveyance system including the 
hopper, piping and valves, is to maintain primary confinement of the dried waste under 
postulated accident conditions, thus decreasing the frequency of  a dried waste accident. 
The safety function of the DWS IS0 freight container, the DWS IS0 container ventilation 
system, the dried waste hopper secondary confinement box, and the WPS secondary confinement 
box system, the DWS I S 0  freight container inlet HEPA filter and the DWS IS0 freight container 
OGTS filter is to provide secondary confinement of the dried waste in the event of a primary 
system breach, thus decreasing the consequences of a dried waste accident. 
The safety function of the DWS IS0 freight container ventilation system is to maintain a 
negative pressure in the DWS IS0 freight container, thus decreasing the consequences of a 
release of dried waste accident. The safety function of the DWS I S 0  freight container inlet and 
OGTS HEPA filters is to provide HEPA filtration, thus decreasing the consequences of a release 
of a dried waste accident. HEPA filters shall provide a minimum 99.95 % efficiency. The DWS 
IS0  freight container negative pressure monitoring and alarm system will provide an alarm 
signal to initiate operator response and safe shutdown of the waste dryer unless the pressure in 
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the DWS I S 0  freight container is negative with respect to atmosphere, thus decreasing the 
frequency of a dried waste accident. 
The safety function of the dried waste hopper/WPS secondary confinement vacuum interlock 
system is to prevent the release by closing off the flow path from the waste dryer to the 
conveyance system in the event of a loss of negative pressure differential with respect to 
atmosphere in the hopperiWPS secondary confinement boxes, thus decreasing the frequency of 
a dried waste accident. If operators were to attempt to initiate waste transfer without the drum 
in place or with a failed seal between the drum and the WPS confinement box, the interlock 
would prevent the release. 
The safety function of the waste dryer discharge valve and the dried waste hopper discharge 
valve is to close, and to fail closed, when a loss of negative pressure signal is received from the 
dried waste hopper/WPS secondary confinement vacuum interlock system, thus decreasing the 
frequency of a dried waste accident. 
The safety function of aboveground transfer vehicle barriers is to prevent dried waste releases 
from the waste dryers, the dried waste conveyance system, or an open drum caused by vehicle 
collision, thus decreasing the frequency of a dried waste accident. 
Technical Safety Requirements 
The TSR controls include new limiting condition for operation (LCO): 
1. Dried waste hopperANPS secondary confmement vacuum interlock system. 
The safety function of this LCO is to ensure the operability of the dried waste hopper 
confinement/WPS secondary confinement vacuum interlock system, thus decreasing the 
frequency of a dried waste accident. The monitoring and interlock system is required to 
be operable when the dried waste material is being conveyed from the waste dryer into 
the plastic-lined drum. It will prevent or mitigate release of dried waste into the WPS 
IS0 freight container by ensuring that waste transfer will stop, or will not be started, if 
the pressure in the dried waste hopper confinement or the in the WPS secondary 
confinement box is greater than the pressure in the WPS IS0 container. 
2. DWS IS0 freight container ventilation system. 
The safety function ofthis LCO is to ensure the DWS IS0 freight container ventilation 
system is operable, thus decreasing the consequences of a dried waste accident. The 
ventilation system must operate to maintain the pressure in the DWS IS0 freight 
container negative with respect to atmosphere whenever the waste dryer is operating. 
3. DWS IS0 freight container negative pressure monitoring and alarm system. 
The safety function of this LCO is to ensure the operability of the DWS IS0 freight 
container negative pressure monitoring and alarm system, thus decreasing the 
consequences of a dried waste accident. This system will alarm and alert operators to a 
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condition of loss of negative pressure in the DWS IS0  freight container, thus initiating 
operator response to safely shut down the waste dryer. 
Additional TSR controls include the following administrative controls: 
CH-TRUM WPU Controls: 
DWS IS0  freight container inlet and OGTS HEPA filters efficiency testing 
DWS IS0 freight container bypass leakage rate 
0 
e 
Waste dryer openings and seals 
DWS IS0 freight container doors 
Vehicle impact barriers at all locations where a vehicle impact could lead to a spill of 
the dried waste material 
Safety Management Programs: 
Hoisting and rigging safety management program 
Fire protection safety management program 
Emergency Preparedness Program. 
Design Features include the following: 
Plastic liners for drums 
Drums 
Drum stabilizer. 
D3.2.3 
Table D3-1 summarizes the frequency, consequences, and risk bin with controls for each 
postulated dried waste release accident scenario. The risk bin results with controls for each 
scenario are discussed below. 
Risk Bin Results With Controls 
Failure of Waste Dryer or Dried Waste Conveyance System with Fall Height Greater than 
3 rn. Application of the stated controls is qualitatively judged to reduce the onsite and offsite 
toxicological consequences and the onsite radiological consequences of the dried waste release 
accident from the waste dryer or dried waste conveyance system to the “moderate” consequence 
category. In addition, the application of the controls is qualitatively evaluated to reduce the 
frequency of the dried waste release accident from greater than 3 m, from “unlikely” to 
“extremely unlikely.” Equipment built to PC-2 seismic design criteria should withstand the 
design basis earthquake which falls in the “unlikely” frequency range. Therefore, an earthquake 
of greater magnitude than the design basis earthquake would be an “extremely unlikely” 
occurrence. The accident scenario involving a spill from greater than 3 m high is thus reduced to 
Risk Bin 111 for offsite and onsite toxicological exposures and onsite radiological exposure. 
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Failure of Waste Dryer or Dried Waste Conveyance System with Falt Height Less than 
3 m. Application of the stated controls is qualitatively judged to reduce the onsite radiological 
consequence to the “low” consequence category and the onsite toxicological consequence of the 
dried waste release accident from the waste dryer or dried waste conveyance system to the 
“moderate” consequence category. In addition, the application of the controls is qualitatively 
judged to reduce the frequency of the dried waste release accident for spills less than 3 rn, from 
“anticipated” to “unlikely.” The accident scenario involving a spill from less than 3 m high is 
thus reduced to Risk Bin I11 for onsite radiological releases and Risk Bin I1 for onsite 
toxicological exposures. 
Release of Dried Waste from the WPS Due to a Drum Spill. To address the dried waste 
release due to the tipping over of a full waste drum before the lid is in place, a drum stabilizer is 
provided as a design feature to prevent the accident. After filling, the 55-gal drum is pulled out 
from under the fill station containment box to a shielded area for reinstallation of the lid and 
where surveying and decontamination is performed if necessary. The “tip-resistant” design 
enhances the stainless steel shielding barrier so that it also provides drum stabilization to prevent 
tipping. In addition, the enhanced design also provides a broader wheel base on the dolly so that 
the drum cannot tip over as the result of an earthquake, or by being impacted by a vehicle. An 
earthquake of greater magnitude than the design basis earthquake would be required to tip over 
the drum. This earthquake has an “extremely unlikely” frequency of occurrence. The drum 
stabilizer design feature is therefore judged to reduce the accident frequency to “extremely 
unlikely,” which combined with “high” onsite toxicological consequences, results in Risk Bin 11. 
Release of Dried Waste from the WPS Due to Failed or Missing Seal to the 55-Gal Drum. 
The controls selected for the representative dried waste release accident also work to prevent or 
mitigate the hazardous conditions associated with this scenario. Safety SSCs and TSRs for the 
waste dryer or dried waste conveyance system (greater than 3 m fall height) failure scenario are 
discussed in Section D3.2.2. The safety function of the dried waste hopper/WPS secondary 
confinement vacuum interlock system is to prevent the release by closing off the flow path from 
the waste dryer to the conveyance system in the event of a loss of negative pressure differential 
with respect to atmosphere in the hopperiWPS secondary confinement boxes, thus decreasing the 
frequency of a dried waste accident. If operators were to attempt to initiate waste transfer with a 
failed seal between the drum and the WPS confinement box, the interlock would prevent the 
release. An “unlikely” frequency and “low” consequences results in this scenario being 
categorized as Risk Bin I11 for onsite radiological and onsite and offsite toxicological 
consequences. 
Release of Dried Radioactive Waste from the WPS Due to the Drum not in Place. The 
controls selected for the representative dried waste release accident also work to prevent or 
mitigate the hazardous conditions associated with the both of these scenarios. Safety SSCs and 
TSRs for the waste dryer or dried waste conveyance system (greater than 3 m fall height) failure 
scenario are discussed in Section D3.2.2. The safety function of the dried waste hopperiWPS 
secondary confinement vacuum interlock system is to prevent the release by closing off the 
flowpath from the waste dryer to the conveyance system in the event of a loss of negative 
pressure differential with respect to atmosphere in the hopper/WPS secondary confinement 
boxes, thus decreasing the frequency of a dried waste accident. If operators were to attempt to 
initiate waste transfer without the drum in place, the interlock would prevent the release. An 
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“unlikely” frequency and “moderate” consequences results in this scenario being categorized as 
Risk Bin I1 for onsite radiological and onsite and offsite toxicological consequences. 
Release of Dried Waste (Height Greater than 3 m) Due to Small Fire-Induced Dryer 
Superstructure Failure and Waste Dryer Collapse. The safety function of the fire protection 
safety management program is to prevent collapse of the steel superstructure supporting the 
waste dryer caused by a fire, thus decreasing the frequency of a release of dried waste accident. 
A fire resistant coating with a 2-hr fire rating on the waste dryer steel superstructure would 
satisfy the safety function. Application of the fKe protection safety management program control 
is qualitatively judged to reduce the frequency of the fire-initiated dryer failure scenario from 
“unlikely” to “extremely unlikely,” which combined with “hi@ consequences, results in Risk 
Bin I1 for onsite radiological and onsite and offsite toxicological exposures. 
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APPENDIX E 
CONTACT-HANDLED TRANSURANIC MIXED WASTE RISK BINNING/CONTROL 
ALLOCATION MEETING ATTENDEES 
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APPENDIX E 
CONTACT-HANDLED TRANSURANIC MIXED WASTE RISK BINNING/CONTROL 
ALLOCATION MEETING ATTENDEES 
CE-TRUM Control Decision Meeting Attendance Sheet 
Meeting Subject: Release of Ow Materials Accident Date: A~ril2.2004 
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CONTROL DECISION MEETING ATTENDANCE 
Meeting Subject: CH-TRUM Dried Waste Release 
Meeting Date: 1/27/05 
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CB-TRUM Control Decision Meeting Attendance Sheet 
Meeting Subject: Dried Waste Release Accident Date: Febrvnrv 16.2005 
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Sefety Management Programs: 
Fire protection 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
Safety function Comments 
To prevent collapse ofthe lwste 
over superstr,tcture caused by a 
tire. tnus decreasing the frequency 
of a release of dned waste accident 
A flre resistant coaling with a 
2-hour nre rating on the waste 
dryer superstnreture w u l d  sattsfy 
the rafelyhnction 
Fmm: Kozbwski, Stephen 
Sent: Wednesday, March 02,2005 159 F'M 
To: Scott, Walter B; Bryson, Dana C; Nelson, Roger; Janicek, eorge P; Kripps, Lawrence 3; Bryan, 
Wesley E (Wes); 'shawn.hailey@dmjm.com'; Kummerer, Maryanne.; Holm, Melissa J; 
'Mark.VanderZanden@dmjm.com'; Tedexhi, Allan R (Rick); Saubnan, Mark; Reichmuth, Curtis R; 
Grgsby, I M (Mike); 'sam.baker@dmjm.com'; Willingham, Grady A; Landon, Matthew R; Heath, Richard 
E; Jennings, Michael -1; Blackbrd, Leonard T (Ty) 
Cc: Danna, Marc; Higuera, Maurice I; Gxk, Thomas G (Torn); Marchese, Andrew R 
Subject: Additional Control [ k i s i o n s  for the Release OF hied Waste and Waste Container Sbtage and 
Handling Accidenb] 
Additional control declsions are required for two new accident scenarios thal were identified by Nick Barito during 
preparation of RPP-21599, PreAmmay fin? H8zanis Ana@& forthe ContaCt-HamrEed Trenwrenk Mixed Waste 
Packaging and Temprafy S t o m  FacNffBs (draft). The CKTRUM PFHA Is cumenlly being prepared in suppott of 
the CH-TRUM PDSA. [Note: A Word varslon of this email is attached.] 
The fin1 scenario identified during preparation of the CKTRUM PFHA Involves a new inllalor to the dried waste 
release accident that was previously analyzed In RPP-20275. R e k w  ororled Radioacthe Waste h!aterhls 
Tecbnka/aeJis DocumM, Rev. 1 (draf!). The scenario invohs  a small fire that occurs in the WPS is0 conblner. 
DWS IS0 container, or exterior tothose faclilties, but in the vicinity ofthe dryer support superstructure. The Rre does 
not progress into a large fire. but bums for sumcient Ume l o  weaken and subsequently fail the dryer's steel 
superstructure causlng the dryer to coiiapse. The accident results in a release of dried waste From a splH from a 
height of 18 n (5.5 In). This is the bounding drled release scenarlo wlth a ratllological dose of 1.4 rem o7Me and 
'high" offsile toxicological consequences that was discussed in the control decision meetings held forthat accident on 
Januaty 27. 2005 and Februaly 16,2005 (ref. meeting minutes). Additlonal controls are required because the 
controls for that accident do not prevent or mltlgate a small fire initlalor to the dried waste accldent 
The fire does not result in a release from the fire slnce, as postulated, It does not reach sumcient size or energy to 
breach the dryer. The large flre scenario. whlch does analyze the release due to aflre. Is analyzed In RPP-24217. 
Technical Basis Report for l a@ Fire A c ~ M o n t ~  InuoMng Aboveground Tankdeaseb, Rev. 1 (drfl) In suppott at 
the CKTRUM PDSA. 
While, several potential control options were discussed internally withln NS&L and with Nick Earilo, it was agreed that 
only one option addresses all causes ofthe flre (e.g., vehicle fuel fires, range fires, hydraulic oll fire, 
electrlcaUcombustlble matertal fires. etc.) and Is consistent wllh the approach taken In the tank farms DSA. 
The control option recommended by NS8L is !he fire pmtection safely management program, a TSR-level control in 
the lank farms DSA (AC 5.7, Safely Management Programs). The fire protection program would recommend now lo 
meet this requlrement (e.g.. fire resistant coatlng thal meets UL classification for a 2-hr flre). The flre protection 
program would also specify or approve the speciRc coating used, and how and where it needs to be applied. If the 
control deelsion team concurs with thls NS&L recommendallon. the foliowlng will be added tb Table 3.3.2.4.7-3 
(Summary of Technical Safety RequiremeMn for the Release of Dried Waste Accidenl) in chapter 3 of the PDSA: 
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The second scenaflo ldcntlned durlng preparalbn of the CKTRUM PFHA Involves a varlatlon of the exlstlng 
transporlatlon-related storage and handling mechanical Impact and vehlcie fuel fire reDresentaklc accident scenarios 
that have been previousiy analyzed. 
The transporlalo~related storage and handling acct(Ms have been updated slnce the prevlous control declslon 
meet,ng (due to the recent change from SWBs to 55-gallon drums as the primarywaste conlalner. increased 
understanding in how operatlons will be condueled in and between the interfm storage facilny [ISF) and waste 
packaging system (WPS). and as a result of discussions between myself and Nick regarding Ihese scenarlos). 
However. the overall results as well as controls selected cy the control declslon team. did not cnange. The orlgtnat 
scenarlos that were discussed In the July 15th meeting were postulatmd to invoke a vehiclo fire engumng SWBs 
staged outs.de tne ISF. ImpacVdrop scenarios Involving SWBs stored inside the facility. and a flammable gas 
oeflagratlon lnsioe an SWB The risk blnning resuns (risk bin I for onsite loxicologlcal releases) lndlcated lhal TSR- 
level controls were requlred and the following controls were selected In the July 15th meeting: 
In summary, TSR-level safety management program controls that were selected for operation of the CH-TRUM 
fadlity are as follows: 
Type A compliant configuration of PSSD-compliant containers. thus reducing the frequency of 
transportation-raided slorage and handling accidents. 
SWBs. thus reducing the freqbency or consequences of transporlatlon-related storage and hendllng 
accldents 
Wade managemenl pogram - to ensure comp81ance to wasle paclcsglng requirements (e.9.. DOT, 
Fire protection program -to prevent or mligale fires inwbing CH-TRUM dried waste d m s  and 
As updated. the lransporlatlon-related storage and handling accident addresses large vehicle fuel fire, large vehicle 
mechanical impact, small vehicle lmpactldrop. and flammable gas deflagrallon accidents invoMg 55-gallon drums in 
and near the ISF. Tne updated scenarlos a5 developed to supprl the CH-TRUM PDSA and as they currently ex141 In 
RPP-13978, Technkel Basis fof the Transpo!tat@n-Re@ted Handling Repmsentatke Accklents end Associatsd 
Hazerdous Condffbns, Rev. 2 (dran). are outllned In the following excerpt from RPP-13978. Appendix C. [excerpt 
omnted] 
'CI.1Repreaentatlve Accidenk 
me transportation accident scenarlos are descrlbed In delall in Section 2.1.1 ol the main document. The C K  
TRUM representative accidents are summarked in thls section. 
The CH-TRUM lranspor(allon representatb accldent postulates (hat containers 0.e.. 55gallon drums or 
SWBs) nned wlth CH-TRUM waste are Involved In a Iransporlation-related storagemandllng accident. Wnhoul 
controls. thin scenarlo is postulated Io cause an uncontrolled release of radobgkal and loxicologlcal dried 
waste. Each scenarlo Is discussed below. 
SWBs and 55-gallon steel drums an? both approved packages for drled CKTRUM waste. Each 55-gallon 
drum (2.08E+02 L) is loaded to 85% of capacity (1.77EM2 L) lo allow room for horse-tailing of plastic liners. 
55-gallon drums can be packaged in SWBs (four drums per SWe) or stored on pallets (four dNmS per pallel). 
SWBs are used for packaging of non-compliant 55-gallon drums, but are expeded to make up less than 1% of 
the total number of conlainers handled and stored In the ISF. Therefore, Only 55-gallon drums are considered. 
E-5 
Page 128 of 168 of DA05056764 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
ReDns%ntMW la rae vellcle flre accldent. Hazardous CondHlons InvoMng fires (e.g.. vehlcle fires. range flres) 
enguMng waste containers were postulated. The representatlve Are accldent postulates that a transport 
vehicle or some other large vehicle collides Into the faclllty passing through the wall, and Impacting up to 128 
55-gallon dums (or an equhlent amount d waste stored In slmllar contalners) stored on pallets (stacked two 
high) inside the ISF. The impact ruptures the vehlcle fUel tank spllllng fuel. The presence of an lgnllion source 
Is assumed and a (he occurs. m e  tire engufs the waste drums resulting in a dried waste release Into the 
atmosphere. The scenarlo MARis 2 . 2 7 E m  L. 
Represented fire hazardous condltbns. Several additimal associated hazardous conditions that are 
represented and bounded by the fire representative accldent were Identified. some with dlllerent causes. 
These indude, vehicle fuellcombustible material fires involving one or mom (but less than 128) waste 
containers In CH-TRUM WPU or ISF facltitles (e.g., contalners stored lnslde. or staged adjacent to. the ISF: 
contalners lnslde the WPS IS0 contalner that are open during drum filling operations or lhose that are 
storedklaged inside thal structure, etc.). Also included, are vehicle fuel fire scenarios that occur subsequent 
to impact accidents during loadlng, unloading, and movement of dNmS from the WPS to the ISF. and from the 
ISF to the WPS In the event that dNmslSWBs requlre repackaging. 
ReDreSmMV0 la rae vehicle mecha nlcal imDaet accldent. Hazardous condltlons InvoMng mechanlcal Impact 
(e.g., vehicle collision, handling, dmp. crane accldents) to waste contalners were postulated. The mechanlcal 
impact representative accident assumes radlological and toxicological relsases as the resun of a transport 
vehicle or other large vehlcle colliding Into the facility, and impactlng contalners stored on pallets (stacked two 
high) inslde the ISF. Up to 128 waste dNmS (or an equivalent amount of waste in similar containers) we 
assumed to be involved In the postulated accident. Two of the 128 dNmS are assumed to overfilled to drum 
capacity (‘2.OaEM2 L) due to operator error. The remaining drums are assumed to be fllled to 85% of capacity 
(1.77Et03 L) in accodance Kith planned operations. 
A dam- ratlo (OR) of 0.1 was assumed as edaMished In SARAH (”F-8739) for mechanical release from 
low and high speed vehicle impact involving more than 29 drums. This value was developed based on test 
data. Slnce only PSSD-compliant contslners. which are DOT Type A contalners that are approved for use 
during cross-rlte transfers, are allowed to be moved from the WPS and placed in the ISF. assuming that 10% 
(damage ratio = 0.1) ofthe wade in the containers will be released during the impad is conservative. The 
accident is assumed to  cause a dried waste release into the atmosphere. The scenario MAR is 2.27E+04 L. 
Several additional associaied hazardous condition that are 
represented and bounded by the represenlatlve mechanlcal Impact accident were Identlfled, some wHh 
different causes. These include impactidrop invoking one or more (but less than 128) contalners dored 
lnslde, or staged adjacent to, the ISF. Also included, are lmpadldrop scenarios during loading, unioadlng. and 
movement of drums from the WPS to the ISF, and from the ISF to the WPS In the event that drumslSWBs 
require repackaging. 
Remsentatlve m m  able aas accident. The flammable gas deflagratlon scenario postulates that a 
deflagration inside a single 55-ganon occurs. m e  deflagration reteases the contents one drum assumed fo be 
85% flied. The container contents are disprsed to the atmosphere. The scenario MAR is 1.77EM2 L. 
Small vehlcle drODAmDect accident. A hazardous condition invoMng mechanical Impact or drop to one 56gal 
drum during storage and handling actIvNies (e.g., forklii or other small vehicle) in or near the ISF or during 
movement of a drum from the WPU to the ISF. or from the ISF to the WPS In the event that drums requlre 
repackaging, was postulated. The dNm is assumed to ba ovemlled to 100% of capacity due to operator error. 
A damage ratio of  1 is assumed. The accident is assumed to result in a release of dried waste to the 
atmosphere. The scenario MAR is 2.08E+02 L.” 
. .  
The results d t h e  frequency determination, consequence category selection. and tlsk bin assignments for the 
representative accldents and boundlng associated hazardous condnlons are summarized h Table C1 of RPP-13978 
(included below). 
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Table C1. Summary of Results for CH-TRUM Transportation-Related 
Storage and kndllng Accident R 
Postulated accldentmazarclour condltlon 
Reprmssntatlve large vehicle fire accident. Release of dried 
waste due to large vehkle fuel fire engulfing 128 drums stored 
lnslde the ISF. 
MAR = 2 . 2 7 E a  L. 
Representative large vehicle mechanical impact accident. 
Release of dried waste due to Iarqe vehicle lmpactina 128 - - 
drums at the ISF. 
MAR = 2.27E+04 L. 
Representative nanmnable gas accldent Release of dried 
waste due to flammable gas accumulation and &flagfation 
Inslde a 55-gallon drum. 
MAR 1.77E+02 L. 
Release of dried waste due io foMM or other Small vehicle 
impact or drop accident Invoking one 55gal drum during 
storage and handling activities in or near the ISF or during 
movement of a drum from the WPU Io the ISF. MAR = 
Notes: 
A = anllclpated. 
E l  
L = low. 
M = moderate. 
MAR = materlat at risk. 
SWB =standard waste box 
U =unlikely. 
I 2.08EM2 L. 
= localhed discharges d hazardous material. 
The risk bmning results obtained for the updated scenarios (risk bin for onsite toxicologlcal releases) Indicated that 
TSR-level controls are requ red. Since The updated scenarios were not substantlally different that those presented at 
the July 15th control declsion meeting. the controls selected at lnat meeting were consldered applicable to those 
scenatios. 
The new scenarto ldentmed by Nlck Barllo involves a vahcle fuel fire that causes weakcnlng and subsequent fdlure 
of thc structural supports far the ISF and collapse of the roof and supportlng Steel components. The result Is a 
comblned vehlcle fuel I mechanlcal lmpaci scenario that engulfs 128 drums In a whlcle fuel fire (the 128 dNm nm 
scenario Is unchangea). causes the roof to collapse. and lmpocts the remaining drums Stored in rho facility. The 
impact scenario uses the same aswmplions as the 128 drum Impact scenario. except that R is astuned to invoke 
the totat number of drums (6650) of waste estimated to be retrieved from the T-Farm SSTs and processed throLgn 
the CH-TRUM faclldy less the 128 drums involved In the fire scenario The total consequences for all receptors 
consists ofthe sum of me fire and impad Scenario ConseqLonces. The scenaroo MAR ,s 5.79E+05 L. 
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m e  prellmlnaty results of consequence calculations performed to assist In the assignment of consequences and In 
risk binning (shown in the fonowlng table) indicate that onsile rachologcal consequences are moderate (25 - 100 
remi. olTsRe radiological consequences are well below 1 rem. and ofkite toxicological consequences are "moderate" 
(SOF 21) Note thd the Individual nre and Impact scenarios separately have row' offsne toxlcolodcal consequences, 
but when summed. are "moderate '' 
I Estimated Conseauences of Combined Vehicle Fuel Fire I 
Dtum inpact itom stmcturai Collapse scenario 
I Radiological I 
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Updated rlsk blnnlng results lncluding those for the nefu representative scenarlo are shown h the foilowlng table 
(lrom RPP-13978. Appendo: C). 
table C1. Slnnmary of Results for CH-TRUM Transportatlon-RelateU 
Postulatlted acclclentlhazardous conditlon 
impact or drop accident involving one 55-gal drum during 
storage and handling activities in or near the ISF or during 
movement of a drum from the WPUto the LSF. 
Notes: 
A = antlclpated. 
E l  
L = low. 
M = moderate. 
MAR = rnateliat at risk. 
U =unlikely. 
= localhed discharges cf hazardous material. 
The rlsk binning results for the new scenario (risk bin I for omjte toxicological releases and risk bin I1 for omie  
toxicological releases) and existing scenarios (risk bin 1 for onslte toxicological releases) indicate that TSR-level 
conlrols are required. As before, these scenarios are simlar to those presented in the July 15. 2004 control declslon 
meeting. The results obtained prevlously and upon which the control decisions were prevlously made indicate that 
TSR-level controls are required. 
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For the comblned large vehlcle fir8 I mechanlcal Impact scenatlo. 8s wll as the remalnlng scenarlos thal were 
updated slnce the prevlous Control declslon meeting. NS&L recommends tne controls that were previously selected 
In the July 15.2004 control decision meeting (Le.. AC 5.7, Safety Management Program - wasle management 
program and fire protectlon program) for operatlon of the CKTRUM facllHy. 
If lhere are arm questions or Comments on enher of there recommendations. or If anyone receMng thls message 
feeh that addilonal control declslon meetings are necessary to finalize these results; please let m i  know and i 
meetlngwlll be scheduled. Unless such a request is received, the recommended controls wlll be added to the CH- 
lRUM PDSA currently being prepared. 
Thank you, 
Steve Kmlawski 
CHZM HILL 
Nuclear Safety & Licensfng 
(5091 373-1360 
Note 1: The a b w n  emsil discusses RPP13978. However, subsequent Io rendlng this email. a decision was 
reached by NS&L to develop a new technical bask document (RPP-25148) for the CKTRLJM transpottation 
accldent. Also note that the title of the accldent was changed in the new technical bask document from 
%ansportation-related shipping and handling accidents" to "waste container storage and handllng accidents. 
Note 2: The consequence calculatlon and rlsk Mnning results show In the above email underwent mlnor changes 
durlng NS&L Internal and peer revlews, and as a result, do not exactly match the results shown In RPP-25148. 
However, the results In lhls document (RPP-25148) are the tinal. technlcally verified results. 
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APPENDIX F 
SUPPORTING CALCULATIONS FOR THE DRIED WASTE RELEASE ACCIDENT 
AT THE CONTACT-HANDLED TRANSURANIC MIXED WASTE PACKAGING UNIT 
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APPENDIX F 
SUPPORTING CALCULATIONS FOR THE DRIED WASTE RELEASE ACCIDENT 
AT THE CONTACT-HANDLED TRANSURANIC MIXED WASTE PACKAGING UNIT 
F1.O INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a basis for the qualitative assessment of consequences 
assigned during the risk binning meetings. Consequences are calculated for the radiological and 
toxicological exposures resulting from a release of dry radioactive waste materials during 
Contact-Handled Transuranic Mixed (CH-TRUM) Waste Packaging Unit ( W U )  operations. 
The calculations for four basic scenarios are presented in this appendix. The scenarios involve a 
spill of the waste dryer contents from a height greater than 3 m, a spill of the waste dryer 
contents from a height less than 3 m, a spill of one 55-gal drum, and a failure of filtration. The 
bounding consequences of other dried waste release scenarios discussed in the main body of 
Appendix D, including the spill resulting from failure to have the drum in place and the failure 
caused by the fire collapsing the steel structure supporting the dryer, are the same as those for the 
spill from greater than 3 m. 
F2.0 ASSUMPTIONS 
In the accident scenario, solids are released to drop on the ground from a failure in the waste 
conveyance system. The release could occur at any point between the dryer and the 55-gal drum. 
The result is release of the dried material to the atmosphere. It is conservatively assumed that 
there is no confinement and the solids move as a fiee-flowing powder. 
Dried waste from the spill would become airborne by two mechanisms. The first is the material 
suspended in the airstream as the spill is occurring. The second is material that is picked up by 
air flowing over the heap of powder for some time foltowing the spill (entrainment and 
resuspension). 
The following assumptions were incorporated into the consequence analysis calculation: 
1. The bounding unit liter doses (ULD) documented in RPP-5924, Radiological Source 
Terms for Tank Farms Safety Analysis, Table E-l , for the CH-TRUM tanks are used for 
estimating radiological consequences. The 1 1  CH-'RUM tanks are listed in Table 2-1, 
along with the offsite ULD values for their waste. 
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Table F2-1. Unit Liter Doses for Contact- 
Handled Transuranic Mixed Waste Tanks 
from WP-5924. Rev. 4. 
I I WasteTank I Onsite ULD (SvL) 
I 241-B-201 I 1.200 I 
I 241-B-202 I 310 I 
I 241-B-203 I 310 I 
I 241-B-204 I 380 I 
241 -T-201 1,200 
241-T-202 
241 -T-203 
241-T-204 200 
241-T-110 
Note: 
Tank Farms Safety Annlysis, Rev. 4, CH2M HILL 
Hanford Group, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
RpP-5924,2003, Radiological Source Terms for 
2. It is assumed that the waste is dried to 0 wt% water. This is a conservative assumption 
since the process is designed to reduce moisture to approximately 10 wt%. As the 
moisture decreases the dried material becomes less granular and begins to plug up the 
system. Even though “sludge” is being transferred into the dryers, the waste contains a 
significant amount of liquid. The waste is assumed to be dried to 0% moisture to 
maximize the concentration factor due to evaporation. 
3. The sludge entering the dryer is assumed to contain 78 wt% water. This is the 
bounding amount of moisture found for the CH-TRUM tanks from the Best Basis 
Inventory (BBI) (TWINS Database queried December 1,2004). The bounding 
moisture is used to calculate the maximum concentration factor due to evaporation, as 
follows: 
Basis = 100 g of CH-TRUM waste solids at 78 wt% water 
This is the equivalent to 22 g dry solids and 78 g water. 
By volume: 
(78 g water) / (0.998 g/ml water) = 78 ml water 
(22 g solids) / (2.0 giml solids) = 11 ml solids 
where: 
0.998 giml water is the density of water at 20 ‘C (Weast 1981, CRC 
Handbook of Chemistry and Physics) 
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Dry L/h 
2.0 g/ml is the bounding density of all solids (BBI queried 
February 12,2004). 
Total volume before evaporation = 78 ml + 11 ml = 89 ml 
Total volume after evaporation = 11 ml 
Concentration factor = 89 ml / 11 ml = 8.1 
Waste Receipt Tanks Ventilation 
4. The material at risk is conservatively assumed to be a full dryer batch (6,120 L). The 
material in the dryer will consist of dried CH-TRUM solids. The dryer batch size is 
60% of the maximum waste dryer volume (1 0,200 L). 
6.52 10.’ 3.26 x 
5. The maximum release rate of the dryer is assumed to be one batch in 10 min. The 
duration of exposure for toxicological releases is 1 min. 
Condenser Off-Gas 
6. The duration of exposure to entrainment and resuspension is assumed to be 8 hr. 
4.52 i o 7  2.26 10” 
Additional assumptions that apply to the filtration failure analysis are: 
Dryer Module Ventilation 
7. The release rate due to the continuous unfiltered release following filtration failure is 
assumed to be proportional to the ventilation rate. 
0 0 
8. The design ventilation system throughputs for the nominal exhaust rate of 1,950 ft3/min 
are given in terms of kilograms per hour of dried material for the various modules in 
the system are shown below. The volumetric equivalents assuming the 2 g/ml (or kgL) 
density for the dried material are also shown. 
Table F2-2. Ventilation System Design Throughputs. 
Packaeine Module Ventilation 4.10 10” 2.05 
Total 4.10 x lo-’ 2.08 x 
9. For purposes of this analysis a maximum exhauster flow rate of 2,000 fi3/min was 
assumed and the throughputs were increased proportionally. 
10. The maximum loading on each HEPA filter is assumed to be 1 L of solids based on 
filter plugging (i.e. high AP and low flow rate). Studies of 2 ft by 2 fi standard HEPA 
filters under very high loading conditions (Response of HEPA Filters to Simulated 
Accident Conditions [Gregory et al. 19821) showed that plugging (defined to be a 50% 
flow rate reduction) occurred at loadings of less than 500 g (corresponding to about 
F-3 
Page 138 of 168 of DA05056764 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
0.5 L) of dry polystyrene-latex aerosol. Using a stearic acid aerosol, plugging occurred 
at a loading of 550 g corresponding to 0.56 L of dry solids. The 50% flow reduction 
corresponded to a filter AP of about 12 in. w.g. A filter AP of 10 in. w.g. was obtained 
at a lower loading of 400 g (0.41 L) of dry solids. Manufacturers generally do not 
guarantee the integrity of their filters above 10 in. w.g. For this reason, operating 
HEPA filters are never allowed to approach a AP of 10 in. w.g., but are limited to much 
less (Le., 5 to 6 in. w.g.). The assumed 1 L filter loading is therefore considered to be 
highly conservative. 
11. The total load of waste within the filter system (two prefilters, four HEPA filters, and 
one duct) subject to release is therefore assumed to be 5.2 HEPA loads or 5.2 L of dried 
solids equivalent to 42.2 L of reference wet sludge. 
F3.0 METHODOLOGY 
F3.1 APPROACH TO ANALYSIS 
Radiological dose exposure consequences are calculated consistent with the methodology 
documented in WP-13482, Atmospheric Dispersion Coeflcients and Radiological and 
Toxicological Exposure Methodology for Use in Tank Farms. The onsite dose (Equation F-1) is 
given by: 
Dose = (Q, released)& /Q?(BR)(ULD, onsite) (F-1) 
where: 
Dose = inhalation dose to the onsite receptor, Sv 
Q, released 
x/er = atmospheric dispersion coefficient, s/m3 
BR = breathing rate, m3/s 
ULD, onsite 
= liters of respirable material released to the environment, L 
= dose per unit liter of material inhaled as aerosols, Sv/L. 
The toxicological consequences were calculated per the methodoIogy established in RPP- 13482 
for toxicological releases. Toxicological consequences are calculated either with a puff release 
model or a continuous release model depending on the duration of the release. The puff release 
model is used for onsite releases with durations < 3.7 sec, and for offsite releases with durations 
< 439 sec (RPP-13482). The events considered in this appendix are modeled as continuous 
releases. For a continuous release, the toxicological consequence (Equation F-2) is given by: 
Consequence = (Qh) (x/Q 3 (SOF Multiplier) (F-2) 
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where: 
Consequence 
Q 
t = release time, sec 
x/e ' 
SOF Multiplier = sum of fractions multiplier, unitless. 
= final sum of fractions value, unitless 
= release to the environment, m3 
= atmospheric dispersion coefficient, s/m3 
Determining the quantity of respirable material released to the environment requires knowledge 
of the volume that is affected and is provided in Equation F-3: 
Source Term (Q) =(MAR)(DR)(ARF,)(RF) (F-3) 
where: 
= source term,L 
= material at risk, L MAR 
DR = damage ratio = I* 
ARF = airborne release fraction 
RF = respirable fraction (not applicable to toxicological consequences). 
*Note: The damage ratio is not used for the scenarios in this appendix so a value of 1 
e 
is applied. 
F3.2 VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
No computer codes have been used to develop the accident analysis results documented in this 
appendix; therefore, software verification and validation is not required or provided. 
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F4.0 INPUT DATA 
The input data used are as follows: 
1. The onsite ULD that bounds the tanks to be processed by the WPU is taken from 
RPP-5924: 
Waste T w e  ULD ISvIL) Basis Tank Waste T m  
SST Solid 1200 241-B-201 Sludge 
2. Sum of fractions (SOF) multipliers that bound the tanks to be processed by the WPU are 
taken from RPP-8369, Chemical Source Terms for Tank Farms Safety Analyses: 
Waste Twe  TEEL-1 Basis Tank TEEL-2 Basis Tank TEEL-3 Basis Tank 
SST Solid 1.71 x I O 9  241-B-203 5 . 6 0 ~  10’ 241-B-203 3 . 3 9 ~  10’ 241-T-202 
3. The breathing rate is 3.33 x IO4 m3/sec (WP-5924). 
4. The bounding airborne release fraction (ARF) for spills of cohesionless powders from 
heights greater than 3 m. 
2 x 0.1064 x x H 2 3 7  
AM, = I 02 
P B P  
where: 
AFWB =bounding airborne release fraction 
Mo 
H = spill height, m 
pep 
= mass of powder spilled, kg 
= bulk density of powder, kg/m3. 
This AFG is to be compared to the ARF x RF (respirable fraction) combination of 
2 x 10” x 0.3 (6  x lo4) given in DOE-HDBK-3010-94, Airborne Release 
FractiondRates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities, for spills of 
cohesionless powders from heights of less than 3 m. The greater of the two values should 
be used. 
The DOE handbook does not indicate a RF value to be used with the ARF calculated 
above. Therefore, it is assumed that the RF for this case is 1 .O, because the comparison 
the handbook asks for is against an ARF x RF combination. 
5. The ARF is 2 x 
than 3 m (DOE-HDBK-3010-94). 
for free-fall spill of cohesionless powders with a fall distance of less 
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6 .  The RF (used only for calculating radiological consequences) i s  0.3 for a free-fall spill of 
a cohesionless powder with a fall distance of less than 3 m (DOE-HDBK-3010-94). 
7. The airborne release rate (ARR) for aerodynamic entrainment and resuspension of a 
homogeneous bed of powder exposed to ambient conditions is 4 x 10'' h i '  
(DOE-HDBK-3010-94). 
8. The RF (used only for radiological consequences) is 1.0 for aerodynamic entrainment and 
resuspension of a homogeneous bed of powder exposed to ambient conditions 
(DOE-HDBK-3010-94). 
9. The integrated atmospheric dispersion coefficients for the initial spill are 3.28 x s/m3 
and 2.22 x 
95'h percentile overall x /Qs  provided in RPP-13482, Tables 2-4 and 2-5. The appropriate 
x / Q s  for use with the resuspension and entrainment portion of the release are the 8-hr 
95Ih percentile overall xIQ's, 5.58 x 
for the offsite receptor. The assumptions, input parameters, and derivation of these 
values are documented in RPP-13482. 
s/m3 for the onsite and offsite receptors, respectively. These are the 1-hr 
s/m3 for the onsite receptor, and 7.90 x s/m3 
F5.0 CALCULATIONS 
F5.1 DRIED WASTE SPILL FROM GREATER THAN 3 M 
F5.1.1 Calculation of Airborne Release Fraction 
As stated in Section B4.0, Item 4, the bounding ARF for a spill of a cohesionless powder from a 
height greater than 3 m is a function of the mass spilled and the spill height. A breach of the 
dryer could occur at any height above its bottom. However, as the breach gets higher, there will 
be less dried waste above the breach available to leak out. A parametric calculation was 
performed to assess the height at which the maximum airborne release would be expected. 
The waste dryer is a horizontal cylinder. To calculate the volume above a breach as a function of 
the height of the breach above the dryer bottom, the cross-sectional area of the waste dryer that is 
above the breach is multiplied by the length, 5. I m, of the waste dryer. 
When the breach is above the middle of the tank, the formula for the cross-sectional area above it 
is the formula for a circular segment: 
For: x s r  
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Materlal at Risk Material at Risk Airborne Release 
(L) 
ARF. 
(Spill Volume in t) (Mu in kg) 
0 0 0 0 
209 334 0.019 4.00 
1,018 1,630 0.023 23 
1,828 2,925 0.0233 43 
When the breach is below the midpoint of the tank, the formula for the waste above the breach 
is: 
6.1 
6 
5.9 
and 
2,625 4,200 0.024 62 
3,395 5,432 0.023 80 
4.124 6.599 0.023 95 
For: x > r 
5.8 
5.7 
5.6 
5.5 
where: 
r = the radius of the dryer cross section, 0.8 m 
x = the vertical distance from the dryer top to the plane of the breach, m 
x' = the vertical distance from the dryer bottom to the plane of the breach, m. 
The fill level for the dryer when it is 60% full (6,120 L) is 0.93 m above the bottom of the tank. 
Therefore, a breach above that level will not result in a release o f  dried material. Table FS-1 
shows the results of calculating the volume and mass of waste above a series of assumed breach 
heights, the ARF, and the resulting volume of airborne dried waste released. 
4,795 7,671 0.023 108 
5,383 8,612 0.022 119 
5,853 9,365 0.02 1 125 
6,118 9.790 0.020 126 
I 
Table F5-1. Evaluation of Maximum Airborne Release as a 
Function of Powder S ~ i l l  Height. 
Notes: 
6.4 m above grade. 
or 1,600 kg/m3. 
The bottom of the CH-TRUM dryer i s  at 5.5 m above grade; the fill height of 6,120 L is at 
Assumes a perfect horizontal cylinder dryer shape and dried waste bulk density, pep, of 1.6 kg/L 
ARF = airborne release fraction. 
CH-TRUM = Contact-Handled Transuranic Mixed (Waste). 
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As shown in Table F5-1, the maximum airborne release would be 126 L of dried waste spilled 
from a breach at the bottom of the waste dryer. 
F5.1.2 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
As stated in Section F3.1, the onsite dose for a free-fall spill of cohesionless powder is found 
using the methodology in RPP-13482. The onsite dose is given by Equation F-1 : 
Dsp,if = (Q, released)& /Q3 (BR)(ULD) 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= M R x D R x A R F x R F  
= (6,120 L)(1)(0.020)(1.0) 
= 126L 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x s/m3 
= 3.33 x IO+ m3/s 
= (onsite ULD before drying) (Concentration factor) 
= (1,200 Sv/L)(8.1) 
= 9,720 Sv/L. 
XIQ’ 
BR = Breathing rate 
ULD 
The onsite dose for free-fall spills is: 
Dspi,, = (126 L)(3.28 x lo-* s/m3)(3.33 x l o 4  m3/s)(9,720 SvL) 13 Sv 
The onsite dose for entrainment and resuspension can be found similarly using the ARR: 
Dmtminmem = (Q, released)& /QY(BWULD) 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= MAR x DR x ARR x RF x release time 
= (6,120 L)(1)(4 x lO”h-’)(l.O)(8 h) 
= 1.96L 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 5.58 x s/m3 
x/Q’ 
BR = Breathing rate 
U !  
= 3.33 m3/s 
= (onsite ULD before drying) (concentration factor) 
= (1,200 Sv/L)(8.1) 
= 9,720 Sv/L. 
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The onsite dose due to entrainment is: 
Dentrainmnenr = (1.96 L)(5.58 x lo3 s/m3)(3.33 x m3/s)(9,720 Sv/L) = 0.035 Sv 
The total onsite dose is the sum of the dose due to the free-fall spill and the entrainment from the 
unconfined powder: 
Dose = &pill + Denrrainmeni 
Dose = 13 Sv t 0.035 Sv = 13 = 1,300 rem 
F5.1.3 Toxicological Consequences 
F5.1.3.1 Onsite Toxicological Consequences 
As stated in Section F3. I the toxicological consequences for a free-fall spill of cohesionless 
powder are calculated per the methodology established in RPP-13482. The onsite toxicological 
consequences are determined by Equation F-2: 
Consequencespilr = (Q/i$ (x IQY(S0F A4ultipfier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment (m3/s) 
= (MAR x DR x A W ) A  
= (6,120 L)(1)(0.020)/600 s 
= 0.20 U S  (1 m3/1 x io3 L) = 2.0 x lo1 m3/s 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x s/m3 
= (TEEL-2 SOF) = 5.60 x 10' 
= (TEEL-3 SOF) = 3.39 x IO'. 
X/Q' 
SOF Multiplier= sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence for a spill (based on TEEL-2) is: 
Consequence = (2.0 x 10" m3/s)(3.28 x 10" s/m3)(5.60 x 10') = 3,800 
The onsite high toxicological consequence for a spill (based on TEEL-3) is: 
Consequence = (2.0 x l o 4  m3/s)(3.28 x 10' s/m3)(3.39 x 10') = 2,300 
The onsite consequence for entrainment and resuspension can be found similarly using the ARR: 
Consequence,n,minmen, = (Q/t)h IQY(S0F Multiplier) 
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where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment (m3/s) 
= MAR x DR x ARR x conversion factor 
= (6,120 L)(1)(4 x 10" hi'j(1 hr/3,600 s) 
= 6.8 x 
= onsite atniospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x lo2 s/m3 
= (TEEL-2 SOF) = 5.60 x lo8 
= (TEEL-3 SOF) = 3.39 x IO8. 
Us = 6.8 x 10- m3/s 
x/Q' 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence for entrainment (based on TEEL-2) is: 
8 3  Consequence = (6.8 x 10' m /s)(3.28 x s/m3)(5.60 x IO') = 1.25 
The onsite high toxicological consequence for entrainment (based on TEEL-3) is: 
8 3  Consequence = (6.8 x 10- m /s)(3.28 x IO-* s/m3)(3.39 x lo8) = 0.076 
The overall onsite toxicological consequences can be found by summing the contribution of the 
Free-fall spill with the subsequent entrainment and resuspension. 
The total onsite moderate toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-2) is: 
Consequence = 3,800 + 1.25 = 3,800 
The total onsite high toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-3) is: 
Consequence = 2,300 + 0.076 = 2,300. 
F5.1.3.2 Offsite Toxicological Consequences 
The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Consequence = (Q/t)& lQ3(;c;OF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment (m3/s) 
= (MAR x DR x ARF)It 
= (6,120 L)(1)(0.020)/600 s 
= offsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 x s/m3 
= 0.20 L / ~  = 2.0 m3/s 
X / e ,  
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SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless 
= (TEEL-1 SOF) = 1.71 x IO’ 
= (TEEL-2 SOF) = 5.60 x 10’. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence for a spill (based on TEEL-1) is: 
m3/s)(2.22 x Consequence = (2.0 x s/m3)(1.71 x lo9) = 7.9 
The offsite high toxicological consequence for a spill (based on TEEL-2) is: 
Consequence = (2.0 x IO“ m3/s)(2.22 x 10” s/m3)(5.60 x IO8) = 2.6 
The offsite consequence for entrainment and resuspension can be found similarly using the ARR: 
Consequencee,,min,ne,l = (Qhj(X /Qy(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = release to the environment (m3/s) 
= MAR x DR x ARR x conversion factor 
= (6,120 L)(1)(4 x l o5  hr-’)(l hr/3,600 s) 
= 6.8 x IO-’ Us = 6.8 x 
= offsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 x io-’ s/m3 
m3/s 
XK?‘ 
SOF Multiplier= sum-of-ftactions multiplier, unitless 
= (TEEL-I SOF) = 1.71 x io9 
= (TEEL-2 SOF) = 5.60 x IO’. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence for entrainment (based on TEEL-1) is: 
8 3  Consequence = (6.8 x 10- m /s)(2.22 x lo-’ s/m3)(l.71 x IO9) = 2.6 x 
The offsite high toxicological consequence for entrainment (based on TEEL-2) is: 
m3/s)(2.22 x s/m3) (5.60 x 10’) = 8.4 x lo4 Consequence = (6.8 x 
The overall offsite toxicological consequences can be found by summing the contribution of the 
free-fall spill with the subsequent entrainment and resuspension. 
The total offsite moderate toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-1) is: 
Consequence = 7.9 + 2.6 x lo5 = 7.9 
The total offsite high toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-2) is: 
Consequence = 2.6 + 8.4 x lo4 = 2.6 
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The consequences are also presented in Section F6.0, Tables F6-1 and F6-2. 
F5.2 SPILL FROM LESS THAN 3 M 
F5.2.1 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
As stated in Section F3.1, the onsite dose for a free-fall spill of cohesionless powder is found 
using the methodology in RPP-13482. The onsite dose is given by Equation F-1: 
DSp;ll = (Q, reIeased)(K/Q3(BR)(ULD) 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= MAR x DR x ARFx RF 
= (6,120 L)(1)(2 x 10-3)(0.3) 
= 3.7 L 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient XIQ' 
BR = breathing rate 
ULD 
3.28 x lo2 drn3 
= 3.33 x m3/s 
= (onsite ULD before drying) (concentration factor) 
= (1,200 Sv/L)(8.1) 
= 9,720 Sv/L. 
The onsite dose for free-fall spills is: 
Dspjrr = (3.7 L)( 3.28 x lo-* dm'l(3.33 x m3/s)(9,720 Sv/L) = 0.39 Sv 
The onsite dose for entrainment and resuspension is 0.035 Sv, as calculated in Section F5.1.2. 
The total onsite dose i s  the sum of the dose due to the free-fall spill and the entrainment from the 
unconfined powder: 
Dose = Dsp;it + Denrrninrnenr 
Dose = 0.39 Sv + 0.035 Sv = 0.42 = 42 rem 
F5.2.2 Toxicological Consequences 
F5.2.2.1 Ousite Toxicological Consequences 
As stated in Section 3.1 the toxicological consequences for a free-fall spill of cohesionless 
powder are calculated per the methodology established in WP-13482. The onsite toxicological 
consequences are determined by Equation F-2: 
Consequence,jll = (Q/f)(K /QY(SOF Multiplier) 
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where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment (m3/s) 
= (MAR x DR x ARF)/t 
= (6,120 L)(l)( 2 x 10”)/600 s 
= 2.0 x 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x lo-* s/m3 
= (TEEL-2 SOF) = 5.60 x 10’ 
= (TEEL-3 SOF) = 3.39 x IO*. 
L/S = 2.0 x 10” m3/s 
x/Q’ 
SOF Multiplier= sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence for a spill (based on TEEL-2) is: 
5 3  Consequence = (2.0 x 10- m /s)(3.28 x IO-’ s/m3)(5.60 x lo8) = 380 
The onsite high toxicological consequence for a spill (based on TEEL-3) is: 
m3/s)(3.28 x IO-* s/m3)(3.39 x 10’) = 230 Consequence = (2.0 x 
The onsite toxicological consequence for entrainment and resuspension was calculated in 
Section F5.1.3.1. The onsite moderate toxicological consequence for entrainment (based on 
TEEL-2) is 1.25. The onsite high toxicotogical consequence for entrainment (based on TEEL-3) 
is 0.076. 
The overall onsite toxicological consequences can be found by summing the contribution of the 
free-fall spill with the subsequent entrainment and resuspension. 
The total onsite moderate toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-2) is: 
Consequence = 380 + 1.25 = 380 
The total onsite high toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-3) is: 
Consequence = 230 4 0.076 = 230 
F5.2.2.2 Offsite Toxicological Consequences 
The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Consequence = (Q/O& /QY (SOF MuItipIier) 
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where: 
Consequence 
Q/t 
= final s u m  of fractions value, unitless 
= rate of release to the environment (m3/s) 
= (MAR x DR x A W ) A  
= (6,120 L)(1)(2 x 10”)/600 s 
= 2.0 x 
= offsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 x 10-~ s/m3 
U S  = 2.0 x IO-’ m3/s 
x/Q‘ 
SOF Multiplier= sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless 
= (TEEL-1 SOF) = 1.71 x io9 
= (TEEL-2 SOF) = 5.60 x 10’. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence for a spill (based on TEEL-I) is: 
Consequence = (2.0 x IO-’ m3/s)(2.22 x IO” s/m3)(1.71 x lo9) = 0.77 
The offsite high toxicological consequence for a spill (based on TEEL-2) is: 
Consequence = (2.0 x 10’’ m3/s)(2.22 x 10” s/m3)(5.60 x 10’) = 0.25 
The offsite consequence for entrainment and resuspension were calculated in Section F5.1.3.2. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence for entrainment (based on TEEL-I) is 2.6 x 
The offsite high toxicological consequence for entrainment (based on TEEL-2) is 8.4 x 
The overall offsite toxicological consequences can be found by summing the contribution of the 
free-fall spill with the subsequent entrainment and resuspension. 
The total offsite moderate toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-1) is: 
Consequence = 0.77 + 2.6 x lo5 = 0.78 
The total offsite high toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-2) is: 
Consequence = 0.25 + 8.4 x 
SPILL OF A SINGLE DRUM 
= 0.26 
F5.3 
F5.3.1 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
As stated in Section F3.1, the onsite dose for a free-fall spill of cohesionless powder is found 
using the methodology in RPP-13482. The onsite dose is given by Equation F-1: 
Dspia = (Q, releaseqk /QI)(BR)(ULD) 
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where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= MARxDRxARFxRF 
= (208 L)(1)(2 x 10”)(0.3) 
= 0.125 L 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x lo2  s/m3 
= breathing rate 
= 3.33 x 10 m /s 
= (onsite ULD before drying) (concentration factor) 
= (1,200 Sv/L)(8.1) 
= 9.720 SvIL. 
x/Q’ 
BR 
ULD 
- 4 3  
The onsite dose for free-fall spills is: 
DSpi1~= (0.125 L)(3.28 x l o 2  s/m3)(3.33 x IO4 m3/s)(9,720 SvIL) = 0.013 Sv 
The onsite dose for entrainment and resuspension can be found similarly using the ARR: 
Denti-inmrnr = (Q, released/(X /QI)(BRWLD) 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= MAR x DR x ARR n RF x release time 
= (208 L)( 1)(4 x 1 0-5 h’)( 1.0)(8 h) 
= 0.066 L 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 5.58 x 10” s/m3 
x/Q’ 
BR = breathing rate 
ULD 
= 3.33 1 0 - ~ ~ ~ / ~  
= (onsite ULD before drying) (concentration factor) 
= (1,200 Sv/L)(8.1) 
= 9,720 Sv/L. 
The onsite dose due to entrainment is: 
4 3  D,,,.oi,,menr = (0.066 L)(5.58 x 10” s/m3)(3.33 x 10 m /s)(9,720 SvL) = 1.2 x Sv 
The total onsite dose is the s u m  of the dose due to the free-fall spill and the entrainment from the 
unconfined powder: 
Dose = Dspill * Dentrninment 
Dose = 0.013 Sv + 1.2 x Sv = 0.014 = 1.4 rem 
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F5.3.2 Toxicological Consequences 
F5.3.2.1 Onsite Toxicological Consequences 
As stated in Section F3.1 the toxicological consequences for a free-fall spill of cohesionless 
powder are calculated per the methodology established in RPP-13482, The onsite toxicological 
consequences are determined by Equation F-2: 
Consequencespill = (Q/t)k /Qy(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
= rate of release to the environment (m3/s) 
= (MAR x DR x ARF)/t 
= (208 L)(1)(2 x 103)/60 s 
= 6.9 x L/s = 6.9 x 10- m /s 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x s/m3 
= (TEEL-2 SOF) = 5.60 x 10' 
= (TEEL-3 SOF) = 3.39 x 10'. 
Q/l 
6 3  
x/Q' 
SOF Multiplier= sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence for a spill (based on TEEL-2) is: 
Consequence = (6.9 x I O 6  m3/s)(3.28 x 10.' s/m3)(5.60 x I d )  = 130 
The onsite high toxicological consequence for a spill (based on TEEL-3) is: 
m3/s)(3.28 x IO-' s/m3)(3.39 x lo8) = 77 Consequence = (6.9 x 
The onsite consequence for entrainment and resuspension can be found similarly using the ARR: 
Consequence,,,minn,~~, = (Q/lj(x /Qy(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment (m3/s) 
= MAR x DR x ARR x conversion factor 
= (208 L)(1)(4 x l o 5  hr-')(l hr/3,600 s) 
= 2.3 x 10" Us = 2.3 x 10- m /s 
= onsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x IOA2 sim' 
= (TEEL-2 SOF) = 5.60 x 10' 
= (TEEL-3 SOF) = 3.39 x 10'. 
9 3  
x/Q' 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless 
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The onsite moderate toxicological consequence for entrainment (based on TEEL-2) is: 
Consequence = (2.3 x lo-’ m3/s)(3.28 x 10” s/m3)(5.60 x IO’) = 0.042 
The onsite high toxicological consequence for entrainment (based on TEEL-3) is: 
Consequence = (2.3 x lo-’ m3/s)(3.28 x lo-’ s/m3)(3.39 x IO’) = 0.026 
The overall onsite toxicological consequences can be found by summing the contribution of the 
free-fall spill with the subsequent entrainment and resuspension. 
The total onsite moderate toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-2) is: 
Consequence = 130 + 0.042 = 130 
The total onsite high toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-3) is: 
Consequence = 77 + 0.026 = 77 
F5.3.2.2 Offsite Toxicological Consequences 
The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Consequence = (@oh /Ql)(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence 
Q/f 
= final sum of fractions value, unitless 
= rate of release to the environment (m3/s) 
= (MAR x DR x ARF)/t 
= (208 L)(1)(2 x 10”)/60 s 
= 6.9 x 10” L/s = 6.9 x 10- m /s 
= offsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 x sim3 
= (TEEL-1 SOF) = 1.71 x lo9 
= (TEEL-2 SOF) = 5.60 x 10’. 
6 3  
x/Q’ 
SOF Multiplier= sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence for a spill (based on TEEGI) is: 
6 3  Consequence = (6.9 x 10- m /s)(2.22 x lo-’ s/m3)(1.71 x lo’) = 0.26 
The offsite consequence for entrainment and resuspension can be found similarly using the ARR: 
Consequence,nwin,,r = (Q/o (x /Q3 (SOF Multiplier) 
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where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = release to the environment (m3/s) 
= MAR x DR x ARR x conversion factor 
= (208 L)( 1)(4 x K')( 1 hr/3,600 s) 
= 2.3 x L/s = 2.3 x 10- m /s 
= offsite atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 x 10.~ s/m3 
= (TEEL-I SOF) = 1.71 x lo9 
= (TEEL-2 SOF) = 5.60 x IO8. 
9 3  
x/Q' 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence for entrainment (based on TEEL-1) is: 
9 3  Consequence = (2.3 x 10- m /s)(2.22 x s/rn3)(l.71 x IO9) = 8.8 x lo5 
The overall offsite toxicological consequences can be found by summing the contribution of the 
free-fall spiIl with the subsequent entrainment and resuspension. 
The total offsite moderate toxicological consequence (based on TEEL-1) is: 
Consequence = 0.26 + 8.8 x = 0.26 
F5.4 Filtration Failures 
Filtration failure scenarios considered are: 
0 High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter failure due to high temperature 
HEPA filter failure due to high pressure 
Leakage around HEPA filters due to maintenance failure, misaligned filter, or damage to 
ductwork. 
The following assumptions and input data apply to the filter failure scenarios: 
0 The exhaust HEPA filter loading for the CH-TRUM Off-Gas Treatment System (OGTS) 
is 1 L of dried waste based on filter plugging data. Prefilters are assumed to be loaded 
with 10% of the maximum waste on a HEPA filter. 
0 Both first and second stage HEPA filters, prefilters, and the activated carbon filter are 
assumed to have a high waste loading and are assumed to be involved in a filter failure 
accident. 
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For purposes of estimating toxicological release rates, the filter releases from the over 
pressure event are assumed to be complete in less than 1 min. 
For purposes of estimating toxicological release rates, the filter releases from the over 
temperature event are assumed to occur over a period of 15 min. 
Release fractions from HEPA filters failed by over pressure or high temperature events 
are 2 x and 1 x lo4, respectively as recommended in DOE-HDBK-3010-94. 
F5.4.1 Eight-Hour Unfiltered Release 
The dust generated by the process is assumed to be equal to the nominal throughput rate given as 
4.2 x lo” kg/h of dried sludge with a bulk density of 2.0 kg/L. On a volumetric basis the dust 
flow rate is then 0.0021 L/h or 5.8 x 10- m /s. The 8-hr release would then be 0.017 L. For 
purposes of this analysis it is assumed that the dust flow rate into the filters is proportional to the 
air flow rate. 
10 3 
F5.4.1.1 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
The resuiting radiological dose due to the 8-hr continuous releases From the OGTS with no 
filtration is shown below. 
The onsite dose is found using the methodology in RPP-13482. 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= 0.017L 
x/Q)bnsite = onsite 8-hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 5.58 x s/m3 
BR = breathing rate 
ULD,,,i,e = onsite ULD 
= 3.33 1 0 - ~ ~ ~ / ~  
= (1,200 x 8.1) SV/L. 
The dose is calculated as follows: 
5.58 x 1 0-3 s 3.33 x 1 0-4 m3 1200Sv 1 OOrem 0.017L x X X- x 8.1 x = 0.03lrem 
m3 S L s v  
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Receptor 
Onsite 
8-Hr Release 
Release Dose 
(L) (W (rem) 
0.017 3.1 x 10" 0.03 1 
F5.4.12 Toxicological Consequences 
The toxicological consequences are calculated per the methodology established in RPP-I 3482. 
Onsite Consequence = (Q/O(y/Qronsire)(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment, 5.8 x lo-'' m3/s 
x/Q' = onsite 1 -hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier is: 
Onsite Consequence(moderate) = (5.8 x lo-'' m3/s)(3.28 x s/m3)(5.6 x lo8) = 0.01 1 
where: 
5.6 x 10' = TEEL-2 SOF multiplier 
The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Consequence = (Q/g(y/QY(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment, 5.8 x 10"' m3/s 
XIQ' = offsite 1 -hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 x 10'~ s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-I SOF multiplier calculated 
in Section F6.1, is: 
Ofsite Consequence(moderute) = (5.8 x 1W'O m3/s)(2.22 x IO-' s/m3)(l.7 x IO9) = 2.2 x 
where: 
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Onsite 
Offsite 
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Release Rate (Us) Sum of Fractions 
0.01 1 (moderate) 
--- (high) 
2.2 x I O s  (moderate) 
--- (high) 
5.8 IO-' 
1 . 7 ~  io9 = TEEL-1 SOF multiplier 
The resulting SOFs for the continuous unfiltered release are shown in Table F5-4. 
Table F5-4. Toxicological Sum of Fractions Relative to the Consequence Class 
Thresholds for a Continuous Unfiltered Release. 
F5.4.2 HEPA Filter Failure Due to High Temperature 
The HEPA filter release fraction for the high temperature filter failure scenario is assumed to be 
1 x 
fraction is assumed to also apply to the prefilter and the material in the upstream filtration 
system. 
based on recommendations in Section 5.4.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94. This release 
F5.4.2.1 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
The onsite dose for the release from the filter due to high temperature is found using the 
methodology in RPP-13482: 
D = (Q, releasedj(x/c23(BRj(ULDj 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirable material released to the environment (L) 
= M A R x D R x A R F x R F  
= (5.2 ~ ) ( i ) ( i  10-~)(1) 
= 5.2 x 1 0 4 ~  
x/Q' 
BR = breathing rate 
ULD = onsite ULD 
= onsite 1-hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x 10.' s/m3 
= 3.33 x lo4 m3/s 
= Sludge ULD x Concentration Factor 
= (1200 Sv/L)(8.1). 
1 OOrem 5.2X1W4LX X X- x8.1x = 5.5xlO-'vern 3.28 x 1 0-2 s 3.33 x 1 0-4 rn ' 1 200Sv 
m3 S L sv 
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The scenario includes 8-hr unfiltered release through the failed filters. Table F5-3 shows the 
radiological doses due to the 8-hr continuous release from the OGTS with no filtration. The 
total consequence for the filter failure due to high temperature is the sum of the release from the 
filters and the 8-hr continuous unfiltered release. 
Dt,,,l = 0.031 rem + 5.5 x rem = 0.36 rem 
F5.4.2.2 Toxicological Consequences 
In the case of toxicological exposures, the maximum concentration at the receptor is the 
operative parameter so that the 1-hr dQ' (Le., without plume meander) is used. The release rate 
Q is given in terms of liters of dried waste released per second averaged over a 15-min release 
time. The release rate must be divided by 1,000 L/m3 to make the units compatible with the X I Q .  
Consistent with previous filtration failure analyses for tank farms facilities, it is assumed that the 
release from the filter in the high temperature failure scenario requires at least 15 min so the 
release is averaged over 900 s (1 5 min). The combined case with both the filter release and the 
unfiltered release from the OGTS is also shown. It is assumed that both releases occur 
concurrently and are thus additive. 
The onsite toxicological consequences are determined: 
Onsite Consequence = (Qt) h/Q'omile)(SUF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/l = rate of release to the environment 
= (5.2 L)(1 x 104)/(900 s)(l,OOO Urn3) = 5.8 x 10'' m3/s 
??Q' = Onsite 1 -hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x 10.' s/m3 
SOF MultipZier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier is: 
IO 3 Onsite Consequence(moderate) = (5.8 x 10- m /s)(3.28 x s/m3)(5.6 x 10') = 0.011 
where: 
5.6 x 10' = TEEL-2 SOF multiplier 
It is assumed that both releases occur concurrently and are thus additive. The combined onsite 
moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier, from the high- 
temperature filter failure and the 8-hr continuous unfiltered release is: 
Combined Onsite Consequence(moderate) = 0.01 I + 0.01 1 = 0.022 
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The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Consequence = (Q/t)h/Q?(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment, 5.8 x lo-’’ m3/s 
x/e’ = offsite 1-hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 x 10” s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-1 SOF multiplier is: 
Offsite Consequence(m0derate) = (5.8 x 10.’’ m3/s)(2.22 x 10’ s/m3)(l.7 x lo9) = 2.2 x lo” 
where: 
1.7 x io9 = TEEL-1 SOF multiplier 
It is assumed that both releases occur concurrently and are thus additive. The combined onsite 
moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier, from the high- 
temperature filter failure and the 8-hr continuous unfiltered release is: 
Combined Ofsite Consequence(moderate) = 2.2 x lo-’ + 2.2 x lo-’ = 4.4 x lo’ 
F5.4.3 HEPA Filter Failure Due to High Pressure 
The filter release fraction for the high pressure failure scenario is assumed to be 2 x 
recommendations in Section 5.4.2.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94. This release fraction is assumed 
to also apply to the prefilter and the material in the upstream filtration system. 
based on 
F5.4.3.1 Onsite Radiological Consequences 
The onsite dose for the release from the filter due to high pressure is found using the 
methodology in RPP-13482: 
D = (Q, released)(X/e?(BR)(ULD) 
where: 
Q, released = liters of respirabIe material released to the environment (L) 
= MAR x DU x AUFxRF 
= (5.2 L)(1)(2 x 10-6)(1) 
= 1 . 0 ~  o - ~ L  
xIQ’ 
BR = breathing rate 
onsite 1 -hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x l o 2  s/m3 
= 3.33 x 10“ m3/s 
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ULD = onsite ULD 
= Sludge ULD x Concentration factor 
= (1,200 SV/L)(8.1). 
1 OOrem L O X  1 0 - ~  L x X X- x8.1x = 1 .I x I  rem 
m3 S L sv 
3 . 2 8 ~ 1 0 - ~ s  3 .33~10-~m’  1200Sv 
The scenario includes 8 hr unfiltered release through the failed filters. Table F5-3 shows the 
radiological doses due to the 8-hr continuous reIease from the OGTS with no filtration. The total 
consequence for the filter failure due to high temperature is the sum of the release from the filters 
and the 8-hr continuous unfiltered release. 
Dtotal = 0.03 1 rem + 1.1 x 1 0-4 rem = 0.03 1 rem 
F5.4.3.2 Toxicological Consequences 
Consistent with previous filtration failure analyses for tank farms facilities, it is assumed that the 
release from the filter in the high pressure failure scenario requires less than 1 min so the release 
is averaged over 60 s (1 min). It is assumed that the release from the filters and the 8-hr 
unfiltered release occur concurrently and are thus additive. 
The onsite toxicological consequences are determined: 
Onsite Consequence = (Q/t)(X/e’o,,i,)(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment 
= (5.2 L)(2 x 10-6)/(60 s)(l,OOO L/m3) = 1.7 x 10-”m3/s 
x/Q’ = onsite 1 -hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 3.28 x lo-’ s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The onsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier is: 
Onsite Cunsequence(moderate) = (1.7 x 10.’’ m31s)(3.28 x lo-’ s/m3)(5.6 x IO’) = 3.1 x l o 3  
where: 
5.6 x lo8 = TEEL-2 SOF multiplier 
It is assumed that both releases occur concurrently and are thus additive. The combined onsite 
moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier, from the high- 
pressure filter failure and the 8-hr continuous unfiltered release is: 
Combined Onsite Consequence(moderate) = 0.01 1 + 3.1 x 10” = 0.014 
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Case 
Dried waste spill from greater than 
3 m  
RPP-20725 REV 2 
Onsite radiological consequences 
High consequence 
guideline 
(rem) 
Moderate 
consequence 
guideline (rem) 
(rem) 
1,300 25 100 
Calculated dose 
The offsite toxicological consequences are determined similarly: 
Consequence = (Q/t)(X/eY(SOF Multiplier) 
where: 
Consequence = final sum of fractions value, unitless 
Q/t = rate of release to the environment, 1.7 x 1 O-'O m3/s 
x/Q' = offsite 1 -hr atmospheric dispersion coefficient 
= 2.22 x io5 s/m3 
SOF Multiplier = sum-of-fractions multiplier, unitless. 
The offsite moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-1 SOF multiplier is: 
Offsite C o ~ ~ e q u e ~ c ~ ~ ~ o d e r u ~ e ~  = (1.7 x lo-'' m3/s)(2.22 x s/m3)(1.7 x IO9) = 6.4 x 
where: 
1.1 io9 = TEEL-1 SOF multiplier 
It is assumed that both releases occur concurrently and are thus additive. The combined onsite 
moderate toxicological consequence, based on the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier, from the high- 
pressure filter failure and the 8-hr continuous unfiltered release is: 
Combined Offsite Consequence(moderate) =2.2 x + 6.4 x 10" = 2.8 x 
F6.0 RESULTS 
Tables F6-1 and F6-2 compare the accident consequences with the risk evaluation guidelines. 
Reviewing the consequences shows that the release of dry radioactive waste materials 
representative accident is above the onsite radiological guidelines for high consequences. Both 
onsite and offsite toxicological consequences are also above their respective high consequence 
guideline. 
Table F6-1. Summary of Onsite Radiological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Release of Dry Radioactive Waste Materials Accidents. 
I I I 42 25 100 Dried waste spill from less than I 3 m (dryer contents) 
I Soill of a sinele drum I 1.4 I 25 I 100 I 
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Case 
WP-20725 REV 2 
~ ~ ~ 
ToxicoIogical consequences 
Onsite Offsite 
consequence consequence consequence consequence 
SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF Guideline SOF Guideline 
Moderate High Moderate High 
Table F6-2. Summary of Toxicological Consequences Without Controls 
for the Release of Drv Radioactive Waste Materials Accidents. 
Dried waste spill from 
greater than 3 m 
Dried waste spill from 
less than 3 m (drver 
3,800 1 2,300 1 7.9 1 2.6 I 
1 380 1 230 1 0.78 1 -- 
Spill ofa single drum I 130 1 1 _ _ _  77 1 0.26 1 
Note: 
The applicable consequences of the filtration system failure scenarios for the CH-TRUM WPU 
with no credit for the OGTS are summarized in Table F6-3. 
SOF = sum of fractions. 
~ ~ 
Scenario Exposure Type Onsite Receptor Offsite Receptor 
Radiological Dose (rem) 0.037 NA 
(moderate) 0.022 4.4 High Temperature Filter Toxicological SOF 
Toxicological SOF 
failure (including 
unfiltered release) _ _ _  _-_ 
(high) 
Radiological Dose (rem) 0.03 1 NA 
0.014 2.8 x 10-5 High Pressure Filter Toxicological SOF Failure (including (moderate) 
unfiltered release) _ _ _  Toxicological SOF _ _ _  
(high) 
Table F6-3. Summary of Consequences of Ventilation System Failure Accidents for the 
Contact-Handled Transuranic Mixed Waste Packaging Unit. 
Radiological Dose (rem) 
Toxicological SOF 
(moderate) 
0.031 NA 
0.01 1 2.2 10'~ Continuous Unfiltered 
Release (no filter failure) 
-_- --_ I I Toxicological SOF Chi&) 
Notes: 
NA 
SOF 
= not applicable for this analysis. 
= sum of fractions relative to moderate consequences. 
The results in Table F6-3 show that the OGTS filtration failure scenarios result in low 
consequence radiological and toxicological exposure for all scenarios and all receptors. 
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No. 
I 
RPP-20725 REV 2 
Yes. No, 
U n h m r  
No' 
Issue 
Does the activity/event being planncdanalyzed require human interaction to 
successfully complete the activity or mitigate consequences of the event? 
APPENDIX G 
, 
- 
HUMAN FACTORS EVALUATION AND PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS FOR THE 
CONTACT-HANDLED TRANSURANIC MIXED WASTE PACKAGING UNIT 
Human Fac to r s  Evaluaiion Checklist. 
Hazard AIMIYSIS Title CH-TRUM Accidcnb 
Documented Safety 
Analysis Section Number. 
Chapter 3 ofthe Contact-HandlcdTransuranic Mixed W a l e  Processing Unil 
Prelimmary h u m e n l e d  Safely Analysls 
. .  
experienced toperform the actions'? 
Have the required actions been walked domr in the field lo verify execution wilhin the 
timc constraints identified in the hazard analysis? 
Have nhvsical obstacles that could mevent succesful comolction of the activitv been ' 
9 
If Ihe answer is No. go Io 1temNo. 23. Otherwsc ronlinue with llcm N o L ,  
-~ 1 _ _  Arc staffing levels adequatc to perform t h e - ~ t y ?  _I . - 
---- 
. ,  
removed or accounted for? 
Have work area environmental concern been identified and accounted for? I 
1 , I Arc the individuals reswnsible for the action adequately trained, qualified. and I 
 
I 
-... .. .... I. Y 
I succ;ssful complelion of the advi ty  as descnbed in the hazard analysis. Com&ete and document corrective 
Evaluaror: 
Mwannns K u m e r  a - 4  9-8-0s 
Print // Signade Date 
Peer Reviewer: A. R. Marchcse 
I No new or specific Technical Safety Requirernenlr (excluding Safety Management Programs) have been allocated 
for the activities bemg analyzed. In 0 t h  words. no specific operator actions are credited in the control allocation. 
Required activities and necessary mining and qualification requirements will be defined by the Safety Marugemor 
FVOgraIllS. 
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w a  
NS&L CHECJUlST FOR TECHNICAL PEER REVIEW 
Scope of Review (e&, document section or portion of calculation): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Previous reviews are complete and cover the analysis, up to the scope of this 
review, with no gaps. *&mmhw 
Problem is completely defined. *wm&~: 
Accident scenarios are develmed in a clear and logical manner. - 
*Expbma!im: 
Anal ical and technical approaches and results are reasonable and appropriate. 
( O J Q A P p  c riferion . 2.8) * ~ W H M :  
Necessary assum tions are reasonable, explicitly stated, and supported. {ORP 
QAPP criterion 12) *.cwamiiw 
Computer codes and data tiles are documented. 
*EIpl.M,i*": 
Data used in calculations are explicitly stated. 
*Gpknmlan: 
Rases for calculations, including assum tions and data, are consistent with the 
woooncd safetv hasis document (c.K.. t\eTank Farms Documented Safciv . I  
AtiiIysis). - ~ & n a m :  
Data were checked for consistency with original source information as applicable. 
(ORP %AFP criterion 2.9) *Erphmi*m: 
discussed. as avmovnale. /ORP OAPP rricenon 2.f 7) 
10. For bot qualitative q d  quantltative data, uncertainties are recognized and 
, .. . - 
*'Erpl..nEIiO": 
1 1. Mathematical derivations were checked including dimensiond consistency of 
results. (ORP QAPP rriferion 2.16) 
12. Models are a y p r i a t e  and wen used within th@r established range of validity or 
adequate justi ication was provided for use outside their established range of 
validity. * 4 b n a i o n :  
13. Spreadsheet results and all hand calculations were verified. 
14. c%%%?ons are sufficient1 detailed.such that,a technically qualified person can 
understand the analysis witiout requiring outside information. (ORP QAPP 
criterion 2.5) *.zw~l&": 
15. Software input is correct and consistent with the document reviewed. 
16. Software output is consistent with the input and with the results reported in the 
17. Software verification and validation are addressed adequately. (OW QAPP 
*Expbnmior: 
'Evknnl ion:  
document reviewed. * ~ + m ~ . t i ~ ;  
~ 
rrifcrron 2 6, -E+.MI. 
referenced Limiis,cnien~uidelinrs were checkcd awnst references (ORP 
18 Limits/critcria/guidelines a plied lo the analysis  result^ are appropnatc and 
QAPP criterion 2.9) *EX~IM&: 
*E.xpie"dlbn: 
- 
19. Safety margins are consistent with good engineering practices. 
20. Conclusions are consistent with analytical results and applicable limits 
21. Results and conclusions address all points in the purpose. (ORP QAPP crirerion 
*Expimuion: 
2.3 * ~ ~ n r l b * :  
22. AI I references cited in the text, figures, and tables are contained in the reference 
IlSt. * ~ o " , a l l w :  
23. Reference citations lex., title and number) arc consistent between the text callout 
and the reference I&. - 
.F%phn.ri.r: 
G-2 
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NS&L CHECKLIST FOR TECHNICAL PEER REVIEW 
Page 2 of2 
24. Only released (i.e., not draft) references are cited. (ORP QAPP criferion 2.1) 
25. Referenced documents are retrievable or otherwise available. 
26. The most recent version of each reference is cited, as appropriate. (ORP QAPP 
27. There are no duplicate citations in the reference list. 
28. Referenced documents are spelled out (title and number) the first time they are 
29, All acronyms are spelled out the first time they are used. 
30, The Table of Contents is correct. *-m.whm: 
31. All figure, table, and section caflouts are correct. 
32. Unit conversions are correct and consistent. 
33. The number of significant digits is appropriate and consistent. 
- w m m i o m  
Txpkmbm 
criterion 2. I )  * w w i i m :  
.cjpLNIb¶". 
Clled. .t+lart*e: 
*&br.r)M: 
*€Kpb"dO,: 
*Er,nl.nd;o".. 
- - .. . 
*5pbm,h:  
34. Chemical reactions are c o m t  and balanced. 
*En.I*nu;.n: 
35. All tables are formatted consistentty and are free of hlankcells. 
%xph".7liOn: 
36. The document is complete (pages, attachments, and appendices) and in the proper 
order. * ~ r p r . d ~  
37. The document is free of graphical mors. Only the section@) being reviewed 
was checked for typgrap%aI errors. * w e w i m :  
38. The tables are internally consistent. *wn&x 
39. The document was pr wed in accordance with HNF-2353, Section 4.3, 
Attachment B, "Calc%tion Note Format and Preparation Instructions." 
* W d w u o n :  
40. Impacted documents are appropriately identified in Blocks 7 and 25 of the 
Engineering Chenge Notice (form A-6003-563 .l). 
%rpf."ll,/m; 
41. If more than one Technical Peer Reviewer was designated for this document, an 
overall review of the entire document was rformed after resolution of all 
Technical Peer Review comments and conrmed that the document is self- 
consistent and mmplete . .~ia- i0~ 
Concurrence 
Reviewer (Printed Name and Signatwe) Date 
* If No is chosen, an explanation must be provided on this form. 
Additionu? explmation: 
G-3 
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